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ABSTRACT
The interplay between tax administration and legitimate expectation has been the subject of debate
and scholarship in many jurisdictions. Questions around how much discretion tax authorities
should be allowed and whether courts should uphold the (substantive) legitimate expectations of
taxpayers – by implication, bind the tax authority – when the tax authority reverses itself on a
guidance, promise, position, etc. feature prominently in this conundrum. In Nigeria, the disposition
of both the tax authority and the court appears to lean towards outright dismissal of legitimate
expectation. Put differently, it seems that the tax authority does not consider itself bound by its
previous position, perhaps, irrespective of the implications for the taxpayer. The court likewise
does not deem the tax authority bound, especially when that previous position appears to contradict
the relevant statute, hence no legitimate expectation. This thesis puts these assertions to the test,
in order to bring out better clarity on the subject. I argue that, as far as Nigeria is concerned, there
are both legal and policy bases for upholding or enforcing tax-based legitimate expectation.
Relying on Nigerian and English authorities, I discuss the possibilities of streamlining the
enforcement of tax-based legitimate expectation in Nigeria. I also discuss the various factors that
militate against the application of the doctrine. From a policy perspective, I argue that the tax
authority respecting/upholding its commitments to taxpayers, in appropriate cases, could be more
consistent with some important aspects of Nigeria’s National Tax Policy – such as fairness,
neutrality, certainty and administrability – and, perhaps, enhance the overall value base of
Nigeria’s tax system.

v

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED
AG – Attorney-General
AGF – Attorney-General of the Federation
CbCR – Country-by-Country Reporting
CIT – Companies Income Tax
CITA – Companies Income Tax Act
CJN – Chief Justice of Nigeria
FBIR – Federal Board of Inland Revenue
FHC – Federal High Court
FIRS – Federal Inland Revenue Service
FMF – Federal Ministry of Finance
JCA – Justice of the Court of Appeal
JSC – Justice of the Supreme Court
KB – King’s Bench
LFN – Laws of the Federation of Nigeria
LPELR – LawPavilion Electronic Law Reports
MAP – Mutual Agreement Procedure
MR – Master of the Rolls
NJR – Nigerian Juridical Review
NWLR – Nigerian Weekly Law Report
NSCC – Nigerian Supreme Court Cases
PPTA – Petroleum Profits Tax Act
SIRS – State Internal Revenue Service
TAT – Tax Appeal Tribunal
TLRN – Tax Law Reports of Nigeria
TPR – Transfer Pricing Regulations
UK – United Kingdom
UKSC – United Kingdom Supreme Court
US – United States (of America)
VAIDS – Voluntary Assets and Income Declaration Scheme
VAT – Value Added Tax
vi

VOARS – Voluntary Overseas Assets and Revenue Scheme
WLR – Weekly Law Reports

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My path on this academic journey has been so often lit by others. I owe a great deal to the selfless
commitment, intellectual impetus and kindness of my supervisor, Professor Brooks, who, even
before I was admitted to the Schulich School of Law LLM program, showed tremendous
enthusiasm towards my project and has gone on to supervise, mentor and encourage me to excel,
and opened up opportunities that positively impact my person. It is no surprise that I have often
been told: “you are so lucky,” whenever I identified my supervisor. I could not ask for better.
I am immensely grateful to Schulich School of Law for the opportunity to research here and for
the generous moral and material support that has made my work so much smoother than I
anticipated. I have encountered many great people at the Weldon Law Building, including my
second reader, Professor Colin Jackson, whose insightful review helped me further improve this
thesis. In no small way, I thank Dean Cameron, QC, Prof Guibault, Prof Devlin, Prof Akinkugbe,
especially, for their openness and mentorship and for graciously making so much of the School’s
resources available to me. I deeply appreciate the numerous amazing faculty staff who were always
eager to lend a hand to my many needs: Shannon, Danielle, Tiffany, Elizabeth, Darlene, Geordie
and, of course, the ever smiling, David Michels. In my heart, there are beautiful adjectives for
everyone, including my Sunday amateur football mates, my compatriots here: Wura, Bayo, Akin,
Sanni, and, of course, Unwana, who affords me the extra privilege of conversing in Nigerian pidgin
on the occasional Halifax bus ride.
We had some awesome times in class, and that is, in large part, thanks to the contributions of my
colleagues. I fondly remember Wozney who went the extra mile to show us some of the tasty stuff
of Atlantic Canada and even gave us a home-away-from-home Christmas experience.
Every researcher builds on the glory of others. I am grateful to the many authors whose works I
have had the benefit and privilege of utilizing. You have all enlightened and intrigued me.
My gratitude extends to Ifedayo, Ibukun, Gina Flores, Onyinye, Ezinne, Dr. Odinkonigbo, Dr.
Nwabachilli, Dr. Nwafor, Mr. Uwa, SAN, Mr. Hilary-Nwokonko, the management, my
colleagues, and friends at Streamsowers & Kohn. The constant love, support, and prayers that I
have so much enjoyed from my dear family – Okanga Snr, Margret, Alice, Hannah, Maryamada
and George – only blossomed during this venture. I thank my many friends at home and in the
diaspora, with whom I often conferred, for aiding my smooth transition.
It is impossible to produce an exhaustive list, but I stop here in pen only. Without you all, this
journey would not be the wonderful experience that it has been. Most importantly, I offer my
profound gratitude to God, the glorious and gracious, for making all this possible and for placing
in my path these awesome human beings and for setting the course for new horizons. Amidst the
madness of 2020, I have many reasons to be thankful.

viii

Chapter 1: Introduction
“Things as certain as death and taxes, can be more firmly believ’d.”1
1.1 Background
This thesis examines the question whether there are legal and policy bases or justifications for the
protection of tax-based legitimate expectations in Nigeria. In other words, the thesis examines the
feasibility of applying the common law principle of legitimate expectation to the exercise of tax
authority discretion in Nigeria. For some time, this issue has occupied the discussion space in many
common law jurisdictions but not so much in Nigeria. However, this research reveals that the
factors that make legitimate expectation important elsewhere also apply to Nigeria. Nigeria is
Africa’s largest economy, host to many local/foreign businesses/investors and home to an
increasingly robust body of tax laws, with diverse and complex obligations. Nigerian taxpayers
rely significantly on the tax authority for guidance on the implementation of the country’s tax laws.
Taxpayers encounter significant discomfort when they find that the tax authority is not reliable in
providing guidance to taxpayers, and in some cases seek the assistance of the court to ensure that
the tax authority acts “fairly.” I invest the pages of this paper exploring whether the doctrine of
legitimate expectation – a judicial remedy – fits the purpose of assuaging the strain of taxpayer
discomfort discussed here. I also look at how the tax authority’s approach to tax-based legitimate
expectation interacts with Nigeria’s tax policies considerations. I have identified five subquestions to guide the discussion. First, I analyze whether Nigerian jurisprudence recognizes the
doctrine of legitimate expectation as a remedy in tax cases. This clarification is necessary because
the perception in Nigeria seems to be that Nigerian courts have no interest in accepting the doctrine
as a protective remedy to taxpayers. Second, I venture into the normative and controversial debate

1

Daniel Defoe, The Political History of the Devil, 1726.
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on whether there should be judicial protection of tax-based legitimate expectation. My brief here
is to examine the usual arguments about the appropriateness of legitimate expectation. The usual
criticisms are that legitimate expectation undermines the public interest (because it risks reducing
the tax base), fetters administrative discretion, contravenes the rule of law or statutory limitation
and tramples on the cardinal principle of separation of powers. In a state like Nigeria, for instance,
where the rule of law and the doctrine of separation of powers are engrained in the constitutional
order, these considerations are sacrosanct. Would the court be unduly crossing the boundary by
granting relief to a person or taxpayer who seeks protection?2 Should the court fold its arms where
there are no remedies?
Third, I examine closely the ingredients that the court should consider in determining whether a
legitimate expectation has arisen and whether legitimate expectation ought to be protected in the
particular case. The ingredients that courts typically look at are: (1) prior disclosure by the
claimant; (2) a clear and unqualified representation; (3) communication to the claimant (or
“class”); and (4) detrimental reliance.3
Fourth, I examine what some scholars regard as the “underlying principle” of legitimate
expectation. Traditionally, the courts look at fairness, the prevention of abuse of power and good
administration as the values driving the protection of legitimate expectation. However, over the
years, scholarly examinations have adjudged these principles to be inadequate and urged the court
to look elsewhere; the need to foster trust in public institutions, for instance. Here, I examine a

2

A counterargument is that the rule of law also requires administrative bodies, such as the revenue, to not abuse their
power, and when they do so, remedies like legitimate expectation ought to be invoked by the court as a facet of its
mandate to do justice and uphold the rule of law.
3
See Michael Fordham, “Legitimate Expectation II: Comparison and Prediction,” (2001) 6:4 Judicial Rev 262.
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variety of views to ascertain whether a particular principle is most apt, or still, whether legitimate
expectation should be guided by a combination of underlying principles.
Finally, I explore the administrative perspective. I examine whether, given the important role of
tax in revenue mobilization and economic management, there are policy implications that the
revenue should consider in deciding whether to honour a legitimate expectation arising from its
interaction with taxpayers. I explore a few reforms that may impact this aspect of tax policy and
tax administration in Nigeria.
The above points are, of course, discussed in the context of tax administration and the important
role that revenue discretion plays in administering tax laws.4 Given the usual complexity of tax
legislation, it is a common practice in many jurisdictions for taxpayers to rely on guidance
provided, in various ways, by tax authorities to ascertain their tax positions. Incidentally, in
Nigeria, reliance on guidance to determine one’s tax status comes at a risk; because a taxpayer is
never sure whether the tax authority, mainly the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), will abide
by the guidance or assurance that it has exercised its discretion to give. The current policy seems
to be that the FIRS does not consider itself obligated to abide by guidance provided to taxpayers.
In any case no hard law compels the FIRS to do so. This may, at least in theory, pose problems for
taxpayers who rely on such guidance to make business decisions or otherwise arrange their affairs.5
The administrative flip-flopping is, perhaps, more concerning when you also consider that Nigeria

4

It is important that I note at this stage that in the context of this thesis, I use the term “discretion” inclusively to refer
to other terms such as promise, concession, guidance, ruling, representation. I use these terms to represent any advice,
information, guideline, position statement, etc. issued or expressed by the tax authority to a taxpayer(s) either to enable
their understanding of and compliance with tax law or to convey how the tax authority would treat any matter of fact
or law in relation to the tax obligations of the taxpayer. I also use the terms “tax authority” and “the revenue”
interchangeably to refer to the government authority that administers tax law.
5
See Victor Onyenkpa & Abisoye Ayoola “FIRS and the Principle of Legitimate Expectation” (2014), online:
http://www.blog.kpmgafrica.com/nigerias-firs-principle-expectation/.
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operates a self-assessment tax system that requires a taxpayer to ascertain their own tax liability,
in accordance with the provisions of the law; complexity or vagueness notwithstanding. What then
is the fate of a taxpayer whose interest stands to be undermined by an abrupt resilement from a
guidance or assurance given by the tax authority? Under Nigeria’s court system, a person can,
generally, seek judicial review of a decision or action of an administrative body if such decision
or action is deemed to unfairly prejudice that person. Legitimate expectation is one of the remedies
improvised by the courts to deal with such situations. However, as I have observed, its place in
Nigeria’s jurisprudence, especially as regards revenue matters, seems to be shallow-rooted. The
pronouncement of Saidu J of the Federal High Court in Saipem Contracting Nigeria Limited v
FIRS seems to capture the subsisting judicial attitude:
It is not the issue of resiling of earlier statement [sic] that is important now. What is important
are the various provisions of law guiding payment of tax in Nigeria.6
The attendant concern is whether the short shrift given to administrative guidance by the courts
gives the revenue the carte blanche (subject to limits of legality) to waver as it deems fit in dealing
with taxpayers. Put another way, it seems that the tax authority may dishonor its promises,
provided it does not appear to contravene the express provisions of the relevant statute. This
disposition may compound the uncertainty and further erode the confidence of the taxpayer in tax
system. It is these ideas that I reflect on in this thesis. As the thesis title suggests, the themes of
this thesis draw from law and policy perspectives.
1.2

Summary of Chapters

This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 deals with introductory matters, sets out the
research agenda and summarizes the methodological approach to research. Chapter 2 offers an

6

(2014) 15 TLRN 76.
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overview of discretion in Nigeria’s tax administration. Chapter 3 discusses the concept of
legitimate expectation. Chapter examines how Nigerian courts have adjudicated cases of legitimate
expectations. Chapter 5 explores the principles underlying legitimate expectations. Chapter 6
examines tax policy issues surrounding the (non)observance of legitimate expectation by the tax
authority. Chapter 7 summarizes the discussion and makes some suggestions on the way forward
from multiple perspectives, mainly administrative and legislative.
1.3

Methodology

I deploy a variety of methodologies and theoretical approaches in this research, starting, naturally,
with doctrinal research. Doctrinal research is concerned with the formulation of legal ‘doctrines’
through the analysis of legal rules.7 The essential features of doctrinal scholarship involve a critical
conceptual analysis of legislation and case law to reveal a statement of the law relevant to the
matter under investigation.8 In order to effectively explore the subject-matter of this thesis, I must
make various conceptual examinations and clarifications. Thus, I use doctrinal analysis, for
instance, to provide clarity on the concept of “discretion,” its various manifestations and
significance in tax administration; to explain legitimate expectation, as a concept, its judicial
evolution, theoretical bases, ingredients, application (in administrative law generally and in tax
matters specifically) and limitations. I discuss the concept of tax policy and its intersection with
legitimate expectation. I analyze the relevant judicial decisions, as well as important official
documents such as tax statutes and Nigeria’s National Tax Policy,9 which is central to the policy
issues in this thesis. I analyze the works of authors who have attempted to shape the way legitimate

7

Paul Chynoweth, “Legal Research”, in A Knight & L Ruddock, eds, Advanced Research Methods in the Built
Environment (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008) 28 at 29.
8
Terry Hutchinson, “The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law”, (2015)
8:3 Erasmus L Rev 130 at 130.
9
See Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Finance, National Tax Policy, (Abuja, Nigeria: FMF, 1 February 2017).
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expectation is deployed in tax and other matters.10 The analysis shows significant divergence in
opinions on these issues, not only in terms of what legitimate expectation means and how it should
be deployed but in terms of the underlying basis for its deployment. It is observed that the opinions
tend to be shaped by the theoretical dispositions of the writers.
In order to explain why courts should protect legitimate expectation, proponents lean on theories
that include fairness,11 trust,12 social confidence,13 good administration,14 legal certainty,15 and the
rule of law.16 Also, utilitarian arguments on the protection of legitimate expectation focus on the
gains of protection vis-à-vis the ills of non-protection.17 Similarly, but from an administrative
perspective, administrative justice theorists18 posit that in order to foster a good administrative
system, public authorities should adopt policies that promote a broad range of values such as
clarity, confidentiality, transparency, secrecy, fairness, efficiency, accountability, consistency,
participation, openness, rationality, equity, and equal treatment, user-friendliness, accuracy,

10

See, for instance, Michael Fordham, "Legitimate Expectation: Domestic Principles" (2000) 5:3 Judicial Rev 188;
Sas Ansari & Lorne Sossin, “Legitimate Expectations in Canada: Soft Law and Tax Administration,” in M Groves &
G Weeks, eds., Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World (2017) 293.
11
This has been the predominant theme in judicial authorities. As a concept, fairness is traceable to general principles
of natural justice as postulated by thinkers like Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant and John Rawls.
12
Paul Reynolds, “Legitimate Expectation and the Protection of Trust in Public Officials”, (2011) Public Law 330.
13
Jack Watson, "Clarity and Ambiguity: A New Approach to the Test of Legitimacy in the Law of Legitimate
Expectations" (2010) 30:4 LS 633.
14
Paul Daly, “A Pluralist Account of Deference and Legitimate Expectations” in M Groves & G Weeks, eds,
Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017) 101.
15
Carlo Romano, Advance Tax Rulings and Principles of Law: Towards a European Tax Rulings System? Vol 4
(Amsterdam, IBFD Doctoral Series, 2002) at 78.
16
Daly supra note 14.
17
See Daphne Barak-Erez, “The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations and the Distinction between the Reliance and
Expectation Interests, (2005) 11:4 European Public Law 583 at 584.
18
See, generally, Joe Tomlinson, “The Grammar of Administrative Values” (2017) 39:4 J Social Welfare and Family
L 524. Administrative bodies can respect, observe, or uphold legitimate expectations, and when they fail to, the court
can protect or enforce legitimate expectation.
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rationality, consistency, coherence, accessibility.19 Unlike legitimate expectations which are
protected by the court, the demands of administrative justice devolve on administrative bodies.20
Some of the arguments against legitimate expectation – that it endorses ultra vires acts of tax
authorities or fetters administrative discretion or offends statutory limitation – are rooted in legal
positivism.21 Others, such as separation of powers and the rule of law are rooted in
constitutionalism.22 Critics of constitutionalism argue that a pure theory of separation of powers
no longer exists23 and that it is sometimes necessary to blur the lines when it comes to discretion.24
Some scholars have gone further to analyze judicial protection of legitimate expectation from the
perspective of legal realism,25 showing that the courts actually adopt a self-restrained attitude –
mostly dismissing claims – which, to them, rubbishes the misgivings that legitimate expectation
undermines separation of powers. Legal realism is further underlined by the fact that legitimate
expectation was created by the court and has been shaped, rather narrowly, by the court.26 It may

19

The taxpayer is said to be a consumer of the services provided by tax administrators and, as such, a client. The
taxpayer is perceived a consumer as a user of the processes and structures that constitute the tax system. From this
perspective, tax administrators are obliged to create a system that is characterized by ease of utilization and
maneuverability. Accordingly, tax authorities are urged to treat the interests of taxpayers with the maximum respect
and to adopt policies that do not prejudice or jeopardize taxpayers. See Ifeanyichukwu Azuka Aniyie, “ConsumerOriented Reforms in Tax Administration in Nigeria” in ML Ahmadu, ed, Legal Prisms: Directions in Nigerian Law
and Practice (Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodiyo University Press, 2012) 554.
20
See Cristian Radu Dragomir, “Autonomous Administrative Authorities - a Means to Achieve Administrative Justice
in the Rule of Law” (2018) 57 RSP 96 at 98–99.
21
See, for instance, Matthew H Kramer, Defense of Legal Positivism: Law Without Trimmings (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
22
See, for instance, MA Ikhariale, “The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations: Prospects and Problems in
Constitutional Litigation in South Africa” (2001) 45:1 J African L 1.
23
See Margaret Allars, Introduction to Australian Administrative Law (Sydney: Butterworths, 1990).
24
See Michael Walpole & Chris Evans, “The Delicate Balance: Revenue Authority Discretions and the Rule of Law
in Australia,” in C Evans, J Freedman & R Krever, eds., The Delicate Balance: Tax Discretion and the Rule of Law
(Amsterdam: IBFD: 2011) 121.
25
Robert Thomas, “Legitimate Expectations and the Separation of Powers” in M Groves & G Weeks, eds, Legitimate
Expectations in the Common Law World (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017) 53; Chintan Chandrachud, “Substantive
Legitimate Expectation in India” in M Groves & G Weeks, eds, Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017) 254 at 263.
26
See, for instance, Schmidt & ors v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149; R v North and East Devon
Health Authority, Ex parte Coughlan [2000] 3 All ER 850; R v IRC Ex p. MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd [1990] 1
WLR 1545.

7

also explain why courts may be more willing to protect legitimate expectation in non-revenue
matters, such as immigration than in taxation, which may affect the revenue base of the state.27
Another theory that explains this judicial hesitancy is public interest theory. This theory, which
underlies many of the legitimate expectation cases, emphasizes the importance of the court not
fettering the tax authority’s ability to fulfill its public duty of collecting taxes. 28
To substantiate my policy-based arguments, I rely on Adam Smith’s widely accepted theory of tax
policy.29 The theory espouses the values of equity (fairness), neutrality, certainty and
administrability as some of the virtues of a good tax system.30 I use this theory to demonstrate how
it may benefit Nigeria for the tax authority to honour its commitments to taxpayers rather than to
repudiate them. I support these policy reflections with interdisciplinary research 31 that borders on
economic analysis of law and policy. I rely on empirical work to explain that inconsistent tax
administration creates uncertainty in the tax system, which may send the wrong signals to investors
in a capital importing country like Nigeria.32 Tax policy has long been the subject of law and
economic analysis.33 This thesis highlights that the inconsistency displayed by the tax authority

27

R (GMAC Investment Limited Aozora) v HMRC (2019) EWCA Civ 1643 (Aozora); Phoenix Motors Ltd v NPFMB
[1993]1 NWLR (pt. 272) 718.
28
For some explanation of this theory and how it influences judicial decisions see Glendon A Schubert, Jr., “The
Theory of "The Public Interest" in Judicial Decision-Making” (1958) 2:1 Midwest J Political Science 1.
29
Adam Smith, The Canons of Taxation (1776).
30
See
Allison
Christians,
“Introduction
to
Tax
Policy
Theory”
(2018),
online:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3186791. See also Clinton Alley & Duncan Bentley, “A
Remodelling of Adam Smith’s Tax Design Principles” (2005) 20 Australian Tax Forum 582.
31
Interdisciplinary research “combines components of two or more disciplines in the search or creation of new
knowledge, operations, or artistic expressions. See Moti Nissani “Ten Cheers for interdisciplinarity: The Case for
Interdisciplinary Knowledge and Research” (1997) 34:2 The Social Science J 201 at 203.
32
See, for instance, Michael Devereux, “Measuring Corporation Tax Uncertainty Across Countries: Evidence from a
Cross-country Survey” (2016) Oxford University Center for Business Taxation Working Paper No. 16/13 at 9, online:
http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/6292/1/WP1613.pdf; Ernesto Zangari, Antonella Caiumi & Thomas Hemmelgarn, “Tax
Uncertainty: Economic Evidence and Policy Responses” (2017), European Union (Taxation Papers) Working Paper
No. 67, online: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/taxation_paper_67.pdf; IMF-OECD’s
concurring report: “Tax Uncertainty”, (2017) IMF/OECD Report for the G20 Finance Ministers, at 20–21, online:
https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-certainty-report-oecd-imf-report-g20-finance-ministers-march-2017.pdf
33
Michael J Trebilcock, “Economic Analysis of Law” in Richard F Devlin, ed, Canadian Perspectives on Legal
Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 1991).
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runs contrary to Nigeria’s National Tax Policy, which emphasizes certainty, fairness and good
administration as some of the guiding principles of tax administration.34
Another crucial methodology that I deploy is comparativism. This entails the study of, and research
in, law by the systematic comparison of two or more legal systems; or of parts, branches or aspects
of two or more legal systems.35 Comparative law “does not merely provide a reservoir of different
solutions; it offers the scholar of critical capacity the opportunity of finding the "better solution"
for his time and place.”36 Comparative research lends itself to many scholarship functions. Among
its many aims, comparative law has been used to: (1) understand a legal rule or institution; and (2)
understand one’s own law better in order to develop the critical standards which might lead to its
improvement.37 These represent the primary reasons for my comparison. The literature on
legitimate expectation in the United Kingdom (UK), on which I heavily rely, far outweighs that of
Nigeria, where there has been limited scholarly attention. Not only is there more literature,
legitimate expectation is more firmly established as a judicial remedy in the UK, including in tax.38
The UK approach inspires great comparative appeal, especially since it encompasses the protection
of both procedural and substantive legitimate expectations,39 and since Nigerian jurisprudence in
this area is modeled on English jurisprudence. 40 Both countries have experienced significant
judicial influence on the development of their laws. Moreover, the usual stumbling blocks in the

34

See National Tax Policy supra note 9, para 2.1.
W J Kamba, “Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework” (1974) 23:3 The Intl and Comp LQ 485 at 486.
36
Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law, (1996), trans. T Weir, 3rd ed, (Oxford, UK:
Clarendon Press Publication, 1998) 1 at 16.
37
Ibid at 16, 19-20.
38
See Tracy Bowler, “HMRC’s Discretion: The Application of the Ultra Vires Rule and the Legitimate Expectation
Doctrine” (2014), online: https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/TLRC/TLRC_DP_10.pdf. Procedural
legitimate expectation only entitles the taxpayer to be heard by the tax authority before a position is changed, while
substantive legitimate expectation ensures not just a hearing but an outcome that binds the tax authority to the initial
representation made to the taxpayer.
39
See, for instance, MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd supra note 26.
40
See Stitch v Attorney-General of the Federation (1986) LPELR-3119(SC); (1986) NWLR (Pt.46) 1007.
35
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path of legitimate expectation – ultra vires, public interest, separation of powers, etc. – are
common to both jurisdictions. The challenge of tax uncertainty, which is one of the core reasons
why taxpayers rely on revenue guidance and other forms of discretion, is common to both
jurisdictions. My approach, thus, reflects a functionalist view of comparative law in that I seek to
identify the underlying social, economic, or political problem that law attempts to resolve then
compare how different countries settle those problems using law.41 Functionalism lends itself
particularly well to the project of evaluating the effectiveness of different legal resolutions to
common social, economic or political problems.42
A major criticism of the comparatist is that he or she is often eager to recommend approaches from
one jurisdiction to another, perhaps, with insufficient understanding of the context of at least one
of the jurisdictions being compared.43 I am cautious to avoid these perceived pitfalls of inelegant
comparison, by limiting my study of foreign literature largely to the goal of assisting
understanding, in a doctrinal sense, of the principles discussed here. I am further encouraged by
Junker’s observation that functionalism seems especially to have an affinity for commercial law
and some other areas of the law that are less culturally connected. 44 It is impossible to ignore the
increasing harmonisation and cross-pollination of tax administration rules across the globe,

41

See Kimberly Brooks, A Hitchhikers Guide to Comparative Tax Law, 2019 [unpublished, on file with author] at 1.
Ibid.
43
For further discussions and criticisms of comparativism, see, for instance, George A Bermann et al, "Comparative
Law: Problems and Prospects" (2011) 26:4 Am U Intl L Rev 935; Jonathan Hill, “Comparative Law, Law Reform and
Legal Theory” (1989) 9:1 Oxford J Legal Studies, 101; Edward J Eberle, "The Methodology of Comparative Law"
(2011) 16:1 Roger Williams U L Rev 51; Jaakko Husa, “Comparative law in legal education – building a legal mind
for a transnational world,” (2018) 52:2 The Law Teacher 201; Ralf Michaels, “Transnationalizing Comparative Law”
(2016) 23:2 MJ 352.
44
See Kirk W Junker, “A Focus on Comparison in Comparative Law” (2014) 52:1 Duq L Rev 69 at 80.
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especially in the areas of international taxation, which, in my view, makes it pertinent for tax law
scholars to explore beyond their own borders when dealing with issues of that nature.45
A gratifying thing about being able to reflect on foreign authorities is that it affords me many
useful materials. There are adaptable solutions. Moreover, while foreign authorities are only of
persuasive influence, there is no doubt that they continue to be relevant in the development of
Nigerian law.46
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Bird & Wilkie observe that “by reducing the degrees of freedom available to policy designers at the national level,
globalization has in some ways shifted the terms of the national tax policy discussion closer to the ‘model’ commonly
set out for tax policy design at the subnational level. See Richard M Bird & J Scott Wilkie, “Designing Tax Policy:
Constraints and Objectives in an Open Economy” (2012) Georgia State University Intl Center for Public Policy
Working Paper 12-24, online: https://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2015/03/ispwp1224.pdf at 4.
46
See, for instance, the recent landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in In Re: Abdullahi (2018) LPELR45202(SC).
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Chapter 2: Overview of Tax Administration and Discretion in Nigeria
2.1

Nigeria’s Tax Structure and Federal Tax Administration

This chapter examines the legal framework for taxation in Nigeria and how this framework enables
the FIRS to exercise discretion in tax matters. It provides a contextual understanding of the factual
situations that may give rise to legitimate expectation claims.
Taxation is an essential sociolegal instrument used by the government in any society for the
effective management as well as delivery of economic and sociopolitical dividends of
governance.47 A tax may be defined as a compulsory levy imposed by a public authority on
incomes, consumption and production of goods and services. 48 Taxation may be regarded as an
exercise of sovereign power especially as fiscal jurisdiction is an attribute of statehood and
sovereignty.49 In jurisprudential context, tax is a creation of legal positivism which by its nature
implies that tax law flows from human sources. 50 This is certainly true of Nigeria where tax is
imposed by government (at federal and state levels) by virtue of powers vested in them by the
Constitution, a document that sets out the framework for the exercise of taxing powers and,
incidentally, tax administration.51
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Saka Muhammed Olokooba, Nigerian Taxation: Law, Practice and Procedures Simplified (Singapore: Springer,
2019) at 3.
48
Karimu A Ishola, Taxation Principles and Fiscal Policy in Nigeria, 2nd ed. (Ilorin: Kastas Publishers, 2019) at 1.
49
See Alfred Nizamiev, “The Main Characteristics of State's Jurisdiction to Tax in International Dimension” (LLM
Dissertation, University of Georgia School of Law, 2003) at 5.
50
Kareem Adedokun, “An Overview of Discretionary Powers in Tax Administration within the Context of the
Nigerian
National
Tax
Policy”
(2017)
online:
https://www.academia.edu/34293220/an_overview_of_discretionary_powers_in_tax_administration_within_the_co
ntext_of_the_nigerian_national_tax_policy at 2.
51
See also the Taxes and Levies (Approved List for Collection) Act, No. 21 of 1998, Cap T2 Laws of the Federation
2004.
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The Federal Republic of Nigeria’s written constitution embodies principles such as federalism,
republicanism and separation of powers.52 In terms of its vertical structure, Nigeria consists of
three tiers of government (federal, state and local), each with specified taxing powers. For the
purpose of this paper, however, I focus only on the federal government’s broad taxing powers.
Part 1 of the 2nd Schedule to the Constitution specifies various taxes and levies that the federal
government may impose. These include taxes on incomes, profits and capital gains,53 as well as
stamp duties, as prescribed in the Exclusive Legislative List. 54 Horizontally, the federal
government consists of the executive, legislative and judicial arms. The federal government’s
power to impose tax is exercised through legislation enacted by the National Assembly, the
legislative arm, subject to presidential assent.55 The power of the federal government to enact tax
legislation has been exercised through various statutes in the Nigerian corpus juris.56 These tax
legislation typically prescribe tax bases, units, obligations, liabilities, compliance and enforcement
instruments.57 Administrative rules are, as well, contained in tax-imposing statutes such as the
Companies Income Tax Act (CITA) as well as the Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment)
Act (FIRS Act),58 which is a statute entirely dedicated to tax administration. Administrative rules
52

For instance, see sections 2, 4, 5 & 6 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended.
See Items 58 and 59. See also Item 68 which confers powers on the federal government to legislate on any matter
incidental or supplementary to any matter mentioned elsewhere in the Exclusive Legislative List. This has been
construed as meaning that the federal government can levy tax on those matters. See Attorney-General of Ogun State
v Aberuagba (1985) 1 NWLR (pt. 3) 395. For more on this, see Nduka Ikeyi & Sam Orji, “How Much Force is Still
Left in the Taxes and Levies (Approved List for Collection) Act?” (2011 – 2012) 10 NJR 73.
54
The Exclusive Legislative List is a list of subject matters that only the federal legislature can legislate on. These
include insurance, meteorology, immigration, external affairs, extradition, currency, exchange control, evidence,
export duties, etc. There is also a concurrent list which contains matters that both the Federal and state legislatures can
legislate on; matters such as education and healthcare. See, generally, Charles Nwalimu, The Nigerian Legal System,
2nd ed (New York: Peter Lang, 2009).
55
See generally sections 4, 58 and 59 of the Constitution. Section 4 vests the legislative powers of the federation in
the National Assembly, while sections 58 and 59 outline the process for exercising federal legislative power.
56
See, for instance, the Companies Income Tax Act, Cap. C21, LFN 2004; Capital Gains Tax Act, Cap. C1, LFN
2004; Petroleum Profit Tax Act, Cap. P13, LFN 2004; Personal Income Tax Act, Cap. P8, LFN 2004; Stamp Duties
Act, Cap. S8, LFN 2004; Tertiary Education Trust Fund (Establishment, Etc.) Act, 2011, No. 65; Value Added Tax
Act, Cap. V1, LFN 2004.
57
See Adedokun, supra note 50 at 2.
58
2007, No. 13.
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typically govern procedural matters such as the filing of tax returns, deduction of tax at source,
service of notices, information request and disclosure, compliance enforcement, issuance of tax
identification numbers, tax refunds, etc.59
Nigeria’s tax enactments, generally, confer diverse powers on tax administrators and adjudicators
in the discharge of their various duties.60 While, for instance, the power of adjudication vests in
the courts and the Tax Appeal Tribunal (TAT),61 the power to administer tax laws in Nigeria is
vested in two main bodies. These are the FIRS and the Internal Revenue Service of a state.62 The
FIRS administers federal taxes while the Internal Revenue Service of a state administers the tax
system of that state.63
In recognition of the fact that tax statutes rarely cover every situation that may arise in tax
administration, the FIRS Act confers on the FIRS the power to make regulations for the
administration of the Act. Section 61 provides that:
the Board may, with the approval of the Minister, make rules and regulations as in its
opinion are necessary or expedient for giving full effect to the provisions of this Act
and for the due administration of its provisions and may in particular, make regulations
prescribing the- (a) forms for returns and other information required under this Act or
any other enactment or law; and (b) procedure for obtaining any information required
under this Act or any other enactment or law.

59

See, generally, the FIRS Act.
The presupposition underlying the vesting of administrative powers by the legislature is that the legislators that
enacted tax laws are human; so too are the tax administrators that implement the law and the judges that interpret. The
trio of law making; implementation and adjudication must aim at securing maximum benefit for the people. Adedokun
supra note 50 at 2.
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of all matters connected with or pertaining to the taxation of companies and… all other persons subject to Federal
taxation) and the 5th Schedule to the FIRS Act (which establishes the TAT).
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Local government authorities within the states also enjoy certain tax imposition and collection powers, as prescribed
by state law, pursuant to section 7(5) and the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution. See Jude J. Odinkonigbo, “Does a
Local Government in Nigeria Have the Power to Tax?” (2020) 48:6-7 Intertax 642.
63
A unique tax statute in this respect is the Value Added Tax Act, which is administered by the FIRS, but a large
chunk of the tax collected is distributed to the states. See sections 7 and 40 of the Value Added Tax Act.
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Four things to highlight in this provision are: (1) the provision confers discretion on the FIRS to
issue subsidiary legislation to facilitate tax administration; (2) the FIRS determines the necessity
or expediency of the subsidiary legislation; (3) the discretion extends to any matter deemed to be
relevant to the due administration of the Act; (4) the FIRS’s discretion in this regard is only subject
to the approval of the Minister.64 The FIRS has issued several significant regulations in line with
its mandate under section 61.65 According to Freedman & Vella, the use of discretion to issue
regulations or subsidiary legislation is an express power which may be categorized as “specific
discretion.”66 The focus of this thesis is on the “general” discretionary powers that the tax authority
exercises in the day to day administration of tax law. General discretion is more open-ended,
compared to specific discretion which is confined to the issuance of regulations. In many cases,
the activities that constitute general discretion are not at all mentioned in the tax statute. Some of
these activities are discussed in the ensuing sections of this thesis.
2.2

The FIRS and Tax Discretion

Tax administration involves the assessment, collection and accounting for all forms of taxes as
well as the implementation of the various tax laws and government policy guidelines on tax
administration.67 Tax administration is one of the three components of the Nigerian tax system;
the others being tax policy and tax legislation.68 As I have tried to show in the last section,
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“The Minister” here means the Minister charged with responsibility for matters relating to finance. See section 69
of the FIRS Act. The FIRS is generally subject to the supervision of the Minister. Section 60 of the FIRS Act provides
that “the Minister may give to the Service or the Executive Chairman such directives of a general nature or relating
generally to matters of policy with regards to the exercise of its or his functions as he may consider necessary and the
Service or the Executive Chairman shall comply with the directives or cause them to be complied with.”
65
See, for instance, the Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Regulations 2018; the Income Tax (Country by Country
Reporting) Regulations 2018, Income Tax (Common Reporting Standard) Regulations 2019.
66
See Judith Freedman & John Vella, “HMRC’s Management of the U.K. Tax System: The Boundaries of Legitimate
Expectation” in C Evans, J Freedman & R Krever, eds. The Delicate Balance: Tax, Discretion and the Rule of Law
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2011) 79 at 80.
67
Aniyie supra note 19 at 3.
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Ibid.
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discretion is an integral part of tax administration, although its role has been controversial. It is
said that an explanation of tax discretion might be approached from two directions.69 First, a
descriptive definition might be offered, that explains the source or consequences of the powers in
question. Second, a normative account might be favoured, which describes an ideal system of tax
rules and shows the role that discretion would play within its proper context. Underneath these
headings, further distinctions might be made.70 My approach reflects both patterns and it is evident
throughout this thesis. I start by examining mainly judicial attempts at defining “discretion”, then
I proceed to demonstrate tax discretion, in its various manifestations. I also, of course, examine
how tax discretion plays in the tax system, bearing in mind both judicial and scholarly responses
to tax discretion.
Nigerian courts have severally attempted to define and explain the concept of discretion.71 In
Akinyemi v Odu'a Investment Co. Ltd72 the Supreme Court, per Tanko Muhammad, J.S.C. (as he
then was), defined discretion, “in its general usage,” as “that freedom or power to decide what
should be done in a particular situation.” In Artra Ind. Nig. Ltd v NBCI,73 the Supreme Court,
defined discretion as the “equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstance or
a liberty or privilege to decide and act in accordance with what is fair and equitable under the
peculiar case guided by the principles of law.”74 In Achie v Ebenighe & ors,75 the Court of Appeal
noted that discretion means “a power or right conferred upon public functionaries by law of acting
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Dominic De Cogan, “Tax, Discretion and the Rule of Law” in C Evans, J Freedman & R Krever, The Delicate
Balance: Tax, Discretion and the Rule of Law (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2011) 1 at 2–3.
70
Ibid.
71
This is usually done in the context of judicial discretion.
72
(2012) 17 NWLR (pt. 1329) 209 at 240.
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(1998) LPELR-565(SC); (1998) 4 NWLR [pt.545] 1.
74
Per Onu JSC at 35, paras B-D. See also Sumaila v State (2012) LPELR-19724(CA); Ero & ors v Ero & ors (2018)
LPELR-44154(CA).
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(2013) LPELR-21884(CA).
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officially in certain circumstances according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience,
uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.” Meanwhile, in the case of Ibigbami & anor.
v Military Governor Ekiti State & ors76 the Court of Appeal, per Nsofor, JCA warned that
“discretion is not freedom. Discretion does not empower a man to do what he likes because he is
minded to do so; he must in the exercise of his discretion do, not what he likes but what he ought."77
This follows the track of the old case of Iwuji v Federal Commissioner for Establishment & anor,78
where Karibi-White, J.S.C., quoting several English authorities, explained, inter alia, that:
The concept of discretion even in its legal usage, implies power to make a choice between
alternative courses of action. Thus, where the exercise of a discretion is vested, it follows
that there is really no absolute answer to the solution of the question… a science of
understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between right and wrong, between
shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do
according to their wills and private affections… that the exercise of a discretion, which was
not confined to the Courts, imports a duty to be ‘fair, candid and unprejudiced; not arbitrary,
capricious, or biased; much less warped by resentment or personal dislike.’ Very concisely
stated, the exercise of discretion is subject to the well settled rules of natural justice. The
exercise of a discretion presupposes consideration of all the factors relevant and requisite to
the exercise of the discretion.79
The common theme of these judicial postulation is that discretion entails the exercise of judgment
by public authorities in performing their functions. Although freedom to act one way or another is
inherent in discretion – and the court would ordinarily not intervene – it is also important that
discretion is exercised fairly, properly, reasonably and responsibly, and, of course, in accordance
with due process. If discretion is abused, there is a possibility that the court intervenes to impeach
what has been done. In other words, the freedom that discretion confers is not absolutely
unreviewable.
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Discretion is an integral part of public administration globally. In Nigeria, public authorities are
often conferred discretion – express or implied, broad or narrow – in the performance of their
functions. In the context of tax administration, significant residual power is vested in the FIRS to
exercise its discretion in managing Nigeria’s tax system. To start, section 25(1) of the FIRS Act
simply provides that:
The Service shall have power to administer all the enactments listed in the First Schedule to
this Act and any other enactment or law on taxation in respect of which the National
Assembly may confer power on the Service.
A few steps back, paragraph 8(1)(t) of the FIRS Act provides that the FIRS shall – in addition to
its express functions – “carry out such other activities as are necessary or expedient for the full
discharge of all or any of the functions under this Act.”80 The scope of the discretion conferred in
this section is not easily determinable, especially in the context of the wide language used. Is the
discretion limited to the functions that are explicitly imposed by the Act or does it extend to matters
that are not explicitly mentioned, but which are nevertheless, in the opinion of the FIRS, necessary,
incidental or expedient?81 Functions commonly performed by the FIRS, such as the issuance of
tax rulings or explanatory notes to taxpayers, are not expressly prescribed by statute. Yet, legal
authority to perform these functions can be linked to an omnibus provision such as the described
paragraph of the FIRS Act. Since the FIRS indulges in such activities in the course of tax
administration, the issue of what weight to attach to these “indulgences” is the overarching concern
of this thesis. These indulgences demonstrate the exercise of general discretion.82
Professors Freedman & Vella identify three broad categories of general discretion:

80

Subsection 8(2) of the FIRS Act further provides that “the Service may, from time to time, specify the form of
returns, claims, statements and notices necessary for the due administration of the powers conferred on it by this Act.”
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or policy document, for instance.
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a.
b.
c.
d.

Discretion as to non-application of the law where its proper interpretation is agreed;
Discretion as to how to interpret the law;
Discretion in management of legislation and litigation; and
Hybrids of the above categories.83

The first category of this taxonomy refers to those situations where there is no dispute as to the
meaning of a statutory provision, but the tax authority, nevertheless, decides, either unilaterally or
in agreement with the taxpayer, not to apply that provision whether in whole or in part. The second
category refers to situations where the import of the tax statute is unclear and the tax authority
decides to adopt a particular line of interpretation, which it conveys to the taxpayer by way of
guidance or ruling. The third category, used broadly, covers situations where the tax authority
decides for the purpose of expediency to waive or narrow a tax obligation or liability, perhaps by
compromising a potential or pending dispute.84
Discretion may also be viewed in terms of the taxonomy adopted by Professors Ahmed & Perry
as to how legitimate expectation may be generated. The authors group discretion giving rise to
legitimate expectation into the categories: promises, policies and practices. 85 A promise suggests
that a fairly direct form of communication has been employed by the tax authority to the taxpayer.
A policy, rather than being directed to a specific person or group of persons, tends to be published
for the information of people generally and need not be brought to the specific attention of any one
of them. A practice is less certain than a promise or a policy. It connotes a situation that makes a
person conclude that a course of action adhered to in the past will continue to be adhered to in the
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waivers, deals and litigation strategies.
84
Put in the income tax context, discretion may be expressly granted by tax statute, may be implied in the
implementation of public policies, may materialize in the interpretation given to unclear or ambiguous, or may be
implicit in the everyday interactions of tax administrators with taxpayers. See Lorne Sossin, “The Politics of
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384.
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Cambridge LJ 61 at 64–66.
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future.86 There are various forms of general discretion that may be catalogued into these
categorizations. The usual forms include advance tax rulings (private rulings), information
circulars, departmental circulars, interpretation bulletins, technical interpretations, taxpayer bills
of rights, guidelines, public notices, etc.87 In the next section, I use the taxonomy devised by
Ahmed & Perry to elaborate on the various forms of general discretion that exist in Nigerian tax
administration. My aim is to provide practical insights on how discretion is a part of Nigerian tax
administration.
2.2.1 Private Tax Rulings or Promises
Advance tax rulings (also called advance, private or letter rulings) are legal instruments under
which taxpayers (or their advisors) may obtain a more or less binding statement from the tax
authorities concerning the treatment of a transaction or a series of contemplated future (or
sometimes past) actions or transactions.88 It is “a letter ruling, which is a written statement, issued
to a taxpayer by tax authorities, that interprets and applies the tax law to a specific set of facts.”89
An advance tax ruling is issued to a specific taxpayer or group of taxpayers, rather than the general
public.90 For there to be an advance tax ruling, the taxpayer would ordinarily put before the tax
authority a specific set of facts and, accordingly, request the tax authority to state its position on
how the law would apply to those facts. While studies show that various countries have established
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See Greg Weeks, “What Can We Legitimately Expect from the State?” in M Groves & G Weeks, eds, Legitimate
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a framework for the issuance of advance tax rulings, the same cannot be said of Nigeria.91 Thus,
while some countries have a legislative or published policy framework that governs the practice,
the FIRS framework is relatively informal. A sub-unit of the FIRS, the Tax Enquiries and
Appeals,92 issues private rulings. However, just like the rulings that it issues, this unit only exists
by administrative fiat. It is not a creation of statute. This differs from some other countries; India,
for instance, where there is an Authority for Advance Tax Rulings (AAR) statutorily saddled with
this responsibility.93 Some UK tax legislation provide that statutory advance clearance or approval
may be obtained from Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs for certain transactions (HMRC).94 For
businesses, HMRC will provide a non-statutory clearance if there is material uncertainty as to how
tax law will apply to a specific transaction and if the issue is commercially significant. 95 Such nonstatutory clearances provide taxpayers with HMRC’s view of what is the correct tax treatment.96
FIRS tax rulings are not binding on a taxpayer. Thus, a taxpayer may choose whether or not to
follow the ruling. Private tax rulings are not published in Nigeria, and there is no precedential
value to them, not being judicial decisions.97 There is also no obligation on the tax authority to
issue a ruling, even if it would be sensible to do so in certain cases. Case law suggest that the FIRS
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may issue a ruling in respect of an ongoing transaction. 98 Whatever the case, the FIRS would
ordinarily include a caveat warning the taxpayer that the ruling was subject to superior
interpretation of the law, either by the tax authority itself or by the court.99
Finally, in dealing with taxpayers, the FIRS may engage in arrangements which may in some cases
result in a “forgiving” of some tax liabilities such as assessed taxes, interest or penalties. It is
relevant to note that the FIRS is conferred with discretion to compound tax offences,100 which may
entail the forgiveness of due tax debt or penalties. Such compromise settlement may occur prior
to or during litigation and may be initiated at the instance of the tax authority, the taxpayer or the
court. It may even occur prior to the transaction or during audit, as a way of resolving disputed tax
liabilities. In other cases, the tax authority may compromise tax liabilities pursuant to the directives
of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, acting through the Honourable Minister of
Finance.101

There are recent examples of this process: the Voluntary Assets and Income

Declaration Scheme (VAIDS)102 and the Voluntary Offshore Assets Regularization Scheme in
Switzerland (VOARS).103 Although these instruments of subsidiary legislation were promulgated
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by a higher authority, such as the President or the Minister, the FIRS has the responsibility of
implementation, which entails determining those taxpayers whose cases deserve to take benefit of
the scheme. Once the tax authority has reached a compromise with a taxpayer pursuant to these
instruments, it can be taken that a promise has been made.
2.2.2 Policy Publications (Circulars)104
Apart from the issuance of private tax rulings, the content and statistics of which are not publicly
available, the FIRS regularly publishes tax circulars, guidelines, public notices and explanatory
notes on various aspects of tax law, policy and administration in Nigeria.105 These publications,
among other purposes, provide insights to taxpayers on relevant developments in taxation and offer
the interpretive position on how the FIRS will apply tax legislation. Circulars may simply state
what the law is on some issue or offer technical explanation or clarification on the law, thus,
serving the same purpose as technical notes. For instance, the Information Circular on the Taxation
of Non-residents in Nigeria106 attempts to clarify the meanings of various terms used in tax
legislation, such as “resident individual,” “resident corporation,” “dual residence,” “fixed base,”
“dual residence.” The circular also contains numerous examples to illustrate the applicability of
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the principles to real situations. Some circulars try to fill gaps in tax legislation, relying on
experience. An FIRS circular published in 2010,107 for instance, acknowledges that a definition of
the word “trade” cannot be found in Nigerian tax statutes but that the issue has been addressed in
several legal cases, the rulings of which provide some legal certainty regarding how the courts
interpret the word.108 The circular states that in line with these rulings, 'trade' can be regarded as
"the business of buying and selling or bartering goods or services". The circular affirms that “the
one-off nature of an activity in no way invalidates that activity as constituting a trade” and adds
that “where one or more of the criteria on the badges of trade apply, FIRS will treat such transaction
as trade.”109
A closely related publication of the FIRS is the 2019 Information Circular on the Claim of Tax
Treaties Benefits in Nigeria.110 This circular explains some important provisions of Nigeria’s
Double Tax Treaties (DTTs) and describes some important recent developments reflecting how
the FIRS will treat certain taxpayer activities. Topics addressed include the application of the
principal purpose test, an anti-treaty shopping policy,111 and the beneficial ownership policy.112
Another publication with cross-border implication is the FIRS information circular on the tax
implications of asset leasing.113 The circular conveys the FIRS’s position on the liability of leases
to companies’ income tax, value added tax and capital gains tax. The circular seeks to clarify the
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“misconceptions” and “misinterpretations” 114 of the principles guiding lease arrangements in
Nigeria. The circular proceeds to define “lease” in its various relevant forms before then stating
the FIRS’s position on the tax implications of lease transactions. For instance, the FIRS posits that
the interest portion of the rent earned by the lessor constitutes taxable income in the hand of the
lessor; while the capital portion is deemed a repayment of initial investment and has no tax
implication115 The circular adds that the lessor is not entitled to claim capital allowances on the
leased assets; only the lessee is entitled to make such claims. (If the lessor makes any such claim
for capital allowances, FIRS will disallow it).116
These publications, on their face, have varying degrees of implication on the scope of application
of tax legislation. For instance, FIRS Information Circular on the Taxation of Non-residents in
Nigeria states that:
The word “habitually” as used in the legislation implies that the operation of the non-resident
company must be repetitive. An isolated case will therefore not quality as “habitual” where
a dependent agent makes an isolated sale of goods on behalf of a principal, that may not
necessarily constitute the income from such an operation as deemed profit liable to Nigerian
tax. However, where the facts show that the sale of goods on behalf of the principal or of
any company associated to it by the agent is on a regular pattern, this arrangement will
conform with the intention of the term “habitually”117
This statement conveys the FIRS’s understanding of CITA as regards when it (the FIRS) can tax
the activities of a non-resident company deemed to have carried on business in Nigeria through a
dependent agent. The activities carried on through the dependent agent must be repetitive to qualify
for tax.
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Paragraph 4.4 of the above circular states that “a turnkey project is defined as a “single contract
involving survey, deliveries, installation or construction.” The profit on a turnkey project is liable
to tax in Nigeria. Such a profit should not be split between the so-called “Nigeria source” and
“off-shore” profits but taxed wholly in Nigeria.” The underlined part of this statement may be
regarded as an enlargement on the implication of substantive legislation. This is because the
relevant statutory provision118 does not specify that a taxpayer cannot split a “single contract,” for
instance between onshore and offshore components. However, the FIRS’s anti-splitting stance
shows just how the tax authority’s perspective can impact the practical application of tax
legislation.119
For the avoidance of doubt, not all tax authority publications seek to shrink benefits possibly
accruable to taxpayers from tax legislation. Indeed, in some cases, such publications may seek to
relieve a taxpayer or a class of taxpayers from the strict – perhaps detrimental – application of tax
legislation. A good example, perhaps, is the Explanatory Notes on the Critical Tax Issues for The
Operation of Bank Holding Company Structure in Nigeria.120 This circular was issued to provide
clarity and simplicity on the tax implications of certain changes triggered by a policy of the Central
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) which barred Nigerian banks from “universal banking.”121 As a result of
this CBN policy, the banks were made to split their operations (such as commercial banking,
insurance, capital market, fund management) between as many subsidiaries as were necessary,
while incorporating a holding company that would coordinate the subsidiaries. The new
arrangement created a tax compliance problem for the banks because they then had to withhold
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taxes on payment of dividend to their taxpayers at both subsidiary and holding company levels.122
To provide administrative relief, the FIRS circular stated that the subsidiaries would not be
required to deduct and remit withholding tax, but rather they could pay gross dividend to the
holding company and the holding company would then distribute the dividend to the shareholders
net of withholding tax which it (the holding company) would deduct and remit to the relevant tax
authority. Of course, under this arrangement, shareholders of the subsidiaries had to give up their
shares in those companies in exchange for shares in the holding company. That way they would
be able to receive the dividends directly from the holding company.
The FIRS, in exercising its powers under section 29 of CITA to approve business restructurings
(such as mergers, acquisitions and takeovers) where a new company emerges from a restructuring,
has the discretion to waive the application of the business commencement or cessation rules
contained in subsections 29(3) & (4) of CITA.123 The FIRS’s position on this provision is partly
contained in the circular entitled Tax Implication of Mergers And Acquisition124 where it is stated
that the “commencement rule as provided under Section 29(3) will apply to the new company.
However, where the merging parties are connected parties (Section 29(10) of CITA) or the new
business is a reconstituted company (under Part II of the CITA) taking over the trade or business
formerly run by its foreign parent company (Section 29(10) of CITA), then the FIRS may direct
that the commencement rule be sidestepped, in which case, the new company will file its returns
as a going concern in which case it will be assessed on a preceding year basis.125
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2.2.3 Practice
It is not unusual in tax administration that an unprescribed mode of tax treatment assumes the
status of a rule by virtue of consistent application.126 This is in the form of prevailing or established
practice. As a working definition, the term ‘established practice’ refers to a regular, consistent
predictable and certain conduct, process or activity of the decision-making authority.127 In such
cases, whether or not there is an express statement as to how the tax authority would act, the
consistent conduct of the tax authority conveys that impression to the taxpayer, to a point where
the taxpayer comes to see it as the norm and such that in certain circumstances the court may not
allow the tax authority to resile from it.128 For example, prior to the issuance of Nigeria’s first
Transfer Pricing Regulations in 2012, the FIRS usually accepted prices approved by the National
Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP)129 as the “arm’s length price” for
intangibles acquired by Nigerian entities from foreign entities; and taxpayers came to expect this
as an acceptable practice even though there was nothing in the law that required the FIRS to do
so.130
In some cases. the tax statutes confer various discretionary powers on the FIRS that are so flexible
that they can be exercised through any one or more of the three categories of discretion discussed
in this section (promise, policy or practice). Okoro, a Nigerian tax lawyer, identifies some of these
discretionary powers.131 These include: discretion to assess a taxpayer not by its actual assessable
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profit, but by a fair and reasonable percentage of that profit;132 discretion on the selection of
transfer pricing method;133 and discretion to extend time for tax compliance.134 In the latter case,
the author argues that the extension of time also implies a waiver of the penalty that would have
applied if time was not extended.135 The FIRS is also empowered, inter alia, with discretion to
reopen assessment, raise additional assessment 136 and to levy tax by distress of goods.137 The tax
laws contain provisions that allow the tax authority to make adjustments as it deems fit for the
purpose of protecting the revenue base from erosion.138
The nature of tax administration is such that once tax legislation is enacted, the tax authority
assumes the role of implementing the legislation to meet its intended effect. The administrators
ensure the practicability of the law by ensuring compliance.139 Tax guidance is an integral part of
this function. Since the positions expressed in tax guidance emanate directly from the responsible
tax authority it is only logical for taxpayers to rely on them, more so when the guidance conveys
how the FIRS prefers to exercise its discretionary powers. A taxpayer who is keen to avoid conflict
with the tax authority would readily play along. In the next section, I shed some more light on the
importance of discretion in tax administration, especially as regards Nigeria.
2.3

The Significance of Discretion in Tax Administration

Taxation provides a critical point of contact between the individual and the state. It requires a
number of delicate balances to be negotiated, ensuring on the one hand that the tax imposed by the
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legislature is collected efficiently and, on the other, that the taxpayers’ rights and interests are
respected.140 The government cannot carry on its functions, particularly the enforcement of taxes,
without wide discretionary powers granted to the administrators by different tax statutes.141
Statutory provisions cannot contemplate all circumstances, hence the provisions for the exercise
of discretion.142 This situation leaves gaps that administrative discretion attempts to fill. Davis
forcefully asserts that it is impossible to have a government of laws and not of men to the extent
that officers exercise vast discretionary power. He affirms that we cannot change that – the exercise
of discretion by public officers – because we simply cannot have a governmental or a legal system
without a large amount of discretionary power.143 He asserts that discretion, even unguided
discretion, is an absolute necessity for every legal system.144 Except if the Act of Parliament were
made with super-natural prescience, the enduring relevance of the exercise of discretion in tax
administration cannot be over-emphasized. Therefore, the justification for discretion is often the
need for individualized justice.145
The sheer size and complexity of the tax corpus juris also necessitates the exercise of discretion.
In a given tax system, governments levy different forms of taxes under different names. In some
instances, taxpayers do not know when to pay, mode of payment, who to pay to as well as how to
ascertain whether the payment is a tax or something else.146 Clearly worded and easy to understand
representations by public authorities will, in some cases of ambiguity, serve to guide an
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individual’s actions and decisions.147 The words of the UK Court of Appeal, per Moses LJ, in
Gaines-Cooper148 provide some useful explanation on the importance of revenue guidance
specifically:
The importance of the extent to which thousands of taxpayers may rely upon guidance, of
great significance as to how they will manage their lives, cannot be doubted. It goes to the
heart of the relationship between the Revenue and taxpayer. It is trite to recall that it is for
the Revenue to determine the best way of facilitating collection of the tax it is under a
statutory obligation to collect. But it should not be forgotten that the Revenue itself has long
acknowledged that the best way is by encouraging co-operation between the Revenue and
the public… Co-operation requires fair dealing by the Revenue, and frank and open dealing
by the public. Of course the Revenue may refuse to give guidance and re-create a situation
in which the taxpayers and their advisers are left to trawl through the authorities to find a
case analogous to their own, or, if they are fortunate, a statement of principle applicable to
their circumstances.149
The importance of guidance through advance tax ruling was stressed further by the former US
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, Mortimer Caplin, who noted in 1962 that "with
complex tax laws and high tax rates, it is understandable why taxpayers frequently hesitate to move
on important business transactions without some official assurance of the tax consequences. 150
A specific factor that makes discretion indispensable in the tax system is the self-assessment
regime. Nigeria is one of many countries that operate a self-assessment system of tax compliance.
Under self-assessment, the taxpayer is granted the right, by law, to accurately compute their own
tax liability, pay the tax due (at the designated bank or other deposit location) and produce evidence
of tax paid at the time of filing their tax returns at the tax office, on due date.151 On the other hand,
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the tax authority has the responsibility of ensuring taxpayers’ compliance with the tax law and
administration process through enablement, compliance and compliance enforcement activities
that may include the application of statutorily prescribed sanctions. 152
Self-assessment tax compliance in Nigeria is governed by the Tax Administration (selfassessment) Regulations 2011. Overall, the Regulations seek to provide some guidance and
introduce some level of consistency in the filing of self-assessment tax returns.153 It is implicit that
an understanding of the requirements of the substantive tax legislation is a precursor to this do-ityourself method, since a taxpayer that does not know how to ascertain their tax liabilities would
almost certainly not know what to file. Given that the tax rules are not always as simple as breaking
an eggshell, it is sacrosanct that the taxpayer receives some form of external assistance on how to
efficiently make computations. While some taxpayers can afford the services of competent tax
advisors, not all taxpayers can. Moreover, even expert tax advisors cannot always tell with
certainty how the tax authority would apply a specific tax provision, especially one that is
ambiguous. Further, the absence of guidance may also circumvent the ability of the taxpayer to
plan its affairs prudently, even in the most genuine of cases. All these factors considered, the
importance of tax guidance cannot be lost.154
Again, guidance enables taxpayers to better apply filing rules, which reduces the need for the
revenue to conduct intense tax audits. This can allow the revenue to channel limited resources to
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matters that require closer attention. Guidance can also help ensure a uniform application of tax
law to taxpayers, which engenders equity among similarly placed taxpayers. When guidance is
publicly provided, all taxpayers can more readily ascertain the position of the tax authority on
specific matters, which reduces the likelihood of similarly placed taxpayers being treated
differently by individual tax officers.
Despite the foregoing, it should be emphasized that tax discretion is not without concerns. Tax
rulings, for instance, can expose the tax system to base erosion, increase administration costs,
cause unwanted delays or lead to the “privatization” of tax law.155 Further, a peep into some of the
statutory discretions in Nigeria reveals that they are too wide and susceptible to abuse particularly
in Nigeria where there are high levels of politics and corruption in the public service.156 Corruption
is said to be prevalent in the administration of taxes and duties in Nigeria, such that until recently,
it was commonplace for tax officers to collect tax payments partly on behalf of one’s self and
partly for the government.157 Evaders take advantage of these corrupt systems to bribe officials
rather than pay taxes; and tax assessors collude with taxpayers, particularly with regard to the
personal income tax, or in some cases, in connection with the assessment. 158 In that respect, the
social context of discretion, and the need for oversight must be emphasized.
Because discretion also exposes taxpayers to abusive practices by tax officers, it is important that
the rights of taxpayers are adequately protected. Taxpayer protection is guaranteed ultimately by
the constitutional principles which underpin each national tax system.159 Debate on the level of

155

Waerzeggers & Hillier supra note 91 at 4.
Adedokun supra note 50 at 15.
157
Leyira Christian Micah, Chukwuma Ebere & Asian Umobong, “Tax System in Nigeria – Challenges and the Way
Forward” (2012) 3:2 Research J Finance and Accounting 9 at 12.
158
Ibid.
159
Freeman & Vella supra note 66 at 80.
156

33

discretion that the tax authority may be allowed to exercise should, thus, take place against the
backdrop of each country’s specific constitutional principles. These principles will define the outer
boundary of the discretion that is allowed under that particular legal system. 160 In Nigeria, these
may include principles such as the separation of powers, the rule of law and the right to own
property, as embodied in Nigeria’s written constitution.
Nigeria does not have specific legislation that outlines or codifies all the rights that a taxpayer is
entitled to enjoy. Some rights are guaranteed by the Constitution, while others may be picked from
tax statutes. Section 42 of the Constitution, for instance, guarantees to an individual the right to
own and acquire both movable and immovable property in any part of Nigeria and the right against
compulsory acquisition of property. Rights contained in statutes include the right to notice in
certain circumstances,161 to a refund of excess tax,162 to confidentiality of information,163 to relief
due to error or mistake in assessment, 164 to appeal,165 to legal representation,166 to privacy,167 etc.168
All these rights are listed in statutes. In contrast, there is no taxpayer right to legitimate expectation
prescribed in any tax legislation or any legislation for that matter.169 However, as I demonstrate in
the ensuing sections, legitimate expectation evolved as a remedy devised by the courts to ensure
that taxpayers – members of the public that interact with other public authorities, generally – are
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treated fairly by the tax authority when they interact with the discretionary functions of the
authority.
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Chapter 3: Legitimate Expectation
3.1

The Concept, Origin and Evolution of Legitimate Expectation

Having discussed the formalities of discretion in the preceding chapter, the aim of this chapter is
to discuss how revenue discretion interfaces with judicial supervision, especially in the form of
judicial review. Although there are various principles of judicial review, the focus of this paper is
on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, which, in theory, provides a certain brand of protection
to taxpayers when the revenue is deemed to abuse its discretion.
Legitimate expectation is a shorthand for the public law principles that will, in some
circumstances, place limitations on a public authority’s ability to act inconsistently with a person’s
expectation as to how the authority would exercise its powers in a particular situation or case,
where the expectation is reasonably based on a representation by, or consistent past practice of,
the authority.170 Simply put and in the context of tax authorities, the concept of legitimate
expectation provides that where a tax authority gives an opinion or clarification on a tax issue
(either on its own or in response to a specific request by a taxpayer, with full disclosure of the
facts) and the taxpayer has relied on the clarification, then the tax authority should not
retrospectively reverse its position.171 Legitimate expectation creates a basis upon which taxpayers
can adopt and rely on official representations and patterned tax practices with the assurance (which
is indeed the legitimate expectation) that the relevant tax body would maintain its expressed
position or promise; or at least that the courts would intervene if the tax authority reneges.172
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The concept was absorbed into Nigerian law from English common law some three decades ago. 173
In that respect, it seems that the origin of the doctrine can be traced to the reasoning of Lord
Denning MR in his concurring opinion in the prominent case of Schmidt & ors v Secretary of State
for Home Affairs.174 In that case, the plaintiffs, US citizens, had been granted leave by the UK
Home Office to enter the UK for a specified period of time to study at the Hubbard College of
Scientology, East Grinstead. The College was at the time a recognised educational establishment
under the Aliens Order of 1953. Around 1968, during the pendency of their study, the UK
Government resolved that scientology was “a pseudo-philosophical cult” whose practices were
socially harmful. The government thus resolved to “take all steps to curb its growth.” The steps
taken included denying leave to aliens who sought to enter the UK to study scientology. It
happened that the plaintiffs could not conclude their studies within the time specified in the leaves
granted them to stay in the UK and, consequently, applied to the defendant for extension. Their
applications were rejected on the basis of the new anti-scientology policy. The plaintiffs’ stay was,
however, extended for a period of two months to allow them time to plan their departures. The
plaintiffs filed a representative action for themselves and 50 other alien students of the college,
claiming declarations that the defendant’s decision not to consider further similar applications was
unlawful, void and of no effect and that the defendant was bound to consider such applications on
their merit. The lower court ordered that the plaintiffs’ statement of claim be struck out as an abuse
of process of the court and that the action be dismissed for showing no reasonable cause of action.
The court’s main basis was that the plaintiffs had no legal right to challenge the defendant’s
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decision because their entry into and extension of stay in the UK was a privilege that the defendant
had the absolute right to grant or refuse, even without having to show cause. The appeal to the
Court of Appeal was dismissed on the same grounds. Lord Denning MR in giving his concurrent
decision made the following observations:
The speeches in Ridge v Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40 show that an administrative body may, in
a proper case, be bound to give a person who is affected by their decision an opportunity of
making representations. It all depends on whether he has some right or interest, or, I would
add, some legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair to deprive him without
hearing what he has to say.175
So marked the birth of the common law doctrine of legitimate expectations, a doctrine that now
enjoys varying degrees of acceptance and application in the jurisprudence of many countries.176
Over the years, legitimate expectation has become a key principle within judicial review. Many
cases succeed, or at least get off the ground, by relying on legitimate expectation. The applicant
will say to the court: (a) I have one; (b) it is under threat; and (c) the court should protect me.177 In
Attorney-General of Hon Kong v NG Yuen Shiu it was stated that the word "legitimate" means
"reasonable", and that, accordingly, "legitimate expectations" includes expectations which go
beyond enforceable legal rights, provided they have some reasonable basis.178
In Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors. v Minister for the Civil Service, 179 it was held, inter
alia, that an aggrieved person was entitled to invoke judicial review if he showed that a decision
of a public authority affected him by depriving him of some benefits or advantage that in the past
he had been permitted to enjoy and which he legitimately expected to be permitted to continue to
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enjoy, either until he was given reasons for its withdrawal and the opportunity to comment on
those reasons, or because he had received an assurance that it would not be withdrawn before he
had been given the opportunity of making representation against the withdrawal.
The extent to which Lord Denning intended the doctrine to play out in subsequent cases was not
elaborated on in his reasoning. In the Schmidt case, the court’s discussion focused on procedural
fairness. The legitimate expectation referred to in Schmidt did not give the alien students an
enforceable substantive right to stay for the time originally permitted but an enforceable right to
be heard before the decision to revoke their permit was taken: a procedural protection only.180 In
Schmidt, Lord Denning did not pause to explain the rationale of legitimate expectation.181 He did
so three years later in R v Liverpool Corporation; ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’
Association182 where he stated that:
So long as the performance of the undertaking is compatible with their public duty, they
must honour it… At any rate they ought not to depart from it except after the most serious
consideration and hearing what the other party has to say; and then only if they are satisfied
that the overriding interest requires it. The public interest may be better served by honouring
their undertaking than breaking it.
Thus, traditionally, English administrative law recognized only procedural protection for
legitimate expectations (so that when legitimate expectations were infringed, only additional
procedural rights, such as a hearing, were granted).183 If Lord Denning intended legitimate
expectation only as a procedural safeguard, the frontiers evolved with time into the realm of
substantive protection. The potential extension of the principle to substantive benefits emerged
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later in English law.184 The cases of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Asif
Mahmood Khan185 (Court of Appeal) and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p
Ruddock186 are commonly cited in connection with this development. Both cases concerned the
application of published government policy criteria (relating respectively to entry clearance for
children, and telephone tapping). In the former case, the UK Court of Appeal equated the criteria
to procedural benefits, applying the principles stated by Lord Fraser in the AG Hong Kong case,
as follows:
I have no doubt that the Home Office letter afforded the applicant a reasonable expectation
that the procedures it set out, which were just as certain in their terms as the question and
answer in Mr. Ng's case, would be followed, that if the result of the implementation of those
procedures satisfied the Secretary of State of the four matters mentioned a temporary entry
clearance certificate would be granted and that the ultimate fate of the child would then be
decided by the adoption court of this country. I have equally no doubt that it was considered
by the department at the time the letter was sent out that if those procedures were fully
implemented they would be sufficient to safeguard the public interest. The letter can mean
nothing else. This is not surprising. The adoption court will apply the law of this country and
will thus protect all the interests which the law of this country considers should be protected.
The Secretary of State is, of course, at liberty to change the policy but in my view, vis-a-vis
the recipient of such a letter, a new policy can only be implemented after such recipient has
been given a full and serious consideration whether there is some overriding public interest
which justifies a departure from the procedures stated in the letter...187
In the latter case, Taylor J, although dismissing the case on the facts, treated the principle as one
of “fairness” not limited to procedural benefits.188 The extension to substantive benefits remained
controversial for some years.189 It was not until around the end of the 20th Century that the UK
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Court of Appeal in R v North and East Devon Health Authority, Ex parte Coughlan.190 undertook
a comprehensive analysis of the authorities and the principles underlying them.191
Coughlan involved a severely disabled woman, Miss Coughlan, who was receiving nursing care
in Mardon House, a National Health Service facility managed by the defendant. The defendant
had made several representations to her that she would be able to spend the rest of her life in
Mardon House. The defendant decided to shut down the facility due to the overwhelming cost of
maintenance. On an application for judicial review of the closure decision, the judge quashed the
decision to close Mardon House, holding that the applicant and other patients had been given a
clear promise that Mardon House would be their home for life and the health authority had not
established an overriding public interest which justified it in breaking that promise. The decision
was upheld by the UK Court of Appeal.
Coughlan, accordingly, defused any doubt that legitimate expectation could be a substantive
remedy of judicial review. Indeed, some now only accord utilitarian weight to the substantive
strand of legitimate expectation.192 As such, going by case law, there are three situations where
legitimate expectation may arise.193 The first situation is where a public body makes a
representation to the claimant (by an express promise or by pursuing a course of action) which it
subsequently retracts. The second situation is where a public body departs from a general policy
or practice in the circumstances of a particular case. 194 Third, a legitimate expectation may be
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established where a public body replaces one general policy or practice with a new policy or
practice, although this proposition remains contentious.195
It is worth noting, perhaps, that at the time the Coughlan case was decided, the Nigerian Supreme
Court had introduced legitimate expectation into Nigerian jurisprudence, and, invariably,
recognised substantive legitimate expectation, even though the UK authorities that the Court relied
on were mainly procedural. It is only proper that I pause my analysis of the English experience
and take a detour to Nigeria.
3.2 Legitimate Expectation in Nigerian Administrative Law Jurisprudence
Legitimate expectation made its debut in Nigerian adjudication decades ago in the prominent case,
Stitch v Attorney-General of the Federation & 3 ors.196 In that case, the appellant, a Nigerian
citizen, while in Western Germany (as it then was) bought a used 1976 Model Mercedes Benz 280
Saloon car, which she shipped to Nigeria on 2nd February, 1982. The car arrived at the Lagos
harbor on 3rd April 1982. While the appellant’s shipping agent was dealing with the Nigerian
Customs, the appellant went over to the Ministry of Commerce to obtain an import licence, the
conditions for which she knew, and fulfilled, before that date.197 At the Ministry she made her
application for import licence, which she said she expected to receive the same day or the next
day. That was not to be. Instead, she was told, after submitting her application, that there was "a
directive" that no import license was to be issued. She was naturally disturbed and, thus,
complained to the Permanent Secretary who told her to return the next day. She returned only to
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be told by the Permanent Secretary that she should be regularly coming to the Ministry as they
would soon resume the issuance of import licences. It was not until 29th April 1982 that an import
license was issued to her. In the meantime, on 20th April 1982 the then Economic Stabilisation
(Temporary Provisions) (Customs Duties) Order 1982 was promulgated. This Order increased the
rate of duty payable on the type of car the appellant imported, from 331/3% to 500%. On the basis
of 331/3%, the duty which the Board of Customs assessed for the appellant to pay on 13th April 1982
was ₦1,449.22. She presented 'a certified cheque' for that amount to the Customs, but the Customs
would not accept it until she produced the import licence. After the import license was issued to
her on 29th April 1982, she re-presented the certified cheque with it but the Board of Customs told
her she would have to pay, not the ₦1,449.22, as they originally assessed, but a sum of ₦14,500.00
on the basis of the new 500% rate. The appellant refused to pay this new amount, arguing that the
car had arrived in the country before the 20th April 1982 Order was made. The Customs thereupon
accepted the certified cheque but stated that it was only accepted as part of the ₦14,500.00 duty.
The appellant deposed that she concluded that the federal government (1st respondent) deliberately
suspended the issue of import license to her when she applied for it, in order that she would be
caught by the new Order. She argued that the government had no power to do so and that the duty
payable was the rate of duty applicable when the car arrived in Nigeria. The appellant, thus, filed
an action for judicial review, contending, inter alia, that she had a legitimate expectation that the
1st respondent would treat her application for import license the way it used to at the time that she
applied and that the 1st respondent’s decision to withhold deliberately the license until the
Economic Stabilisation Order came into force amounted to an abuse of power. The appellant
averred that the Ministry of Commerce had always issued import licences as a matter of course in
respect of motors cars which satisfied these conditions and the Ministry was aware that Nigerians
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had arranged their affairs accordingly, and that in reliance upon this policy, Nigerians imported
cars to the Nigerian Ports confident of being issued with an import license when the conditions
were satisfied, and that she had complied with all the said conditions and was therefore entitled to
be issued with an import license. Both the Federal High Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed
the appellant’s case, holding that the appellant could not prove that the Minister acted arbitrarily.
The Supreme Court of Nigeria overturned the decisions of the lower courts and held unanimously
in favour of the appellant.198 According to the Court:
It has to be remembered that the Appellant is a Nigerian Citizen and as had been shown
earlier, she had relied on the conditions laid down by the Minister for importation of the type
of car she brought in. She had fulfilled those conditions. There was no denial that those
conditions were the conditions applicable to the Appellant's case and that the Appellant had
fulfilled them. Was the Appellant who was returning home to her country from a sojourn
into a foreign land, not entitled to rely upon the word of the Minister of her country that if
she fulfilled the conditions put out by the Minister, she would be entitled to the benefits of
that fulfillment? Would those conditions put out to the whole world by the Minister not
amount (to say the least) to a promise to the Appellant that if she fulfilled those conditions
the Minister would act in the way therein prescribed, namely, that she would be entitled to
bring into Nigeria her car paying in respect thereof the prevailing customs duty? I must
answer these questions in the affirmative, just as such a question was answered by the Privy
Council in Attorney-General of Hon Kong v NG Yuen Shiu (1983) 2 A.C. 629 referred to
us by Appellant's Counsel.199
After reviewing a number of foreign authorities, the Court held further as follows:
The rationale which I gather from these decided cases is that a Government in which the
citizen is entitled to repose confidence and trust, is not expected to act in breach of the faith
which it owes to the citizen, and if it does so act, the courts will intervene. The right of the
appellant in this case to be issued an import licence, on terms prescribed by the Minister on
compliance with those terms, had vested. It was the right of the citizen which could not be
ignored.200
In conclusion of the leading judgment, it was held as follows:
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It was an improper exercise of the Minister's discretionary power for him to suspend the
issue of a license to the Appellant when the duty payable was 311/3% in order that the
Appellant might be made to pay, at a later date, duty charged at the rate of 500%, thus
steeping her into an additional financial liability of about N13,000.00. It was unjust and
retrospectively punitive. The Legislature had not given to the Minister authority to levy that
amount from the Appellant. Accordingly, this appeal must be allowed and is hereby allowed.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 26th November 1984 is hereby set aside
and in its place Claims 1 and 2 of the Appellant's claims succeed. 201
The application of legitimate expectation in the above case is emphatic. Without much elaboration
at this stage, there are certain points that I would like to note. The first is that the decision was
made by the Supreme Court, which means that it is binding on all other courts in Nigeria and
makes legitimate expectation an integral part of Nigerian administrative law jurisprudence, at all
levels. Second, the application of legitimate expectation is not merely procedural but substantive,
even though most of the foreign authorities discussed by the court were based on procedural
legitimate expectation. Third, the decision portrays legitimate expectation as an enabler of – rather
than a deviation from – the rule of law.202 Fourth, the case asserts the importance of checks and
balances vis-à-vis separation of powers. Fifth, the decision reemphasizes the authority of the court,
by judicial review, to evaluate the exercise of discretion by administrative bodies. Sixth, the
advancement of judicial review by the court is based on principles such as fairness, non-abuse of

201

Ibid at 1029, para E–G.
It has elsewhere been soundly argued that “whenever a person relies on an administrative policy and acts upon it,
both the interests of efficiency and fairness require that the expectations entailed by such a policy will gain suitable
legal protection. Such policies laid down by the administration operate in various fields of human activities and affect
the way individuals plan the course of their actions. In this respect the duty of the authority to comply with the rules
which it creates is no more than a necessary application of the fundamental principle of the rule of law in its formal
meaning. This principle demands governmental power to be exerted only by known, predictable rules, which can
provide guidance and enable individuals to plan and control their course of action." When an authority publishes its
policies and acts upon them, it improves the ability of individuals to plan their actions and fosters the notion of the
rule of law. See Dotan, supra note 104 at 28. See also Hysni Ahmetaj, “Legal Certainty and Legitimate Expectation
in the EU Law” (2014) 1:2 Interdisciplinary J Research and Development 20.
202

45

power, good administration, confidence and trust.203 Seventh, legitimate expectation is recognised
as a ‘right’, the breach of which the court has a duty to intervene to protect.204
A second case that follows the pattern of Stitch, but this time directly in the realm of taxation, in
lending support to the existence of legitimate expectations is Shell Petroleum Development
Company Limited v Federal Board of Inland Revenue. 205 In that case the Supreme Court upheld
an extra-statutory agreement between the Nigerian government and the appellant, the effect of
which was the reduction of the petroleum profits taxes payable by the appellant. The Court held
that given that payable tax constituted a debt owed by the taxpayer to the state, the debt obligation
could be compromised. The court regarded the agreement as an accord and satisfaction on the
original tax debts. The court held that the tax authority, as an agent of the federal government was
bound by the agreements between its principal and the taxpayer. Accordingly, exchange losses and
Central Bank commissions incurred by the appellant in complying with the agreements were
deductible by the appellant in computing its tax liabilities, even though the deductions inevitably
led to a significant reduction in the taxes that the respondent could collect from the appellant.
Uwais, C.J.N., who read the lead judgment held:
It is clear that the profits tax to be paid by the appellant for the 1973 period had been assessed.
But for Exhibits 1,2,3 and 4, the tax would have been paid in Nigeria and in Nigerian
currency which is Naira. However, the appellant was under the additional obligation by
virtue of the Exhibits to effect payment in England. Failure to do so would have undoubtedly
rendered the appellant liable to sanction at the instance of and by the Federal Government.
There is also the legal effect to be given to the agreements entered between the appellant and
the Federal Government. There is no doubt that the agreements (Exhibits 2 and 3) are not
illegal contracts because their terms vary the obligations of the appellant and the respondent
203
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under the Petroleum Profits Tax Act, 1959; nor are they against public policy - See Solanke
v Abed (1962) 1 SCNLR 371; (1962) 1 All NLR 230 at pp. 233-4. Since the agreements are
not illegal it follows that the principles of contract can rightly apply to them. Hence the issue
of accord and satisfaction becomes pertinent to this case. 206
Further, Ogundare, J.S.C., in his concurring judgment, observed that:
In any event, it is my considered view that payments made by the appellant to the account
of the Central Bank of Nigeria with the Bank of England in London were in satisfaction of
its obligations under Exhibits 3 and 4. By the agreement, the Federal Government had
discharged the appellant of its liability under section 8 of the Act to pay tax in Lagos in Naira
currency and had substituted therefore a new liability to make payment in London in pounds
sterling… The court below, per Awogu J.C.A, was right when it observed: "Clearly, if Shell
paid their tax in sterling abroad, as agreed, and the Board issued the necessary receipts in
acknowledgement of the payments, how can it be argued that the payments did not discharge
the tax obligations of the Company? It was no longer open to the Board to approbate and
reprobate. Ayinde J. appears to have been right in so holding.207
What these pronouncements drive home is that the state can consummate extra-statutory
compromises on tax matters and those compromises may not be deemed illegal. A taxpayer who
relies on those compromises may be entitled to judicial protection should the state chose to
reprobate. By allowing the deductibility of the foreign exchange losses, for instance, the Supreme
Court impliedly endorsed the payment agreement between the government and the taxpayer,
despite the agreement not being within the contemplation of the Petroleum Profits Tax Act and
despite those expenses being, at best, a stretch of the meaning of expenses incidental to petroleum
operations, as defined in the relevant statute. It is my view that the same weight can be ascribed to
legitimate expectation. In other words, the court can, in appropriate cases, uphold a legitimate
expectation where a taxpayer has reached some understanding or compromise with the revenue on
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how the affairs of the taxpayer would be treated, such that, in those circumstances, the revenue
may not be allowed to reverse itself if to do so would be unfairly detrimental to the taxpayer.
Although legitimate expectation is not mentioned, Azubuike v Govt of Enugu State208 is another
case that lends credence to the contention that the Nigerian court may in an appropriate case invoke
judicial powers to bind a public authority to a representation made to a private person. In that case,
the Court of Appeal reasoned that:
The courts over time have continued to be confronted with this kind of situation where
members of the public rely to their detriment on the unauthorized acts or assurances of state
officials. The question has always been whether equitable estoppel should be allowed to
operate to ameliorate the hardship that the member of the public would suffer from strict
application of the doctrine of ultra vires. The over time is that the judicial approach to the
determination of this question in each case is influenced by the subject matter and the
peculiar facts of each case. It has become judicially accepted that in some situations a citizen
is entitled to rely on the organ or government having the authority it has asserted if he cannot
reasonably be expected to know the limits of that authority and he should not be required to
suffer for his reliance on such assertion if it turns out that the organ lacks the necessary
authority… It is clear from the long line of judicial decisions on the point that it is extremely
difficult to define with any degree of precision the circumstances in which the courts will be
prepared, in the interest of “Fairness” to the individual, to derogate from orthodox notions
of ultra vires. This is particularly so with cases of detrimental reliance on the negligent
misstatements and assurances of government officials.209 [Emphasis added]
It is apparent from the above pronouncement that what the court had in mind to protect was a
legitimate expectation. The pattern of the above cases, few as they are, lays the foundational
framework for the contention that Nigerian jurisprudence does recognize legitimate expectation
and that the court may be moved to invoke the doctrine in an appropriate tax matter. In practice,
however, despite the continued prominence of judicial review in Nigerian adjudication, litigants
and courts alike have largely ignored legitimate expectation, more than three decades after Stitch.
There has been next to no doctrinal or normative advancement of the doctrine in Nigeria. As I will
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show, even in a case where legitimate expectation would, perhaps, have represented a more
plausible argument, parties relied instead on other principles, particularly estoppel. The reason for
this is not clear. It is, however, pleasantly surprising that the few subsequent cases that border on
legitimate expectation are tax-related cases. In the next chapter of this thesis, I discuss the
application of legitimate expectation in Nigerian tax jurisprudence.
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Chapter 4: Legitimate Expectation and Taxation in Nigeria
4.1

Legitimate Expectation in Nigerian Tax Jurisprudence

The romance between taxation and legitimate expectation in Nigeria is controversial. The few
relevant cases mainly reveal that judicial attitude to legitimate expectation in tax matters in Nigeria
is not very accommodating.210 I commence this chapter with Federal Board of Inland Revenue v
Halliburton (WA) Limited.211 The FBIR made additional assessments of US$6,927,248212 for the
tax years of 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 on Halliburton. This was affirmed by the Body of Appeal
Commissioners (the BAC).213 Halliburton appealed the additional assessments to the Federal High
Court (FHC), on points of law alone, seeking to set aside the judgment of the BAC by declaring
the additional assessments invalid, null and void and directing the appellant to refund to
Halliburton the US$6,927,248, with interest. The additional assessment arose from contractual
transactions between Halliburton, a nonresident company incorporated in the Cayman Islands, and
its Nigerian affiliate, Haliburton Energy Services Nigeria Limited (HESNL). It was agreed
between Halliburton and HESNL that Halliburton would obtain contracts from third parties in
Nigeria for execution by HESNL with billing for the contracts made in United States (US) Dollars.
It was the US Dollars income derived by Halliburton from the services rendered by HESNL to
third parties that the FBIR taxed additionally in 2002.
Halliburton’s challenge of the tax assessments at the BAC was unsuccessful, but an appeal to the
Federal High Court succeeded, which prompted the revenue to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The
Court of Appeal granted the relief sought by the FBIR. Having resolved the main appeal against
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Halliburton, the Court of Appeal then proceeded to resolve a cross-appeal filed by Halliburton.
The issues raised by Halliburton in the cross-appeal were as follows:
(1) whether the original assessments were final and conclusive and if they were, whether
the respondent could re-open them on the same facts and issue;
(2) whether 'the lower court was right to hold that Exhibit S (the Information Circular No.
93/02) is merely 'the personal opinion' of its maker;
(3) whether a legitimate expectation had been created by the combined reading of
Exhibits B, C and S in favour of the applicant (sic) such that the respondent is barred
in the circumstance from denying.
Issues 2 and 3 are of importance to this paper, so I restrict my discussion to them. On issue 2,
Halliburton argued that Exhibit S,214 contrary to the holding of the FHC, was not merely an opinion
on a point of law upon which there was no estoppel, but rather had the force of law. Halliburton
argued that the circular was valid as it did not conflict with the parent law, and was, therefore,
binding on the FBIR who should have followed the circular in assessing Halliburton’s tax
liabilities. Halliburton argued that the FBIR could not be allowed to resile from the representations
made to the effect that recharges were allowable deductions for a non-Nigerian company as the
representations were caught by the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Halliburton argued further
that the FHC misunderstood the argument on the doctrine of legitimate expectation by likening it
to estoppel. Estoppel, Halliburton submitted, applies when a party is not allowed to approbate or
reprobate, while legitimate expectation is based on the idea of fairness, certainty and equality in
the conduct of public affairs, to ensure that public authorities do not alter abruptly existing policies
to the detriment of the legitimate expectation of members of the public who arranged their affairs
in accordance with the policy.
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The FBIR countered, inter alia, that taxpayers seeking revenue allowances for their proposal must
make clear and unambiguous full disclosures before there would be legitimate expectation by the
taxpayer from the assurance given by the tax authority, which the Halliburton failed to make at the
initial or original tax assessment. FBIR further argued that clear statutory words override any
expectation. The FBIR added that the circular could not override the clear provisions of Section
26(1) of CITA; that while there was arbitrariness in the exercise of ministerial powers amounting
to ministerial perfidy in Stitch, such was not the situation in the instant case; that, whether the
lower court confused estoppels with legitimate expectation was immaterial since the ultimate
decision reached by the court lower favoured Halliburton, showing the conclusion reached by the
court below did not lead to a miscarriage of justice, especially as there is overlap between
legitimate expectation and estoppel. The Court of Appeal pronounced on legitimate expectation as
follows:
The doctrine of legitimate expectation is not in the realm of estoppel. The court below
thought it is a specie of estoppel. It slipped… What the doctrine postulates is that where a
public body or person acting in public authority has issued a promise or has been acting in a
given way the members of the public who are to be affected by the scheme of conducting
public affairs in the charted manner would, by law, require the promise or practice to be
honoured or kept by the public body or person acting in public authority, save where there
exists sound basis not to so insist on the settled scheme of conducting public affairs. The
doctrine, therefore, enjoins public bodies to be fair, straightforward and consistent in their
dealings with the public. In other words, the doctrine of legitimate expectation is based on
the existence of regular practice by a public body which the claimant can reasonably expect
to continue or subsist and thus relies on the state of affairs to conduct or arrange his business
or affairs in anticipation of the availability of the regular practice to cater for the case of the
claimant. Fair and open dealing are the pillars of the doctrine. And fairness requires that the
exercise of the doctrine of legitimate expectation be moored to full disclosure or utmost food
faith by the potential beneficiary of the doctrine. See the apt English case of R.V Board of
Inland Revenue (supra) 91 at 111 (per Bingham, LJ). 215
The Court then proceeded to apply the principles to the case before it:
In the instant case, the cross-appellant had not made full disclosure of the income from the
transaction. It omitted to declare the income or profit its subsidiary, HESNL, was to derive
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from the transaction for assessment to tax at the original assessment to tax which covered
the declared income or profit of the crossappellant from the transaction only. In the absence
of full disclosure by the cross-appellant of the total income in the first exercise, the crossappellant could not reasonably rely on Exhibits B, C and S to reap benefit from the doctrine
of legitimate expectation which is rooted in utmost good faith by stakeholders concerned
with tax matters.
Again, Wade and Forsyth's Administrative Law (supra) states that clear or unambiguous
statutory words, such as Sections 26(1) and 48(1) of CITA dealing with additional
assessment to tax of taxpayers, would "override any (legitimate) expectation howsoever
founded." In addition, the Privy Council case of A. - G., Hong Kong v Ng.Yuen Shiu (1983)
2 AC 629 638(F) Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council,
aptly held inter alia that - "It is in the interest of good administration that [a public authority]
should act fairly and should implement its promise, so long as the implementation does not
interfere with its statutory duty." (my emphasis). Further, in the useful case of Ex P. Begbie
(2000) 1 WLR 1115, it was held that the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation
was aborted or frustrated by the operation of statute. A similar result was reached in the case
of Birkdale District Electric Supply Co. Ltd. (1926) AC 355 at 364 followed in Ex P.
Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association (1972) 2 Q.8., 299 to the effect that a person of
public authority entrusted with statutory functions for public purpose cannot compromise
the functions by entering into any agreement or taking any action incompatible with the
discharge of the statutory functions. Since Section 26 of CITA supersedes Exhibits B, C and
S, the doctrine of legitimate expectation lavishly argued by the cross-appellant yields ground
to the clear words of Section 26 of CITA. See Administrative Law by Wade (supra).216
It is clear from the above passages that the court resolved the issue of legitimate expectation against
the taxpayer on grounds of both law and fact. The factual aspect is the nondisclosure of relevant
fact by the taxpayer. The legal aspect concerns statutory limitation. The legal aspect is of greater
interest to this research because it is a theme that plays in the other cases. Legality is a point that
the courts have been quick to stress in the few relevant cases. Regardless of the outcome, however,
Halliburton bears significance as the first judicial exploration of tax-based legitimate expectation
in Nigeria. As such there are significant implications that can be drawn from the case; the main
one being, as noted here, that the case has ultra vires or statutory limitation underpinnings. In other
words, the court cannot deem an expectation to be legitimate if it is induced by a representation
that is legally “incorrect”, since the statute is supreme. A wrong interpretation is only “a personal
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opinion” of the person interpreting. Any assurance arising from it cannot be upheld by the court
because the court would not endorse an “ultra vires” act or position. This will be further discussed
below.217
In Transocean Drilling UK Limited v Federal Inland Revenue Service,218 Global Offshore – a
Nigerian resident company – provided logistic support services to Transocean. In return,
Transocean paid recharges to Global Offshore (costs plus 10% mark-up). In filing its CIT returns
for 2008–2013, Transocean deducted the recharges it had paid to Global Offshore. The respondent
rejected the deductions and assessed the appellant to additional CIT on the recharges. The appellant
contended that the recharges were allowable, relying on paragraph 5.2(i) of the respondent’s
Information Circular No. 93/02, which purports to allow the deduction of recharges. The TAT
followed the decision of the Court of Appeal in Halliburton in holding that a circular is not a
subsidiary legislation and has no force of law. Even if it were a subsidiary legislation, it would still
be overridden by the CITA in the event of any conflict. Instructively, the TAT also observed that:
The doctrine of legitimate expectation thrives on fairness and openness. To benefit from the
doctrine, a person must have made full disclosure or displayed ultimate good faith in the
transaction. The doctrine cannot stand when it conflicts with a clear statutory provision.
Since the Appellant did not declare its profits to the Respondent, the Respondent had to
compute the Appellant’s tax liability using the deemed profit mode. Section 30(1) of CITA
is clear and it supersedes any legitimate expectations the Appellant might entertain.219
The Halliburton and Transocean decisions appear to follow a consistent view held by Nigerian
courts on the legal status of circulars. For instance, in Omatseye v Federal Republic of Nigeria,220
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the Court of Appeal, quoting the Supreme Court in Maideribe v Federal Republic of Nigeria stated
as follows:
Administrative circulars or notices have its (sic) place in government but cannot create an
offence. The apex Court in the case of MAIDERIBE v. FRN (2013) LPELR-21861(SC) on
circulars held thus: "In Administrative Law Book, Eight Edition Co Authored by Prof. W.
Wade and C. Forsyth page 851 throws light on the status of departmental circulars generally.
Such circulars are- "a common form of administrative document by which instructions are
disseminated; Many such circulars are identified by serial numbers and published and many
of them contain general statements of policy... they are therefore of great importance to the
public giving much guidance about Governmental organization and the exercise of
discretionary powers. In themselves they have no legal effect whatsoever, having no
statutory authority.221
The main theme of these two cases is that a circular cannot create an offence. This, of course, goes
without saying given the nullum crimen sine lege nulla poena sine lege principle enshrined in
section 36(12) of the Constitution, which forbids charging a person for an offence that is not
created by a written law.222 However, without disputing the point that a circular cannot create an
offence, it is my respectful opinion that these cases should be viewed in the narrow context of
criminal law: that is, the principle that a circular cannot create an offence does not necessitate the
inference that a circular cannot create a legitimate expectation, especially when it conveys the
discretionary intentions of the issuer.
The above line of authorities was reiterated in an almost identical case to Halliburton. In VF
Worldwide Holdings Ltd v Federal Inland Revenue Service,223 the appellant, a nonresident
company, was awarded a contract to render visa related services to United Kingdom Border
Agency (UKBA) in many countries, including Nigeria, in 2007. To execute the Nigerian portion
of the contract, the appellant set up a Nigerian company called VF Nigeria Limited (VF Nigeria)
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with which it executed a Service Agreement. Under the Service Agreement, the appellant
appointed VF Nigeria to perform the Nigerian portion of the contract in respect of which the latter
was entitled to cost plus 8%. For the 2007 year of assessment, the appellant paid a total sum of
GBP2,547,874 to VF Nigeria for the performance of the contract (out of the total contract sum of
GBP2,902,577). Based on the practice of the respondent, the information circular issued by the
respondent and judicial decisions, the appellant made its self-assessment on turnover assessment.
The appellant deducted the sum of GBP 2,547,874 it paid to VF Nigeria as recharges from the
contract sum of GBP 2,902,577 to arrive at its own turnover for the purpose of the turnover
assessment. The appellant thereafter subjected 20% of the excess to tax at the rate of 30%, resulting
in a tax liability of GBP21,281.
After a tax audit, the respondent disallowed the appellant's treatment of recharges as deductible,
contending that it is 20% of the gross turnover of the appellant that should be subjected to tax at
the corporate tax rate. The respondent's position was that all costs incurred by the appellant,
including the recharges, were covered or captured by the 80% turnover that was not assessed to
tax under the Turnover Basis of Assessment.224 The appellant disputed the assessment and
consequently appealed to the TAT.
The second contention of the appellant was that based on the information circular issued by the
respondent stating that recharges were deductible, VF Worldwide was entitled to a legitimate
expectation that it would not be penalized for complying with a guideline issued by the respondent.
The appellant submitted that it acted in good faith by disclosing the total contract sum, including
the amount paid to VF Nigeria, in its tax returns, and applied the formula set out in the respondent's
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information circular. The appellant relied on the UK cases of R (on the application of Bancoult) v
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2)225 and R v IRC Ex p. MFK
Underwriting Agencies Ltd in support.226
The TAT adopted the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Halliburton to the effect that a circular
is not a subsidiary legislation and, therefore, has no force of law; and that even if the circular were
a subsidiary legislation, CITA (the relevant statute) would prevail. With regard to the doctrine of
legitimate expectation, the TAT also adopted the opinion of the Court of Appeal that the doctrine
of legitimate expectation thrives on fairness and openness of dealings; to benefit from the doctrine,
a person must have made full disclosure or displayed utmost good faith in the transaction; and that
the doctrine cannot stand when it conflicts with a clear statutory provision. The TAT held that the
appellant did not declare its profits to the respondent, as a consequence of which the respondent
had to compute the appellant's tax liability using the deemed profit mode. The TAT, following the
precedent in Halliburton and Transocean Drilling, concluded that Section 30(1)(b)(i) of CITA is
clear and supersedes any legitimate expectations that the appellant might harbor. The TAT, thus,
reaffirmed the supremacy of statute over legitimate expectation.
Although none of these cases went the way of the taxpayer, the way the courts went about
dissecting the facts of each case also elicits the conclusion that had the courts found sufficient
factual basis, they may have upheld the legitimate expectations of the respective taxpayers.
The Court of Appeal in Saipem Contracting Nigeria Ltd & 2 ors v Federal Inland Revenue Service
& 2 ors,227 although upholding the taxpayer-adverse decision of the FHC, adopted a similarly
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analytical approach that suggests that a court may, in an appropriate case, be inclined to protect
legitimate expectation. The appellants, related multinational corporations, entered into a
consortium agreement with Shell to supply certain oil and gas services. The contract had onshore
and offshore work components. The nonresident companies were to perform their tasks outside
Nigeria, while Saipem Nigeria was responsible for the onshore work. In a bid to ascertain their
potential tax liabilities in Nigeria, the appellants, prior to commencing the performance of the
contract, obtained advance tax rulings from the FIRS to the apparent effect that the nonresident
companies (NRCs) would not be liable to CIT, etc., if they performed their responsibilities outside
Nigeria. However, the FIRS subsequently reversed its position and assessed tax on the income of
the NRCs. The FIRS reckoned that the incomes all derived from a “single contract”, the proceeds
of which were under Nigerian tax law fully subject to tax in Nigeria irrespective of place of
performance. The appellants challenged these assessments at the FHC, Lagos. The challenge was
unsuccessful, except as regards VAT, which the Court determined was not payable by the
appellants, the providers of the services. The appellants, thus, appealed to the Court of Appeal,
which dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and upheld the decision of the lower court. One of
the arguments raised by the appellants was that the FIRS was “estopped” from resiling from the
tax ruling. The Court, upon examination of the exhibits, found that the appellants had entered the
contracts before seeking the opinion of the tax authority, so there was no reliance. Consequently,
the court concluded that since there was no reliance there could be no estoppel. The case, thus,
failed on the facts.
Although what was argued in this case was estoppel, the facts are such that legitimate expectation
might be argued instead. Be that as it may, it is comforting that the court performed a surgical
screening of the facts to determine whether the appellants did rely on the representation made by
58

the FIRS. The court concluded that the appellants did not. In principle, however, taken together
with the pronouncements of the Court of Appeal in Halliburton, it seems there is ample evidence
to assert the existence of judicial recognition of tax-based legitimate expectation in Nigeria. All
the tax cases considered here can be regarded as consistent on this point, only taking the adverse
position based on their peculiar facts or in deference to limitations imposed by statute. What is
more, in the Saipem case, the Court of Appeal found not only that the appellants did not rely on
the tax authority’s guidance but also that the representation was made subject to certain conditions,
which were not fulfilled.228
A theme that flows through the above pronouncement is that some crucial elements to support a
plea of estoppel, as well as legitimate expectation, were missing. Even the representation did not
meet the required levels of unambiguity. There appeared to be no full disclosure on the part of the
appellants. There appellants appeared not to have relied on the FIRS’s representations. Also, the
appellants appeared to have misconstrued the message received from the tax authority, which also
suggests that the message was ambiguous.
Ndibe,229 a Nigerian tax solicitor, offers a forceful criticism of Saipem, a decision which, he asserts,
has done more harm than good in terms of providing a definite position on the binding force of
advance tax rulings (ATRs) in Nigeria. He submits that the court failed to provide any legal
analysis or conclusion on whether ATRs issued by Nigerian tax authorities are binding, and in
what circumstances such ATRs can be revoked. According the commentator, the Court merely
made a general statement on the conditions for the applicability of estoppel and proceeded to
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evaluate the evidence before it (an issue of fact), and drew a conclusion that the FIRS could not be
estopped by law from determining Saipem’s tax liability. He contends that the decision is so fluid
that it is capable of more than one interpretation. On the one hand, it may be taken that the court
upheld and reiterated the decision of the FHC to the effect that ATRs are not binding and all that
is relevant is the court's interpretation of the tax statute. In support of this inference, he points to
the conclusion of the Court of Appeal to the effect that: “the 1st Respondent (i.e. the FIRS) is not
estopped from applying the provisions of the law to determine the tax liability of the
Appellants (i.e. Saipem)…”230 On the other hand, Ndibe contends, the court’s deep factual analysis
seems to have impliedly endorsed the position that the FIRS may not resile from its representation
to Saipem. In other words, if Saipem had proved that it relied on the representation, the FIRS
would have been bound.231 These criticisms can be adjudged fair in some respects. However, I
must emphasize that the court, it seems, was not particularly aided by the arguments that were
advanced by the appellants. Perhaps, if the appellants had put forward a public law claim of
legitimate expectation rather than private law estoppel the court may have done a better job of
analysing that doctrine and its applicability to tax rulings. It seems unlikely to me that such an
analysis would have changed the outcome, but, at least, there could be better doctrinal clarity on
whether the notion of tax-based legitimate expectation subsists. As Ndibe rightly suggests, it is
inferable from the judgment, as well as Halliburton, that there is a place for tax-based legitimate
expectation in Nigeria; which means that there might be circumstances where the tax authority is
bound to an ATR. It is implicit that the court is now inclined to thoroughly examine the facts and
circumstances of each case vis-à-vis the related ATR to determine if legitimate expectation is
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applicable against the tax authority.232 The challenge lies in meeting the threshold for a successful
plea of the doctrine.
In cases like Azubuike and Saipem, although the court discussed estoppel rather than legitimate
expectation, it is apparent from those discussions that the court was in a broader sense
contemplating the possibilities of holding a public authority to a representation made in official
capacity. The opinion of the court in Azubuike, in particular, may pass as an opinion in support of
substantive legitimate expectation. English authorities also show that in the early stages of the
development of legitimate expectation there were mentions of “estoppel” in the context of
estopping the public authority from acting against the interest of the claimant.233 English law
building on legitimate expectation has developed constantly: from the recognition of estoppel in
public law, to the development of substantive remedy in public law cases, to the relocation of
equitable doctrine within the newly developed public law arrangements.234 As far as Nigeria is
concerned, arguments of estoppel are mainly relevant to legitimate expectation from a historically
persuasive perspective, as I attempt here. This is because it is firmly established that estoppel does
not operate against a statutory obligation.235 This trenchant assertion brings us back to some legal
principles that militate against legitimate expectation. These principles, all revolving around the
supremacy of statute, impress that legitimate expectation is not enforceable because to do so would
be to endorse a waiver of statutory mandate or to endorse the ultra vires act of a public authority.
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4.2

Legitimate Expectation and Estoppel, Waiver, Statutory Limitation and Ultra vires

As stated above, a cord that runs through these intertwined principles is that they all resist
legitimate expectation on the general notion that legitimate expectation offends statutory
supremacy. For instance, the principle of waiver is as captured in the locus classicus case of Ariori
& ors v Elemo & ors:
The concept of waiver must be one that presupposes that the person who is to enjoy a benefit
or who has the choice of two benefits, but he either neglects to exercise his right to the
benefit, or where he has a choice of two, he decides to take one but not both...The exercise
has to be a voluntary act. There is little doubt that a man who is not under any legal disability
should be the best judge of his own interest. If therefore having full knowledge of the rights,
interests, profits or benefits conferred upon or accruing to him by and under the law, but he
intentionally decides to give up all these or some of them, he cannot be heard to complain
afterwards that he has not been permitted the exercise of his rights or that he has suffered by
his not having exercised his rights. He should be held to have waived those rights. He is, to
put it in another way, estopped from raising the issue.236
A literal implication of this principle is that once the revenue has made a representation to a
taxpayer, which implies a waiver of a certain right, the revenue cannot go back to reassert that
right. This is, however, subject to the settled principle that a mandatory statutory provision of a
public nature cannot be waived.237 In Menakaya v Menakaya,238 the Nigerian Supreme Court
asserted this position as follows:
When therefore it is argued that a statutory provision has been waived, it has to be considered
whether the statute confers purely private or individual rights which may be waived or
whether the statutory provision confers rights of a public nature as a matter of public policy.
If it is the latter, the provision of such statute cannot be waived as no one is permitted to
contract out of or waive a rule of Public Constitutional Policy.239
In that case, it was further held that:
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A mandatory statutory provision directing a procedure to be followed in the performance of
any duty is not a party's personal right to be waived. You cannot resort to estoppel to
compromise a statutory provision of a public nature. Estoppel is the inhibition to assert a
personal right, benefit or advantage in consequence of previous conduct, admission or in
consequence of a final adjudication of the matter in a court of law. Any decision made by a
court contrary to a mandatory statutory provision is a nullity.240
A plea of estoppel (or even legitimate expectation) may in some respect – depending on whether
the statute is interpreted as mandatory – be construed as imputing a waiver by the tax authority of
its statutory duty to act in a certain way or do certain things (in the extreme cases, statutory
duty/obligation to collect tax) – a duty that the tax authority performs, not for himself, but for the
public. Such an outcome may not be judicially acceptable in the light of the nonwaiver principle.241
Ultra vires, in affinity with the nonwaiver principle, dictates that a public authority cannot exceed
the powers conferred on it by statute.242 In a tax and legitimate expectation context, this is further
underlined by the pronouncement of the Nigerian Court of Appeal in Halliburton to the effect that
the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot stand when it conflicts with a clear statutory
provision.243 Again, in a sense, these principles can also be anchored on the rule of law; that is, the
widely accepted principle that government should govern by known rules rather than by whim or
discretion.244
In my view, there are three counterarguments that can be made against the unmitigated adherence
to statutory limitation in legitimate expectation cases, as captured in the preceding judicial
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pronouncement. First, the prohibition does not apply where the statutory provision in question is
unclear. Second, the prohibition does not apply where the wordings of the statute, although clear,
allow for the exercise of discretion by the revenue.245 Third, the extreme view, even if the statute
is clear and mandatory and the tax authority has applied it ultra vires, there may be compelling
reasons, in some cases, for the court to allow a plea of legitimate expectation.
The first counterargument is simply implied from the wordings of the court’s pronouncement
itself. The inference to be derived from that pronouncement is that in those circumstances, the
revenue should be deemed – as a matter of judicial deference – to have discretion to apply the
provision as it deems reasonable or appropriate; and if the revenue has exercised discretion in a
given case, it should not be allowed to reprobate simply because it now has a “better” view,
especially if the reverse cause would be detrimental to the taxpayer. The court should bear in mind,
as some have urged, that the fact that the FIRS held a view one day and changed the view another
day, in itself, attests to the “greyness” of the law, on the matter.246
Regarding the second counterargument, it seems that the statutory limitation to the doctrine of
legitimate expectations, which is not meant to take absolute effect, has unduly influenced the
courts.247 This is, perhaps, why the FHC in Saipem v FIRS simplistically declared that:
It is not the issue of resiling of earlier statement [sic] that is important now. What is important
are the various provisions of law guiding payment of tax in Nigeria.248
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No case-specific analysis, on the face of it, went into this far-reaching declaration by the court,
prompting skepticism about the status of legitimate expectation in Nigerian tax administration.249
This dismissive approach, thankfully, contrasts with what the courts have done in the other cases
discussed here, including the Court of Appeal decision in Saipem, where the approach was more
detail-oriented. Along these lines, in what I deem to be the proper approach, Okoro argues that the
statutory limitation rule is not meant to be absolute but should be applied based on the
circumstances of each case and with painstaking reading of the relevant law to determine if the
law gives legitimate expectation any chance of survival. He observes that a major flaw of the
approach adopted by the Nigerian court is that it erroneously interchanged the existence of a tax
liability with the mode of assessing tax. While statutory law may create a tax liability with a strict
provision, leaving no escape route, the law can also make permissive provision on how to assess
the tax.250 The dogmatic thought that wide discretionary power is incompatible with the rule of
law cannot be taken seriously today, and indeed, it never contained much truth.251 What the rule
of law demands is not that wide discretionary power should be eliminated, but that the law should
be able to control its exercise.252
Although it is not always clear as to what the extent of discretion is in a given case, it goes without
saying that the law has long recognised that where a body is vested with power to do certain things,
such power includes a discretion on the part of that body to do so. In Shitta-Bey v Federal Public
Service Commission253 the Supreme Court observed that:
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My Lords, I have earlier endeavoured to show that the power of the respondent under Section
147 of Act No. 20 of 1963 includes power to "re-appoint'' and "re-instate". Now, there is no
doubt that where power is vested in a body to do certain things, there is prima facie a
discretion on the part of that body to do so.254
It is naive to assume that the operations of the revenue or any administrative body with complex
functions are wholly teleguided by statute with no room to improvise.255 The wide discretionary
powers conferred on the FIRS by tax statutes, as discussed in chapter 2, invariably allow the FIRS
in many cases to act as it deems appropriate at the particular time and occasion.256 This is a matter
of expediency; and although it is generally undesirable, enforcement of legitimate expectation will
always involve the fettering of the discretion of the decision maker.257 Contrary to the impression
which most of the post-Stitch decisions may have created, statutory law is not a rigid barrier to
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legitimate expectation in taxation. It limits the doctrine only when the language of the law indicates
a mandatory duty. The wording of a statutory provision should be examined in each case to
determine if exercise of powers under that provision is subject to any fairness rule or
consideration.258 A statutory provision can create a substantive power, but the mode or procedure
of exercising the power would be by discretion bestowed on the tax authority by the same law,
another law or an executive policy instrument enabled by law.259
Where the tax authority elicits an expectation which it then sees fit to repudiate, the court should
scrutinize the relevant statute(s) to see whether there is an ounce of discretion in the power
conferred. If the answer is in the affirmative, then, following Stitch, the tax authority should not
be allowed to casually ride on the taxpayer's detriment.260 The Supreme Court decision in Stitch,
which is binding on all other courts in Nigeria, provides ample basis that the court has a duty to
act in appropriate cases. The court should not turn a blind eye to allow the tax authority or any
public authority hide unapologetically behind the wall of statutory limitation.
I should add, and it is fundamental, that there is no statutory obligation on the revenue, at least not
as far as Nigeria is concerned, to give guidance or assurance to a taxpayer, even though it can be
inferred from statute that there is discretion to do so in some instances. Thus, if the revenue, in its
best judgement, decides to exercise that discretion, having not been misled, like a private person
who enters into an undertaking or makes a representation, the revenue should not always be
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allowed to resile simply because it is not statutorily bound. Again, the relatable views of Judge J
in Ex p. MFK Underwriting Agency Ltd are instructive:
In the present case the revenue promulgated a number of guidelines and answered questions
by or on behalf of taxpayers about the likely approach to a number of given problems. The
revenue is not bound to give any guidance at all. If however the taxpayer approaches the
revenue with clear and precise proposals about the future conduct of his fiscal affairs and
receives an unequivocal statement about how they will be treated for tax purposes if
implemented, the revenue should in my judgment be subject to judicial review on grounds
of unfair abuse of power if it peremptorily decides that it will not be bound by such
statements when the taxpayer has relied on them. The same principle should apply to revenue
statements of policy. In those cases where the taxpayer has approached the revenue for
guidance the court will be unlikely to grant judicial review unless it is satisfied that the
taxpayer has treated the revenue with complete frankness about his proposals. Applying
private law tests the situation calls for utmost good faith on the part of the taxpayer. He
should make full disclosure of all the material facts known to him.261
On the third, even more controversial counterargument, I argue that even where the revenue or any
public authority has exceeded its powers in issuing a promise, representation or policy, the dictates
of justice may yet require that the court lift the veil of ultra vires. Courts from other common law
jurisdictions have held often that ultra vires representations cannot create enforceable rights,
interests or obligations.262 Nigerian courts have likewise fully recognized and invoked the ultra
vires doctrine as a measure to forestall a public body from acting beyond its powers.263 Yet, like
any normative doctrines, ultra vires is not without its shortcomings, and there are circumstances
where other prevailing factors demand that the court enforces legitimate expectations even though
to do so may impliedly endorse an ultra vires act. 264 A blanket rule for nonenforcement of ultra
vires representations clashes with the rule of law and good administration values for the protection
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of legitimate expectations.265 It is unreasonable to expect a taxpayer who has relied upon a
statement to accept, even to their detriment, that because the statement was ultra vires they have
no remedy where they have relied upon it.266 In Azubuike v Government of Enugu State, AbdulKadir, J.C.A stated that:
It has become judicially accepted that in some situations a citizen is entitled to rely on the
organ or government having the authority it has asserted if he cannot reasonably be expected
to know the limits of that authority and he should not be required to suffer for his reliance
on such assertion if it turns out that the organ lacks the necessary authority.267
Great unfairness may befall an individual who relied on a representation which they had no reason
to doubt.268 It is also wrong for the innocent party, the representee, to be made to bear alone the
brunt of a misrepresentation, while the public officials walk free.269 Similarly, it seems like missing
the point to argue that the taxpayer does not suffer if a statement, while intra vires, is changed as
a result of a change in the understanding of the law, because the treatment that they thought applied
was wrong. Allowing the tax authority to walk away from the consequences of statements
undermines confidence in the system and in the relationship between the tax authority and
taxpayers.270 A more nuanced approach which permits enforcement in appropriate circumstances
would do less violence to the values underpinning legitimate expectations.271 This call for
loosening the grip is necessitated by the fact that judicial reluctance to acknowledge that legitimate
expectations can give rise to a substantive benefit has had a detrimental effect on the goal of
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achieving fairness in public administration.272 What is required in those circumstances is a delicate
balancing act by the court between the need to entrench what is fair and the need to forestall
administrative indiscretion. Professor Craig has advocated such a balancing test: “where the harm
to the public would be minimal compared to that of the individual, there is good reason to consider
allowing the representation to bind”273 by focusing on more sensitive ways of reconciling the needs
of… innocent individuals and the requirements of the public body.”274
Finally, while estoppel may be a no-go, the Nigerian Supreme Court’s resounding endorsement of
legitimate expectation in Stitch, which invariably placed the interest of the individual over the
state’s revenue generation objective in that case, significantly underlines the plausibility that a
court may do the same with regard to tax.275 This is another reason why legitimate expectation
appears to be the most tenable helmet to protect a taxpayer from a detriment that may result from
unfair changes of policy. In appropriate cases, the court may find itself looking beyond the
somewhat simplistic view that a public right statute is involved and inquire into the fairness of the
specific situation. After all, it is sometimes the case that where rigid or strict adherence to the letter
of the statute will result in absurdity, unfairness or injustice the courts in their interpretative and
equitable jurisdiction will yield to overriding interest of justice and allow substantial justice to
prevail.276 The Nigerian cases discussed in this thesis, especially Stitch, underline a notion, even
if bleak, of judicial response to the demands of fairness in public administration even when the
revenue of the state is at stake. As aptly observed by Okoro, Stitch itself also involves government
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revenue that was rooted in a statute.277 The case of Shell Nig. Ltd & 3 Ors. v FIRS278 further
buttresses the pro-legitimate expectation notion. In that case the Tax Appeal Tribunal (TAT) made
a pronouncement which seems to support a more friendly approach to legitimate expectation in
the context of tax administration:
the Respondent is required to view taxpayers claims and objections within the overriding
objective of its responsibilities for the entire tax regime. It is not fair for the Respondent to
use the NNPC as a sham to deny the Appellants of their legitimate expectations of a fair
treatment of their tax matters.279
These factors, in my view, ameliorate some of the obstinate barriers to the enforcement of taxbased legitimate expectation in Nigeria. The next section examines how Nigerian courts derive
power to enforce legitimate expectation.
4.3

Legitimate Expectation and Nigerian Judicial Power

The next issue that I (briefly) examine is how the court derives power to enforce legitimate
expectation, especially considering that legitimate expectation, as stated in chapter 2, is not a
legally vested right. Nigerian courts are created either by the Constitution or by statute280 and their
powers derive from those instruments.281 Constitutionally, the judicial power vested in the
Nigerian court broadly extends “to all inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law; and to all
matters between persons, or between government or authority and to any persons in Nigeria, in
and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the
civil rights and obligations of that person.”282 Accordingly, the courts have power of judicial
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review over the actions of administrative bodies and can, where necessary, confer traditional
judicial review remedies such certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.283 Unlike these remedies
which are firmly established and are contained in the various rules of court,284 legitimate
expectation is only an emerging remedy that is not prescribed in any form of legislation in Nigeria.
The implication is that the court can only enforce legitimate expectation by invoking its inherent
judicial powers.285 The doctrine of legitimate expectation has been developed in the context of
judicial review.286 The inherent power of the court is that which is not expressly spelt out by the
constitution, or in any statute or rule of court but which can, of necessity, be invoked by any court
of record to supplement the express jurisdiction or powers conferred on it.287 It is the power which
is itself essential to the existence of the court as an institution charged with the dispensation of
justice.288 The inherent judicial power of the court has been invoked in a vast range of cases, even
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where there was no obvious right due the plaintiff.289 The invocation of this power stands on the
pillar of justice. The principle of ubi jus ibi remedium, which connotes that where there is a wrong
there ought to be a remedy to redress the wrong290 also provides justification for the court to invoke
its inherent powers and, thus, enforce legitimate expectation. The demonstration of this principle
was implicitly evident in Stitch, in two senses. First, it is evident in the sense that the court enforced
a remedy (legitimate expectation) that was previously unknown to Nigerian law, and, second,
because when it was realised that Mrs. Stitch’s vehicle – the release of which she claimed – had
been damaged beyond repair while the suit progressed through the courts, the court invoked its
inherent powers to order that she be compensated financially to the value of the vehicle, even
though she had made no such claim. The court saw a wrong and improvised or adopted a
remedy.291 To the extent that legitimate expectation is not one of the legally recognized rights, it
is only by the court invoking its inherent judicial powers to right an administrative wrong that
legitimate expectation can be enforced. Such assertion of judicial power can, however, result in
friction between different arms of government, in the context of constitutionalism.
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4.4

Legitimate Expectation and Separation of Powers

A notable objection to (substantive)292 legitimate expectation is that it involves courts descending
into the merits of administrative decision-making and, thus, undermines the separation of powers
between the executive and the judiciary.293 Many critics of substantive legitimate expectation fear
that the doctrine represents the judiciary straying beyond their appropriate institutional and
constitutional limits.294 For these critics, supporters of substantive legitimate expectation fail to
acknowledge that the doctrine clearly narrows the freedom of the executive government, and more
importantly, the effect that this may have on the judicial and executive arms of government.295
Legitimate expectation is said to impose unacceptable constitutional restrictions on the ability of
public bodies to change their policies and is thus out of step with the broader constitutional
framework because it oversteps the limits between the judiciary and the executive.296 In sum, the
courts are, from the standpoint of such critics, perceived as inappropriately conducting so-called
‘merits review’ [of administrative decisions].297
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The doctrine of separation of powers is an integral constituent of Nigeria’s constitutional order.
Separation of powers works against the concentration of power by allocating governmental power
to different institutions, the legislature, executive and judiciary, which then operate as a check on
each other.298 The doctrine posits that neither the legislature, the executive, nor the judiciary should
exercise the whole or part of another's power.299 The doctrine, in its pure version, is based on three
theoretical principles: that each arm of government has a separate and identifiable set of functions;
that the arms do not interfere with each other in the exercise of their separate functions; and that
the personnel of one arm should not be members of another arm exercising the functions of that
other arm of government.300 The Nigerian Court of Appeal in Ahmad v Sokoto State House of
Assembly & anor301 observed that:
The doctrine of separation of powers has three implications:- (a) that the same person should
not be part of more than one of these three arms or divisions of government. (b) that one
branch should not dominate or control another arm. This is particularly important in the
relationship between executive and the Courts. (c) that one branch should not attempt to
exercise the function of the other, for example a President however, powerful ought not to
make laws indeed act except in execution of laws made by legislature. Nor should a
legislature make interpretative legislation if it is in doubt it should head for the Court to seek
interpretation. We owe this concept or doctrine to the French political philosopher, and one
of proponents of American revolution Baron De Montesquieu who reasoned as follows:
"Political liberty is to be found only when there is no abuse of power. But constant
experience shows us that every man invested with power is liable to abuse it and to carry his
authority as far as it will go... To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the nature of things
that one power should be a check to another. There will be an end of everything if the same
person or body, whether of the nobles or of the people, were to exercise all three powers.302
The Nigerian Supreme Court in Attorney-General of Abia State & ors v Attorney-General of the
Federation303 pronounced on separation of powers, as follows:
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The principle behind the concept of Separation of Powers is that none of the three arms of
government under the Constitution should encroach into the powers of the other. Each arm
- the Executive, Legislative and Judicial - is separate, equal and of coordinate department
and no arm can constitutionally take over the functions clearly assigned to the other. Thus
the powers and functions constitutionally entrusted to each arm cannot be encroached upon
by the other. The doctrine is to promote efficiency in governance by precluding the exercise
of arbitrary power by all the arms and thus prevent friction.304
Accordingly, respect for legislative choice and a concern to ensure that some sort of distinction
can be drawn between legislative, executive and judicial power underpins and motivates arguments
for judicial deference in the enforcement of legitimate expectations. 305
A basic problem of the separation of powers discussion is that it often confuses institutions with
functions. In practice, it is often difficult to distinguish between the exercise of these functions.306
A pure theory of separation of powers is functionally unrealistic under Nigeria’s current
governmental framework. Although Nigeria’s Constitution recognises three separate arms of
government, with primarily diverse functions, the same Constitution positively sanctions “a degree
of blurring of separation of powers,” to borrow the words of Walpole & Evans.307 Indeed, only the
third aspect of pure separation of powers is deeply entrenched in Nigeria, because Nigeria has
ceased to be a parliamentary system of government since 1966. Assuming that administrative
discretion does amount to lawmaking308 and upholding legitimate expectation amounts to an
endorsement of executive encroachment on legislative functions, it has to be said that that sort of
encroachment is already an integral element of the lawmaking process dictated by the Nigerian
Constitution. For instance, bills passed by the National Assembly become law only when they are
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assented by the President.309 Second, the executive is often responsible for the conceptualization
and drafting of bills initiated in the National Assembly, including tax-related bills.310 Third, the
Constitution empowers the President of Nigeria, the head of the executive arm, to make
modifications to “existing laws”. This entails the modification of federal statutes. 311 Fifth, the law
allows both the executive and the legislature to perform quasi-judicial functions, such as the
convention of administrative tribunals, commissions of inquiry and legislative inquiry committees.
Sixth, the legislature recognizes the need for administrative flexibility in dealing with regular or
emerging circumstances, which is why delegated legislation, as well as discretion, is enshrined in
Nigerian tax administration.312 Seventh, the Constitution empowers the courts to interpret and
apply the laws, which sometimes shapes administrative policy and results in the creation of judicial
precedent. Eighth, the Constitution allows the courts to determine disputes between the other arms
of government and to invalidate the actions of the other arms of government including the
invalidation of statutes enacted by the legislature.313 Ninth, statutes establishing courts permit the
heads of court to make rules of court and other subsidiary legislation incidental to the
administration of justice and the coordination of certain quasi-judicial functions. All these features
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taken together show that the notion of a pure theory of separation of powers is, as far as Nigeria is
concerned, nonexistent.
My aim here is, of course, not to dismiss or downplay separation of powers – a doctrine that makes
constitutional democracies functional – but rather to emphasise that separation of powers has its
limitations and can be blurred in certain expedient situations. Perhaps, tax administration is one of
those situations. It seems that there are many advantages for blurring the lines of separation of
powers. From a tax perspective, one such positives would be to take advantage of the expertise of
the executive and judicial branches.314 Another advantage of delegating the task of developing
interpretative positions and discretionary administrative practices to the revenue, as supervised by
the courts, is that it enables a flexible and textured response to emerging issues in tax that takes
account of changing social and economic dynamics.315 Also, given the relatively slow pace of the
legislative process – which may not be apt for dealing with everyday realities of administering tax
laws, the expediency of administrative discretion enables taxpayers and tax authorities alike to
leverage on the quicker pace of decision making in the executive.316 In any case, resorting to the
legislature to fill every blank in the law might make legislation too unwieldy and administration
detrimentally static.
Another way to assess the implications of legitimate expectation on separation of powers is to look
at outcomes, i.e. the eventual results that the cases have brought about. As Tomlinson observes:
If one was to advance a claim about a legal principle usurping the decision-making powers
of public authorities, it would be of great concern – perhaps of greater concern than what is
merely said in judgments – to build a detailed account about the extent to which such powers
are actually usurped in practice through the outcomes of cases… it would be that it is fairly
314

Brooks supra note 87 at 69.
Ibid.
316
This is even more crucial in a country like Nigeria where the legislative process can be rather slow. Tax statutes
are not amended as often as they should, despite often highlighted flaws.
315

78

difficult to find cases where substantive legitimate expectations arguments have succeeded,
and more difficult still to find cases where the courts have actually directed the public
authority concerned to uphold the expectation.317
Empirical conclusions reached by English Professor, Robert Thomson, support this view,
highlighting that, in quantitative terms, the number of successful legitimate expectation cases is
small.318 He observes also that a detailed analysis of the five cases that did succeed, all of them
were justifiable instances of judicial intervention to correct injustices caused by unfair
administrative behaviour.319 Even more telling, in another common law jurisdiction, India, a
survey of the Supreme Court decisions on substantive legitimate expectation shows that of 34 cases
litigated between 1992 and 2012, none was successful.320 I think that it is equally discernible in
the small quantity of Nigerian cases discussed that there is only one – Stitch – where the court
upheld a legitimate expectation (or like) claim.321 This shows that the fears of encroachment are
far from realistic.322 Moreover, a methodical, rather than whimsical, enforcement of legitimate
expectation by the courts will ensure that legitimate expectation only succeeds in “appropriate”
cases where the courts can be seen as exercising their adjudicatory obligation to dispense justice
to those who rely on the choices of public authorities. In the next chapter I examine how legitimate
expectation can be approached methodically by the court.
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Chapter 5: Refining the Application of Tax-based Legitimate Expectation in Nigeria
This chapter examines the various factors that the court may consider in deciding whether the facts
of a tax case give rise to a legitimate expectation and, further, whether the legitimate expectation
is worth protecting. I also examine the underlying principles that may guide the court’s
examination or justify the protection of legitimate expectation in a given case.
5.1

What Factors Are Relevant?

If it is taken as established that legitimate expectation is part of Nigerian jurisprudence and, by
inference, that the Nigerian taxpayer can, at least in theory, make a legitimate expectation claim,
it is also pertinent to iterate that it is not every assurance or representation that is made to a taxpayer
that can give rise to a legitimate expectation. The law is, after all, concerned not simply with what
the applicant expected, but also with what they were entitled to expect.323 As Bingham LJ observed
in the UK case of R v IRC ex parte MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd:324
I am, however, of opinion that in assessing the meaning, weight and effect reasonably to be
given to statements of the revenue the factual context, including the position of the revenue
itself, is all important. Every ordinarily sophisticated taxpayer knows that the revenue is a
tax-collecting agency, not a tax-imposing authority. The taxpayer’s only legitimate
expectation is, prima facie, that he will be taxed according to statute, not concession or a
wrong view of the law: Reg. v Attorney-General, Ex parte Imperial Chemical Industries plc
(1986) 60 T.C.1, 64G, per Lord Oliver of Aylmerton. Such taxpayers would appreciate, if
they could not so pithily express, the truth of the aphorism of “One should be taxed by law,
and not be untaxed by concession”: Vestey v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1979] Ch. 177,
197 per Walton J. No doubt a statement formally published by the Inland Revenue to the
world might safely be regarded as binding, subject to its terms, in any case falling clearly
within them.325
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The above persuasive326 statement sets a general tone on the parameters within which the court
may protect a legitimate expectation in revenue matters. There have been various attempts, judicial
and academic, to refine the province of legitimate expectation to better streamline the
circumstances under which a court may ascertain the existence of a legitimate expectation (worthy
of protection) and, perhaps more importantly, where a court may refuse to enforce a recognized
expectation.327 Watson, for instance, identifies a sub-divisible two-step test that differentiates
between the expectation, on the one hand, and its legitimacy, on the other hand.328 Fordham329
asserts that legitimate expectation “usually” needs: (1) prior disclosure by the applicant; (2) a clear
and unqualified representation; (3) communication to the applicant (or that "class"); and (4)
detrimental reliance, but then cautions that:
It is dangerous to think that all these ingredients are essential for all purposes… (1) There is
often no mention of disclosure. (2) The absence of a clear and unambiguous representation
was not fatal in Unilever. (3) The absence of communication to and knowledge by the
applicant was not fatal in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Ahmed [1999]
Imm AR 22 at 40 (involving an "objective" legitimate expectation that the Home Secretary
would not, without reason, act inconsistently with a ratified Convention). (4) It is recognised
"that reliance and detriment as such are not necessarily required in every legitimate
expectation case" (Francisco Javier Jaramillo-Silva v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [19941 Imm AR 352 at 357).330
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Judicial effort to streamline legitimate expectation has similarly followed a zigzag path. The
Nigerian Supreme Court in the Stitch case did not lay down a constructive framework for any
future consideration of legitimate expectations. I find it difficult to look at Stitch and say: ‘these
are the yardsticks for a future application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation’. Although there
are a few inferable pointers, such as the existence of the Ministry of Interior’s regular practice on
the issuance of import permits, the appellant’s reliance on that regular practice and the “wrongful”
frustration of the appellant by the Ministry, it does appear that the case was simply decided on its
own facts without significant effort towards laying the parameters for future application of the
doctrine. It is, perhaps, not surprising that the subsequent Nigerian decisions have also avoided a
broad conceptual analysis of legitimate expectation. It seems the attitude of the courts has been to
pick a few elements, particularly those that would assist them in coming to a conclusion on whether
an enforceable expectation has not been created in the particular case.331 A consequence is that
any scholar or court engaging legitimate expectation in-depth would, from a doctrinal standpoint,
likely gravitate towards English authorities, and, perhaps, authorities from other foreign
jurisdictions. It is on this cruise vessel that I find myself.
Tomlinson asserts that in England and Welsh public law, development of a tailored set of
parameters of (substantive) legitimate expectations has, for the most part, been attributed to the
UK Court of Appeal rather than the UK Supreme Court.332 It was the Court of Appeal – consisting
of Sedley, Woolf, and Mummery LJJ – that controversially pronounced the existence of the
substantive dimension of the doctrine in Coughlan.333 It was also the Court of Appeal – often
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through the judgments of Laws LJ – that refined the contours of the doctrine in the subsequent
decade and a half.334 However, as highlighted by Varuhas, English courts have also struggled to
streamline legitimate expectation and have continually articulated fresh approaches and
taxonomies in the bid to do so.335 Thus, we find in the jurisprudence,336 a five-step test, a threestep approach,337 a sliding scale approach,338 a four-part categorization,339 a three-point
categorization,340 a non-exhaustive two-point categorization341 and a different two point
categorization.342 In a recent case, Rose LJ of the UK Court of Appeal made an instructive
observation about how the tests of legitimate expectation have been formulated:
There have been many different formulations of the test to be applied because claims of
legitimate expectation are made in greatly differing circumstances, tax, immigration and
asylum procedures, planning law and provision for the homeless. The different ways in
which the test has been expressed reflect the particular circumstances in which the issue has
arisen but they are all directed at the same, high level question because they all contain the
same key ingredients: a representation made by the public authority followed by conduct on
the part of that authority vis à vis the claimant which contradicts that statement and about
which the claimant is aggrieved. The question for the court in each case is whether the failure
of the public body in its conduct towards the claimant to abide by the representation it made
is something which the courts should intervene to prevent.343
Her Lady Justice warned that the safest course in any particular case is not, therefore, to pick out
passages from earlier authorities dealing with different circumstances and attempt to transplant
them into a different situation, but to consider what factors should be relevant in answering the
fundamental question, guided by earlier cases in which the facts were reasonably close to the facts

334

He refers to the cases of R (Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363; R
(Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 755. See Tomlinson supra note 300.
335
Varuhas supra note 257 at 18.
336
R v Jockey Club; ex parte RAM Racecourses Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 225.
337
R (Bibi) v Newham LBC [2002] 1 WLR 237.
338
R v SOS Education and Employment; R v Education Secretary ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1115.
339
R v Devon CC; ex parte Baker [1995] 1 All ER 73.
340
Coughlan supra note 26.
341
R (Bhatt Murphy) v Independent Assessor [2008] EWCA Civ 755.
342
CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374.
343
Aozora supra note 27, para 35.

83

facing the court in the instant case.344 This follows the path of an earlier observation made by Judge
J in Ex parte MFK Underwriting that “the correct approach to ‘legitimate expectation’ in any
particular field of public law depends on the relevant legislation.”345 An impression made by these
opinions is that the approach of the court to the application of legitimate expectation in a tax matter
may be at variance with how the court’s approaches the doctrine in other matters. The effect is that
a Nigerian court, for instance, may gravitate towards more liberal requirements for the enforcement
of legitimate expectation in immigration matters than in claims involving the revenue of the state.
It is the duty of the courts to protect the revenue base after all.346
Assessment of UK decisions suggests that two broad perspectives continue to exist on the
ingredients of legitimate expectation. From one perspective, it is the duty of the claimant to
establish certain basic elements: a clear and unambiguous representation and detrimental reliance,
after which the onus shifts to the public authority to avail the court of an overriding public interest
by reason of which the established expectation should not be enforced. This is reflected in the
decision of the Privy Council of the House of Lords in the case of United Policyholders Group
and others v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago.347 In that case, the Privy Council laid down
a harmonized two-stage test for determining when it is appropriate to enforce a legitimate
expectation. The objective of stage 1 is to ascertain whether a legitimate expectation has been
created. The objective of stage 2 is to ascertain whether there is an overriding reason for allowing
the state to resile from the expectation. The conditions in the first stage must be satisfied first. In
that specific case, even though the court found that the assurance given by the state created a
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legitimate expectation, the court, nevertheless, found overriding reasons to refuse to enforce the
expectation against the state. In summarizing what the court deemed to be the “modern” position
of the law on legitimate expectation, Lord Carnwath, JSC, stated that:
In summary, the trend of modern authority, judicial and academic, favours a narrow
interpretation of the Coughlan principle, which can be simply stated. Where a promise or
representation, which is “clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification”, has been
given to an identifiable defined person or group by a public authority for its own purposes,
either in return for action by the person or group, or on the basis of which the person or group
has acted to its detriment, the court will require it to be honoured, unless the authority is able
to show good reasons, judged by the court to be proportionate, to resile from it. In judging
proportionality, the court will take into account any conflict with wider policy issues,
particularly those of a “macro-economic” or “macro-political” kind.348
Like the first perspective, the second perspective on legitimate expectation posits that the claimant
must establish the existence of facts giving rise to an expectation; ingredients such as a clear and
unambiguous representation, reliance and resilement. The point of departure is that once those
ingredients have been established, enforceability of the expectation would then depend on the
claimant further establishing that, in the circumstances, there has been a high level of unfairness
towards her, which demands the court to intervene.349 In other words, unlike the first perspective,
the evidential burden never shifts from the claimant to the defendant.
In Aozora, the UK Court of Appeal rejected a test that places any burden on the revenue to provide
an overriding justification for why a legitimate expectation should not be enforced. The court took
the view that in all cases, the onus rests squarely on the taxpayer to show why she is entitled to a
legitimate expectation and that after establishing “objectively”, as a first stage, that the statement
made by the revenue is capable of giving rise to a “legally enforceable legitimate expectation”, the
court then turns on the question whether the statement has done so in the particular case of this
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taxpayer. At this second stage, the taxpayer must establish “a high degree of unfairness” or
“conspicuous unfairness” on the part of the revenue.350
It is my reckoning that there is no conflict between the two lines of authority (United Policyholders
and Aozora) as regards the first stage. However, I have made a deliberate decision to critically
treat the second stage from the two seemingly conflicting perspectives: overriding public interest
and unfairness, before drawing inferences on what should be the appropriate test at that stage. In
doing so, I also highlight that United Policyholders, unlike Aozora, is not a tax case, although it
was a case with significant economic and financial implications for the state.
Following the above taxonomy, the stage 1 ingredients discussed here are: (1) the existence of a
promise that is clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification; (2) given to an identifiable
defined person or group by a public authority for its own purposes; (3) either in return for action
by the person or group, or on the basis of which the person or group has acted to its detriment.351
I also discuss the reoccurring issue of disclosure by the party seeking to enforce the promise.352
The factors in stage 1 are considered cumulatively – meaning that the absence of any one of these
ingredients defeats any inference that an expectation or reasonable expectation has been created353
– while stage 2 – relating to questions of unfairness or, alternatively, “the absence of good reasons,
judged by the court to be proportionate, to resile from the promise” – may be considered only if a
case scales the herculean hurdles of stage 1.
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Again, due to the paucity of Nigerian case law on the various points, I discuss these elements with
substantial reference to case law from other jurisdictions, especially English law. I, however, focus
mainly on tax cases bearing in mind the dictum of Rose LJ that: 354
There have been many different formulations of the test to be applied because claims of
legitimate expectation are made in greatly differing circumstances, tax, immigration and
asylum procedures, planning law and provision for the homeless. The different ways in
which the test has been expressed reflect the particular circumstances in which the issue has
arisen but they are all directed at the same, high level question because they all contain the
same key ingredients: a representation made by the public authority followed by conduct on
the part of that authority vis à vis the claimant which contradicts that statement and about
which the claimant is aggrieved. The question for the court in each case is whether the failure
of the public body in its conduct towards the claimant to abide by the representation it made
is something which the courts should intervene to prevent.355
5.1.1 Nature of the Promise or Representation
It seems settled that the first factor that a court interrogates when faced with a legitimate
expectation claim is the clarity of the promise, representation, assurance, policy, etc. that the
claimant seeks to enforce. It has long been the principle that a legitimate expectation can arise only
where there has been a 'clear and unambiguous representation' as to the decision maker's future
conduct.356 Thus, when a person purports to rely on a statement, the court will scrutinize the
statement to see whether it was made unequivocally or without ‘relevant qualifications.’357
Dyson LJ in R (Association of British Civilian Internees: Far East Region) v Secretary of State for
Defence stated that:
It will be only in an exceptional case that a claim that legitimate expectation has been
defeated will succeed in the absence of a clear and unequivocal representation. That is
354
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because it will only be in a rare case where, absent such a representation, it can be said that
decision maker will have acted with conspicuous unfairness such as to amount to an abuse
of power.358
In Saipem, one of the reasons why the court dismissed the appellants’ argument that they relied on
representations by the FIRS was that the so-called representations were conditional, thus, did not
meet the required standards of unambiguity. The court affirmed that:
The above is not a blanket exemption of the Appellants from tax liability. It eloquently states
that to the extent that the activities of the foreign companies are not carried out in Nigeria
they are not taxable. Furthermore, that the profit of the foreign company will be taxable in
Nigeria in circumstances where the stipulation of Section 13 (2) (a)-(d) of the Companies
Income Tax Act are applicable. It therefore follows that where the 1st Respondent determines
that the activities of the foreign company was carried out in Nigeria or that Section 13 (2) of
the Companies Income Tax Act is applicable, it will be consistent with the advisory in
Exhibit A2 if it imposes a tax liability. It will definitely not be going back on any assurance
it had given.359
The test of clarity is an objective one and it is interpreted strictly.360 As Lord Dyson JSC of the
Privy Council puts it in Paponette & others v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago,361 the
relevant question is “how on a fair reading of the promise it would have been reasonably
understood by those to whom it was made.”362 In the words of Lord Wilson in Davies:
It is better to forsake any arid analytical exercise and to proceed on the basis that the
representations in the booklet for which the appellants contend must have been clear; the
judgment about their clarity must be made in the light of an appraisal of all relevant
statements in the booklet when they are read as a whole; and that, in that the clarity of a
representation depends in part on the identity of the person to whom it is made, the
hypothetical representee is the “ordinarily sophisticated taxpayer” irrespective of whether he
is in receipt of professional advice.363
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Realistically, however, it may be the case that the content of the expectation varies significantly
depending on how broadly the representation is interpreted by the courts or respective judges.
Watson opines, 364 correctly, that the fact that different interpretations can arise from the same court
demonstrates that the test is insufficiently certain. He was commenting on the UK case of R
(Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs365 where the majority and
minority decisions of the UK House of Lords had reached different conclusions on the import of
the Foreign Secretary’s statement to the claimants.
A tax case that comes to mind is Regina (Drax Power Ltd & anor.) v HM Treasury and anor,366 a
case decided by the UK Court of Appeal. Here, the claimants were generators of electricity from
renewable sources and benefited from the exemption for renewable source electricity (“RSE”),
conferred by the Finance Act 2000367, from the climate change levy, an environmental tax levied
on electricity, gas, solid fuels and liquefied petroleum gas supplied to business and the public
sector but not on those supplied to domestic customers.368 In his Budget statement on 8 July 2015
the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the exemption would be removed with effect from
1 August 2015. On 14 July 2015 the House of Commons passed a resolution giving effect to that
decision and the necessary legislative change was made by the Finance (No 2) Act 2015.369 The
claimants sought judicial review on the grounds, inter alia, that the decision to withdraw the
exemption without a lead time of at least two years violated the European Union law principles of
(i) foreseeability, legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations, and (ii) proportionality.
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The judge dismissed the claim, holding that although European Union law applied to the
exemption and the legislation removing it, (1) the claimants had failed to establish an express or
implied assurance given by the government that had prompted the legitimate expectation that it
would not withdraw the RSE exemption without a two-year lead time, and a prudent and
circumspect operator should not have inferred that the exemption would not be removed without
such a lead time. This appeal by the second claimant was also dismissed. The Court of Appeal held
that, in the context of a national tax code set by the legislature of a member state, a protected
legitimate expectation would arise only where, by giving a precise, unconditional and
unambiguous assurance, the public authority had promoted an expectation as to how it would
behave in future; that such an assurance could be given by words or conduct, in the administrative
sphere or in the legislative sphere; that no promise had been made by the authorities and no
assurance given that the exemption would be maintained indefinitely, nor that it would be subject
to the giving of a period of notice before being changed370
Although the court did not uphold the legitimate expectation argument, the case reflects some of
the important considerations that a court must bear in mind when adjudicating a case of this nature.
The cautious approach adopted by the court places a significant burden on the taxpayer to
demonstrate that a representation meets the standards set by the courts, as, ironically, illustrated
by not-so-clear words such as ‘precise’, ‘clear’, ‘unambiguous’, ‘unconditional’ etc.
In Hanover Company Services v HMRC, the UK First-Tier Tribunal (Tax Division) considered the
implication of HMRC's Guidance Manuals (on the liability to VAT of certain services), which
contained the following statement:
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It should not be assumed that the guidance is comprehensive nor that it will provide a
definitive answer in every case… The guidance in these manuals is based on the law as it
stood at the date of publication.
The Tribunal accepted the revenue’s contention that the statement constituted a “health warning”
to the taxpayer that the Guidance was qualified. In a case such as this, it would be more prudent
for a taxpayer to seek direct confirmation from the revenue, something that the taxpayer in this
case failed to do. It is also important for a taxpayer making a legitimate expectation claim to
scrutinize the assurance to ascertain what it truly means. Where what the tax authority has assured
is different from what the taxpayer claims, then the assurance cannot qualify as “clear,
unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification.”371
The phrase “relevant qualification” used in United Policyholders suggests that it is not every
qualification that is relevant. In other words, if the tax authority, for instance, claims that a
representation was made conditionally or qualifiedly, the court would scrutinize the wordings of
the representation to ascertain whether those qualifications are relevant in the circumstances of the
case. For instance, in Aozora372 the UK Court of Appeal declared as irrelevant a warning inserted
by the HMRC in a published manual which read that the manual could not be relied on for tax
avoidance and that in a particularly difficult or complex case an experienced officer might arrive
at a different answer. The court found that “there was no suggestion of tax avoidance and the
interest of payment arrangements were not particularly difficult or complex compared with typical
double taxation problems.”373

371

See Oxfam v Revenue & Customs [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch); MFK Underwriting Agencies supra note 26.
Supra note 27.
373
Ibid, para 29.
372

91

If it is so difficult for a taxpayer to show that a promise or representation falls within the parameters
of clarity, it would seem even more difficult to do so in the case of practice. How does a taxpayer
show, for instance, that the way the tax authority has acted in the past paints a precise,
unconditional and unambiguous picture of how it would act in the future? On this point, the
observation of Lord Wilson of the UK Supreme Court in Davies v HMRC suggests that “clear
evidence” would be necessary to make good the proposition that the revenue undertook to act a
certain way. This is partly because, as the court reasoned, unlike written assurances that are easily
trackable, it is more difficult for a taxpayer to elevate a practice into an assurance to taxpayers
from which it would be abusive for the Revenue to resile and to which under the doctrine it should
therefore be held. “[T]he promise or practice… must constitute a specific undertaking, directed at
a particular individual or group, by which the relevant policy’s continuance is assured”. 374 It seems
here that the “clear evidence” is not just of how the revenue has acted but of how it intends to
continue acting. The taxpayer requires evidence that the practice was “so unambiguous, so
widespread, so well-established and so well recognised as to carry within it a commitment to a
group of taxpayers including themselves of treatment in accordance with it.”375 There are, thus,
very rare cases where a legitimate expectation predicated on regular practice has succeeded. 376
It is evident that the extremely textual emphasis on what is clear and unambiguous significantly
stacks the odds of proving legitimate expectation against a taxpayer. Perhaps, a more tenable
formula may be drawn from Watson’s perspective on the legitimacy of an expectation.377 Watson’s
perspective advocates a separation of the “preliminary” question of whether an expectation is
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legitimate from the question of whether it is enforceable. While lamenting the status quo, he
opines, as regards legitimacy, the adoption of a new test that jettisons the requirement to prove the
existence of a promise that is clear, unambiguous and without condition, and instead focuses on
three questions: (1) is the representation clear enough for the court to make an order?; (2)
objectively construed, what could the applicant expect in all the circumstances as a result of the
decision maker’s representation or conduct?; and (3) did the decision maker realise that they were
making a promise or that the circumstances amounted to a promise, to an individual or group, as
to a specific benefit or ought they reasonably have realised?378 Watson’s test presents a shift in
focus from the strictly textual construction of a representation and looks instead at the entire
circumstances to ascertain whether it is feasible to infer that a reasonable expectation has been
created.379 This test is not only clearer but also more amenable to circumstantial reality. The test
also balances out by taking into cognizance the deducible intention of the authority in the
circumstances of making the promise or representation. It ensures that the only time that the
decision maker is bound is when they know that they have made a promise or clearly ought to have
known that they were making a promise.380
5.1.2 The Number of Beneficiaries
The test highlighted by Lord Carnwath in United Policyholders suggests that it is only a
representation or promise that is made to a specific person or small group of persons that deserves
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to be accorded the protective shield of legitimate expectation. 381 The court refers in this regard to
a promise or representation having ‘the character of a contract.’382 This is an adoption of the view
in Coughlan, where Lord Woolf CJ said that one of the deciding factors in that case was that the
promise was confined to a few people and was akin to a contract.383 To that extent, it seems more
likely that the court binds the government to a promise made to an individual or a small group as
opposed to one made to a larger group.384 It is arguable that the limitation improves the likelihood
that the tax authority knows exactly what it is promising and the likely ramifications of that
promise. In contrast, a statement made to the whole world may have the inherent character of being
too general – lacking the attributes of specificity and unambiguity – and, accordingly, extraneous
to the unique characteristics of each taxpayer’s case. Watson explains that the key is that where a
promise is made to a small group it is more likely that this will be a voluntary assumption of greater
responsibility than general statements to a more disparate group and more likely that the decision
maker will conceive of her statements as a promise, rather than an indication of her current
mindset.385 In that sense, it demonstrates that the decision maker knew that they were making a
morally binding promise and taking responsibility for another person.386 This is in contrast to very
general statements made to the public regarding the assisted place scheme in ex parte Begbie.387
Watson’s explanation dovetails with Reynolds’s specific trust theory. Reynolds advocates that
legitimate expectation should only protect individual cases where the representation or promise is
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made to a specific person or group. This is on the basis that a specific trust is created between the
authority and the known individual or group, the breach of which warrants judicial intervention.
Reynolds argues that such restriction is necessary to avoid the doctrine becoming uselessly
overextended, but is also justifiable since, in cases of representation, issues of trust will be
particularly acute: reneging from the representation is a particularly explicit affront to the
preservation of trust.388
Further, if courts were to hold government bound to policy positions, this would ossify public
administration and utterly undermine the pursuit of the public good. If the adoption of a policy in
and of itself were held to ground enforceable expectations, this could discourage the setting of
policies, given the adoption of a policy could potentially tie the administration’s hands in the future
so they would be prevented from changing tack given the changed demands of the public interest.
This would be difficult to reconcile with the no fettering principle.389 Moreover, it would seem
generally more tenable to enforce a promise made to a few than one made to the whole world.
Still, if the approach is to bind the revenue to policy, the court may be unduly fettering the
revenue’s discretion to change an unfavored policy. If the court allows the revenue to change that
policy as regards the public but makes an exception for an individual, there is a risk of creating
inequity between taxpayers. The chances of such a situation occurring reduces if the relief of
legitimate expectation is limited to promises made ab initio to an identifiable taxpayer in respect
of that taxpayer’s peculiar circumstances.
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Despite the rationality of the above views, focusing on the number of taxpayers is an uncertain
yardstick and it is not always easy to see where the line should be drawn. 390 Thus, this useful
distinction may not be helpful in every situation. In tax administration, for instance, the distinction
may not be practically expedient for the tax authority or the taxpayer. For the taxpayer it means
that she will in every case where she seeks guidance have to reach out to the revenue to request
specific answers even where a representation publicly made by the revenue is clear and
unambiguous and capable of fulfilling those answers. On the other side, it means that the tax
authority would be inundated with enquiries from taxpayers even in respect of positions already
made publicly clear. This scenario certainly does little to aid the onerous task of tax administration.
As Rose LJ observed in Aozora:
[i]t is true… that it is open to taxpayers to apply specifically to HMRC for a ruling on their
circumstances, but an important function of publishing guidance is precisely to reduce the
number of occasions on which a taxpayer or its advisers will need to seek an individual ruling
from HMRC. 391
Moreover, there is the risk that an individualist approach to guidance increases the risk of applying
the law unequally and inequitably to similar situations. An average taxpayer should be able to
ascertain the revenue’s position without having to, barring peculiarities, reach out to the revenue
for a private ruling.392 Such a distinction does not enjoy manifest judicial support.393 As Bingham
LJ declared in MFK Underwriting that:
No doubt a statement formally published by the Inland Revenue to the world might safely
be regarded as binding, subject to its terms, in any case falling clearly within them.
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To exclude public guidance or assurances from the protective dome of legitimate expectation
would also deny protection to taxpayers who rely on a significant body of useful tax guidance even
when the detriment arising from resilement may not lend itself to such discrimination. Moreover,
if it is taken that a promise given privately is in the character of a contract, is it also not logical that
a promise given publicly is in the form of a unilateral offer, and once “accepted” and acted upon
by a taxpayer, ceteris paribus, becomes binding likewise? It is submitted that contract principles,
however enticing, should rather be avoided here.394
In Association of British Civilian Internees,395 a promise to between 800 and 1500 people was held
to give rise to a legitimate expectation by the Court of Appeal. Although, the decision was
overturned on appeal to the House of Lords, the court did not reject the idea that legitimate
expectations could arise amongst such a large group of people. The key, therefore, as Watson
observes, is not merely that this is a small group, but that it is a group that has the same interest in
the fulfilment of the promise or that the promise applies in the same way to each individual.396
Such an approach is consistent with the policy consideration of allowing maximal flexibility for
the decision maker.397 It seems that a better way to approach the issue is to regard this ingredient
not as a prerequisite but as solidifying the inference that the decision maker intended to make a
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promise. Thus, it may be subsumed under the question of whether there is a clear and unambiguous
statement or promise. A statement made to an individual is more likely to reveal unambiguous
intent than, say, one made to the whole world, which may be nuanced.398 It is quite possible, after
all, for a statement or guidance issued to the whole world to be intended as a promise. A taxpayer
should be able to benefit in so far as her case falls within the parameters intended by the tax
authority.
5.1.3 Disclosure
A reoccurring theme in the jurisprudence of legitimate expectation, a sword upon which many
claims have fallen is the requirement of disclosure. A taxpayer that does not disclose to the tax
authority the full facts upon which she seeks guidance, assurance or compromise will not be
allowed to enforce a legitimate expectation.399 Thus, it has been held that a legitimate expectation
will only arise if full disclosure of material information was made to the decision maker.400 Watson
explains the idea behind this principle from the practical point of view that “it is impossible for
the decision maker to make a binding promise where she does not have all material facts in front
of her.401
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In both Transocean and Halliburton, the failure of the taxpayers to fully disclose contributed
greatly to the defeat of their claims. In the UK case of Reg. v Inland Revenue Commissioners Ex
parte Preston,402 the House of Lords considered the question whether the revenue was entitled to
reopen an assessment which it had agreed on the basis of a presumed mutual benefit to the revenue
and the taxpayer should not be reopened. The revenue reached the agreement about the taxpayer's
liability with the belief that all the relevant facts were known. They were not known. It was held
that the revenue was not acting unfairly in seeking to reopen the assessment. 403
In the context of legitimate expectation, it is not every nondisclosure that counts against the
taxpayer. Only the nondisclosure of a material fact; that is, one that would have had an impact on
the assurance or representation, counts against the taxpayer.404 In that context, I opine that there is
room for skepticism about how the Nigerian Court of Appeal applied the disclosure element in
Halliburton. In that case, the court found that Halliburton did not fully disclose the income from
the transaction. Halliburton omitted to declare the income its subsidiary, HESNL, was to derive
from the transaction for assessment, but limited the declaration to only the part that Halliburton
received.405 The court regarded this nondisclosure as a lack of “fair and open dealing” which, of
its own, disentitled Halliburton to claim legitimate expectation. Without justifying the motives of
Halliburton in not itself disclosing that part of the transaction income paid to its subsidiary, my
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skepticism is based on the fact that the circular on which Halliburton’s legitimate expectation claim
rested was a public document, issued by the revenue without any sort of inducement by
Halliburton. Put differently, this was not a case of Halliburton seeking to rely on a private ruling
or an assurance that it had in any way induced the revenue to give. Halliburton merely relied on a
representation that was made to the whole world by the revenue. As far as legitimate expectation
is concerned, it is, at least, doubtful whether the disclosure test was relevant in those circumstances,
since the relevant transaction took place after the fact of the representation. In fairness to the court,
and as a general admonition, it is worth reiterating that legitimate expectation is an equitable
remedy resting on the court’s perceptions of fairness. As it is so often said, he who comes to equity
must come with clean hands.406 So, even if Halliburton’s not-so-open conduct was not directly
relevant to the specified elements of its legitimate expectation claim, the equitable foundation of
the claim was, perhaps, liable to capitulate as a consequence of that suspicious conduct. 407
5.1.4 Detrimental Reliance
Generally, for there to be an enforceable legitimate expectation the taxpayer must show that it
relied on the revenue’s representation or assurance to its detriment. It is the case that defeating an
expectation created by a public authority in another party is not legally significant without more.408
Thus, the courts accord significance to the presence or absence of “detrimental reliance” in
legitimate expectation claims. Gibson LJ in ex p Begbie observed that:
It would be wrong to understate the significance of reliance in this area of the law. It is very
much the exception, rather than the rule, that detrimental reliance will not be present when
the court finds unfairness in the defeating of a legitimate expectation.409
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Detrimental reliance as a normative basis for protecting legitimate expectation seems to find
rooting in utilitarianism, arguments that focus on the gains of protection vis-à-vis the ills of nonprotection. According to Professor Barak-Erez:
The utilitarian arguments supporting the protection of reliance are also relevant in
administrative law because efficiency is one of the social interests that administrative law
seeks to promote. First, protecting reliance promotes the goals of administrative intervention
in the free market, requiring people to take official initiatives ‘seriously.’ When the
administration gives financial backing to an economic activity, the citizens’ willingness to
rely upon it is crucial. Investors will not cooperate if promises of support prove
undependable.410
The view generally taken by English courts seems to be that knowledge of the representation and
detrimental reliance on it are powerful factors – not prerequisites – in deciding whether it would
be unfair for the revenue to frustrate the expectation that their representation has created.411 In
GSTS Pathology LLP v HMRC412 it was observed that although it has sometimes been said to be
a requirement that the claimant has relied to its detriment on what the public authority has said,
the law now seems to be clear that such detrimental reliance is not essential but is relevant to the
question of whether it would be an unjust exercise of power for the authority to frustrate the
claimant’s expectation.413 Clarifying this position, the UK Court of Appeal in Aozora reaffirmed
that reliance remained, as a general rule, a requirement for the sustenance of a legitimate
expectation claim. The court acknowledged, however, that there were circumstances in which
reliance may be dispensed.414 This is mainly in respect of cases involving public statements. The
implication is that a successful legitimate expectation claim in the absence of detrimental reliance
is the exception rather than the general rule. In Oxfam v Revenue and Customs,415 the UK High
410
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Court rejected a legitimate expectation claim partly on the basis that the taxpayer did not show any
detrimental reliance on its part to justify binding the authority. The Court observed that:
In my view, in a case such as this, involving an assurance given to only one person and where
there is no irrationality on the part of the public authority in adopting a different approach,
the absence of detrimental reliance on the part of the person to whom the assurance is given
is fatal to the argument that to modify the assurance would involve an abuse of power on the
part of the public authority which gave the assurance. 416
Although no Nigerian court has laid down a general rule on whether detrimental reliance is a
sacrosanct factor, I am of the view that the detriment suffered by the appellant in Stitch played a
significant role in swaying the Supreme Court to her case. Although this does not necessarily mean
that the absence of detriment will in every case defeat a legitimate expectation claim, it can be
inferred from the generally cautious disposition in subsequent court decisions that the courts would
most likely insist on detrimental reliance.
Saipem shows that the timing or sequence of events can be crucial in helping the court to ascertain
whether there has been a reliance at all. In that case, one of the factors that saw to the failure of
the appellants’ case was that there was not just a lack of proof that the appellants relied on the
representation, but the existence of proof that they did not. As the Court of Appeal observed, the
relevant contracts were entered into long before the taxpayers sought the opinion of the revenue.
In those circumstances any pleas of reliance were liable to be unsuccessful. It speaks to logic that
if a taxpayer became seized of a guidance only after having committed to the relevant transaction,
that may well prove fatal to his claim of reliance.417
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A narrow construction of legitimate expectation that requires the existence of detrimental reliance
stands to limit the number of cases where legitimate expectation can be enforced, limiting the
likelihood of judicial interference in administrative discretion. As the Court observed in Oxfam:
The general position in public law is that discretionary powers are conferred on a public
authority in order to allow that authority to make judgments about how to treat specific cases.
A public authority is free, within the limits of rationality, to decide on any policy as to how
to exercise its discretion; it is entitled to change its policy from time to time for the future
(e.g. as its perception of the public interest changes in the light of new circumstances); and
a person whose case falls within the scope of the policy is only entitled to have whatever
policy is lawfully in place at the relevant time applied to him.
The position would be different in the case of an attempt to disapply a policy in
circumstances where there had been detrimental reliance by the individual. In that situation,
the requirements of fairness will be more demanding and the public authority may only be
entitled to disapply the policy which was in place at the relevant time if the court is satisfied
that there is some overriding public interest, as explained in Coughlan.418
As far as detriment is concerned, the English court draws a distinction between an assurance given
to an individual and an assurance or policy directed to the public. Thus, where an individual is
dealing with a general policy statement and there is no question of public authority changing that
general policy, then ordinary rules of preventing a public authority from acting arbitrarily and
capriciously will prevent the public authority from applying that policy in a discriminatory way
against the individual, even if the individual was not aware of the policy at the time they acted.419
Finally, where detriment does exist, it must be traceable to actual reliance by the taxpayer on the
revenue’s representation. Thus, coincidental detriment may not be regarded by the court. In R
(Hely-Hutchinson) v HMRC,420 for instance, the taxpayer had entered into the relevant transactions
before the guidance was issued. It was found that the detriment suffered by the taxpayer was not
caused by the guidance. This supports the position of the court in previous cases showing that a
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valid reliance is one that is based on a communication that does flow from the revenue to the
taxpayer. In Hanover Company Services Ltd v HMRC, for instance, the UK Tax Tribunal found
that the claimant, Hanover, made its business decisions reliant on the practice of a certain Jordans,
the adjudged industry leader, as advised by its accountants. Hanover did not consult the revenue
to confirm the correctness of the supposed practice of Jordans, albeit the practice reflected what
was contained in HMRC’s Manual V1–3.421 It did not move the Tribunal that the revenue’s
assessment was inconsistent with paragraph 9.5.4 of its own Manual V1–3. The manual was an
internal document of HMRC which was, perhaps, only intended to guide the staff of HMRC in
making tax assessments. 422 In Aozora, however, the court clarified the position on reliance through
an intermediary (such as a tax consultant or adviser) when it held that such reliance was not fatal
to a legitimate expectation claim. The court also held that the question of reliance would not rest
on whether the intermediary mentioned the guidance expressly in any advice or communication to
the client. The extent and content of what the adviser tells the taxpayer will be influenced by other
facts, such as the degree of knowledge and interest on the part of the recipient.423 The court,
however, held that “if a taxpayer engages a specialist adviser to advise on the correct tax position,
that greatly diminishes – but does not rule out – the extent to which the taxpayer can then say that
his view of the law was influenced by a representation of the kind given in this case (a public
guidance).424
The conclusion drawn from the cases is that detrimental reliance is a requirement, except for the
limited class cases where it is not. The threshold of reliance is set high. There is a huge onus on
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the taxpayer to prove that it did indeed rely on the communication of the revenue. Also, there is a
suggestion that the relevant communication must have been directed to the taxpayer, and not to
some other person, as was the case in Hanover. Alternatively, if the communication is through an
intermediary, such as a tax adviser, the taxpayer must be alerted to the fact that the tax adviser
forms its opinion from the revenue’s representation and not of its own (the tax adviser’s)
interpretation or deduction.425
5.1.5 Stage 2: Unfairness Amounting to Abuse of Power or Overriding Public Interest?
Where a taxpayer has established facts giving rise to an expectation, then going by the principles
enunciated in Coughlan and United Policyholders, the onus shifts to the tax authority to show, in
spite, that an overriding public interest exists, by reason of which the legitimate expectation should
nevertheless be frustrated. The view advanced by Professor Craig would deny that an expectation
is legitimate where an overriding public interest exists. For Craig, “expectations ... are not merely
a matter for factual analysis. They will depend on a normative view of the expectations which an
individual can be said to derive from the original policy, combined with an interpretative judgment
as to whether the legislative framework will be jeopardized by holding the administration to the
original policy”.426
In R (Vacation Rentals (UK) Ltd (formerly known as the Hoseasons Group Ltd)) v HMRC427 the
UK Upper Tribunal opined that the principle of ‘conspicuous unfairness’ 428 amounting to an abuse
of power is pertinent where there is no express promise, assurance or representation on which the
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taxpayer can rely. It is not directly applicable where the taxpayer has established a legitimate
expectation based on clear guidance by a public authority. In particular, it cannot be used to throw
a greater burden onto a claimant than would otherwise exist.429 The Tribunal concluded that it was
only open to the revenue to override the legitimate expectation that it had encouraged in
circumstances where there was a sufficient public interest to override it. The Tribunal added, as
regards the burden of proof, that the onus shifts to the revenue to justify frustration of the legitimate
expectation. Where the revenue fails to do so convincingly, then the court can draw the conclusion
that the conduct is so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power.430
This position, as stated above is a controversial one, owing to decisions of the UK courts which
favour a different path. For instance, the UK Court of Appeal in Aozora431 completely rejected the
idea that the revenue has, in any circumstances, a duty to establish an overriding public interest
against a legitimate expectation claim. The court maintained that in all cases where a legitimate
expectation has been shown to exist (stage 1) the onus remains on the taxpayer to show (stage 2)
that manifest unfairness will befall it (the taxpayer) if the legitimate expectation is frustrated. Put
differently, the onus is squarely on the taxpayer to convince the court that the conduct of the tax
authority in the circumstance of the case is so unfair as to amount to abuse of power. In her
judgment in Aozora, Rose LJ declared that:
I do not accept that, once a representation capable of giving rise to a legitimate expectation
has been identified, the burden shifts to HMRC to adduce evidence to the court showing
some public interest in it being able to resile from the representation. Such an approach fails
to recognise that these supposed separate elements or stages in establishing unfairness are
all part and parcel of the taxpayer making good his claim that he has a legitimate expectation
arising from the representation which the court should protect.432
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The court iterated that in any case the collection of tax is itself an important public interest imposed
by the legislature.433 The court relied, inter alia, on an earlier decision in Hely-Hutchinson where
Arden LJ had made the following pronouncement:
[I]t is well established that it is open to a public body to change a policy if it has acted under
a mistake. The decision whether or not to do so is not reviewed for its compatibility in the
public interest: the question is whether or not there has been sufficient unfairness to prevent
correction of the mistake. It is clear from the authorities that the unfairness has to reach a
very high level: see, in particular, the holding of Simon Brown LJ in Unilever where he held
that it was not enough that the change of course by the public body was "mere unfairness"
or conduct which was "a bit rich". It had to be outrageously or conspicuously unfair.434
The decisions in the cases cited above convey the inference of conflict in terms of how the socalled second stage of a legitimate expectation claim is to be adjudicated. One approach shifts the
burden to the revenue to establish an overriding public interest while the other approach keeps the
burden on the taxpayer to establish the unfairness of the decision.
5.1.5.1 What Constitutes Overriding Public Interest?
This question is relatively straightforward in the context of tax. It has been asserted that legitimate
expectation cannot be invoked where to do so would interfere with the public authority’s statutory
duty.435 It goes without saying that the primary (statutory) duty of the revenue, as a public
authority, is to collect taxes which are properly payable in accordance with current legislation,
albeit, the revenue is also responsible for managing the tax system. 436 As we have shown with the
Aozora case, this primary duty of tax collection, by itself, also constitutes a public interest. The
point of contention, therefore, is whether it can be taken, even as a general rule, that where the
revenue’s policy change or resilement is driven by its duty to collect tax (or more tax), as would
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ordinarily be the case, legitimate expectation cannot be invoked. In Reg. v Attorney-General, Ex
parte Imperial Chemical Industries Plc.,437 it was stated that the legitimate expectation of the
taxpayer was the payment of the taxes actually due. Thus, no legitimate expectation could arise
from an ultra vires relaxation of the relevant statute by the body responsible for enforcing it. There
are also authorities that the revenue may not “dispense” with applicable statutory provisions.438 If
this strict position is adopted, that is, to the effect that the duty to collect tax automatically defeats
legitimate expectation, then it may well be accepted that legitimate expectation is useless in tax
matters. This does not seem to be the case, however, as the courts have in various cases recognized
the place of judicial intervention with the tax authority’s statutory duty, where need be. It is
arguable that the fact that the Nigerian Court of Appeal in both Halliburton and Saipem made the
effort to comb through the relevant elements of legitimate expectation before dismissing those
claims supports this argument. Several UK court decisions also support this point. The UK Court
of Appeal in Samarkand Film Partnership No 3 & ors v HMRC described this issue as follows:
There is a strong public interest in the imposition of taxation in accordance with the law, and
so that no individual taxpayer, or group of taxpayers, is unfairly advantaged at the expense
of other taxpayers. There is also a real public interest in the revenue making known the
general approach which it will adopt, and the practice which it will normally follow, in
specific areas… [T]here are likely to be few cases where a taxpayer can plausibly claim that
a representation made in general material of this nature is so clear and unqualified that the
taxpayer is entitled to rely on it and to be taxed otherwise than in accordance with the law.439
The dictum of Judge J in MFK Underwriting Agents on this point is also very instructive:
I accept without hesitation that (a) the revenue has no dispensing power and (b) no question
of abuse of power can arise merely because the revenue is performing its duty to collect taxes
when they are properly due. However, neither principle is called into question by recognising
that the duty of the revenue to collect taxes cannot be isolated from the functions of
administration and management of the taxation system for which it is responsible… If the
argument for the Inland Revenue were correct any application for judicial review on the
ground of unfair abuse of power would be bound to fail if the revenue were able to show that
437
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its actions were dictated by its statutory obligation to collect taxes. However it was clearly
recognised in Ex parte Preston [1985] A.C. 835 that in an appropriate case the court could
direct the Inland Revenue: “to abstain from performing their statutory duties or from
exercising their statutory powers if the court is satisfied that ‘the unfairness' of which the
applicant complains renders the insistence by the commissioners on performing their duties
or exercising their powers an abuse of power…’ per Lord Templeman, at p. 864.440
In applying the doctrine of legitimate expectation to tax, the court performs a delicate balancing
between some important conflicting interests. On one side there is the taxpayer whose tax liability
is at stake and who risks being taxed in an “unfair” manner. On the other side there is the revenue,
which shoulders that public responsibility to collect taxes for the actualization of government
business, as well as other taxpayers who are not disposed to that one taxpayer receiving a treatment
that may create inequity between taxpayers. In R (Dixons Retail plc) v HMRC,441 the Court stated
that:
On the other hand, and to be weighed on the other side of the balance, is the obvious and
strong public interest in the defendant collecting tax that is due in accordance with statute
and correcting an incorrect decision if there is a good reason to do so. Fairness in relation to
the general body of taxpayers who do pay their VAT so that no individual or group of
taxpayers is unfairly advantaged at the expense of other taxpayers weighs strongly on this
side of the balance.442
I subscribe firmly to the reasoning expressed above. I reiterate that while it is of great importance
to preserve the statutory mandate of the tax authority to do all that is legally permissible to collect
tax, simply allowing the tax authority to recite the statutory mandate mantra when called upon to
keep its word may not necessarily serve the interests of that mandate. Legal recognition of that
autonomy must, therefore, be exerted within proper context. An unrefined assertion of statutory
mandate will render the useful concept of legitimate expectation completely useless in the sphere
of taxation which may be detrimental to the tax system. It must be borne in mind, after all, that the
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reason why the tax authority issues guidance is to enable the collection of tax. Thus, as the court
put it in Aozora, “it is inherent in the nature of guidance that it only fulfils the function of assisting
in the management of the collection of taxes if taxpayers can rely on it.”443 It is, therefore, pertinent
to find the right balance. One that preserves the statutory mandate of the tax authority, allows the
tax authority to make necessary decisions and yet protects the taxpayer when the tax authority acts
wrongfully. There are, thus, cases where the revenue has had to show the existence of an overriding
interest in order to defeat a legitimate expectation. In Drax Power Ltd,444 for instance, the court
accepted that the government had advanced a reasonably compelling case that the exemption’s
removal was justified in the public interest, notwithstanding its evident harm to the claimants’
private interests and to its property rights in the form of concluded contracts to supply companies,
so that the decision came within the appropriate margin of discretion and was therefore not
disproportionate.
I would iterate that the revenue, despite its important function of tax collection, is nevertheless a
public authority whose actions are ordinarily subject to judicial review.445 Moreover, its actions
are in many cases capable of jeopardizing the rights and genuine interests of ordinary citizens as
well as the broader macroeconomic space. If the revenue’s attempts to collect tax in the
circumstances of a given case would unfairly prejudice a taxpayer, then the court is entitled to
intervene, the public interest or duty notwithstanding.
5.1.5.2 What Constitutes Unfairness?
I have argued in support of the approach of the UK Court of Appeal in Aozora that the revenue
need not prove that it has an overriding reason for resiling from an assurance given to a taxpayer.
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I agree with the court, among other reasons, that there is an underlying public interest in tax matters
which negates, ordinarily, the need for the tax authority to provide an overriding interest. This
position is, however, not fatal to the cause of a taxpayer seeking to enforce a legitimate expectation.
A taxpayer can always approach the court where it is able to establish that there has been, as
described in Hely-Hutchinson, “sufficient unfairness to prevent correction of the mistake” made
by the authority.446 In those circumstances, the principal public interest, being the collection of tax,
may be sidestepped. 447 The question that follows is what degree of unfairness must the taxpayer
establish to succeed?
One of the dominant features of Arden LJ dictum in Hely-Hutchinson, quoting Unilever, is the
reference to terms such as “sufficient unfairness”, “very high level” of unfairness, “outrageously
or conspicuously unfair”.448 The use of these terms by the court signifies the fact that, generally,
the courts see the revenue as acting within its mandate when reversing itself on an incorrect
decision. It is also an attitudinal reflection of the courts’ cautious thread when called upon to
intervene in the administrative functions of the revenue. Moreover, given as the court asserted in
MFK Underwriting that a taxpayer’s only legitimate expectation is that it would be taxed according
to law, the court is unsurprisingly reluctant to enforce a legitimate expectation that is based on a
wrong application of the law. Thus, it is apparent that it is only in those rare cases where the
conduct of the tax authority can be deemed to be manifestly unfair, to add to the muddle of
semantics, that the court may be moved to intervene. This cautious arm’s length judicial approach
has been the consistent pattern. Lord Templeman of the UK House of Lords in Preston said that
the court can only intervene if “the unfairness” of which the applicant complains renders the
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insistence by the revenue to perform its duty or exercise its powers an abuse of power. 449 In
Unilever, Brown LJ stated that “unfairness amounting to an abuse of power” as envisaged by
Preston was unlawful because it is either illegal or immoral or both for a public authority to act
with conspicuous unfairness and in that sense abuse its power.450 In R (Dixons Retail plc) v HMRC,
Simler J stated that:
It is well-established that it is open to a public body to change a decision if it has acted under
a mistake or adopted a mistaken view. However, it will not be permitted to do so where there
is sufficient unfairness to justify preventing it from doing so. The authorities, as I have said,
make clear that the unfairness must reach a high level. 451
Rose LJ in Aozora justified the need for a high degree of unfairness as arising from the fact that
the primary duty of the revenue is to collect, not to forgive tax. A duty which “is not linked with
the existence or absence of a representation…”452 Her Lordship added that “wherever an express
representation is established it is still essential for the court to consider all the factors relevant to
whether it would be unfair to allow HMRC to frustrate an expectation arising from that promise,
assurance or representation and further that a high level of unfairness is necessary to override the
public interest in the collection of taxes to which I have referred.”453
It is apparent from the available English cases that the presence of unfairness can be gleaned from
either of two main factors: the revenue’s motive for resilement and the taxpayer’s detriment. Rose
LJ in Aozora stated that “in each case… it is up to the taxpayer to point if he can, to some detriment
that he has suffered as a result of relying on the representation. That will need to be weighed in the
balance by the court in deciding whether it is fair to allow HMRC to resile from their
449
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representation. The absence of any detriment… would, of course, create a significant hurdle for
the taxpayer to overcome.”454 In that specific case, the court held that the taxpayer did not show
that it suffered a “serious detriment” as a result of any reliance on the representation.
In Unilever, the court held that on the exceptional facts of the case, the revenue acted unfairly in
not exercising its discretion to extend time for the taxpayers, especially in the light of the history
between the parties and the fact that granting the extension would not have done any damage to
the legitimate interests of the public. Lord Bingham MR held that the revenue’s conduct towards
Unilever had been so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power and so unreasonable as to be
irrational.
The term “conspicuous unfairness”,455 used in Unilever, it should be noted, is not a principle of
law, by itself. In the subsequent case of R v Gallaher Group Ltd & ors v Competition and Markets
Authority,456 Lord Carnwath JSC clarified that the term was simply an expression used to
emphasise the extreme nature of the revenue’s conduct in that specific case. Thus, a taxpayer’s
claim must be judged according to the ordinary principles of judicial review, notably irrationality
and legitimate expectation, and the terms unfairness, conspicuous unfairness or abuse of power are
not distinct legal criteria.
The decision of the UK Court of Appeal in Aozora is to the effect that it is the unfairness that is
supposed to override the inherent public interest and not the other way around. The court held:
It is therefore necessary in my judgment, that before Aozora UK can hold HMRC to a view
of the law that HMRC has expressed but which they now believe to be wrong, it is necessary
for Aozora UK to show a high degree of unfairness arising in its particular circumstances in
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order to override the public interest in HMRC collecting taxes in accordance with a correct
interpretation of the law.457
It is plausible that even though the revenue is not required to establish the existence of an
overriding interest or reason, the existence of such can help negate the idea of unfairness or abuse
of power. In Regina (Dickinson and others) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners458 it was held
on appeal that the judge had been entitled to conclude that “the unfairness which he had found had
been outweighed by other factors with the result that there had been no abuse of power.”
I would add that since (Nigerian) tax jurisprudence generally recognizes tax planning/avoidance
as a legitimate taxpayer design,459 where a taxpayer has relied on the tax authority’s assurance or
guidance to organize its affairs to reduce its tax liabilities, the mere fact that the state may lose
some tax revenue, may not, by itself, provide sufficient justification to defeat a legitimate
expectation claim. Again, as Judge J. observed in Ex p. MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd:
The suggestion that a huge amount of tax would be lost to general funds as a consequence
of an order for judicial review is an argument without force. The remedy of judicial review
for improper abuse of power – if established – should be available equally to all taxpayers
irrespective whether their potential liability is huge or small. If persuaded that judicial review
would otherwise have been appropriate I should have exercised my discretion in favour of
granting it.460
If, on the other hand, the tax avoidance or other benefit to be derived by the taxpayer is materially
different from what was contemplated by the tax authority at the time of giving the assurance or
was likely to cause significant inequalities between taxpayers or disruptions in the tax system, then
the tax authority may not be deemed to have acted unfairly.461 It is not out of place, after all, for
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the tax authority to seek to collect taxes in a way that achieves reasonable fairness as between
taxpayers, avoiding where possible unmerited windfalls for particular taxpayers.462 It may also be
of importance in defusing any notions of unfairness or abuse of power if the revenue acts promptly
in correcting a mistaken assurance by withdrawing same before the taxpayer has acted on it. In R.
v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex p. Matrix Securities, for instance, the UK Court of Appeal
stated, albeit obiter, that it would not have been unfair to allow the revenue resile its approval of a
taxpayer’s tax avoidance scheme having done so timeously and in those circumstances it would
be wholly wrong to hold the Revenue to the mistaken clearance and allow the scheme to go ahead
at a cost of some £38m of lost revenue to the national exchequer.463 Perhaps, the court would have
reasoned differently if the scheme in this case was a genuine or good faith tax avoidance scheme
and if the revenue had sought to withdraw belatedly.

Having carefully considered the two approaches, I am of the view that the Aozora approach is the
right one as far as tax-based legitimate expectation is concerned. First, the overarching purpose of
legitimate expectation, has, generally, been the eradication of unfairness and abuse of power in
public administration. Thus, as observed by the court in Aozora the establishment of unfairness,
as the case may be, forms an integral part of the requirements that the taxpayer needs to meet.
Taking out the need to prove this ingredient and, in its place, shifting to the tax authority the onus
of proving that there is an overriding interest effectively means that that crucial foundation on
which legitimate expectation is built stands uprooted. Second, as also observed by the court in
Aozora, the collection of tax itself constitutes an inherent public interest that is present in tax-based
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legitimate expectation disputes. Given the indelible presence of this factor, the need to establish
an overriding interest becomes superfluous, although it may favour the revenue’s case to do so.
It seems to me that the two perspectives are more reconcilable than not and that the seeming
disparity between them only relates to the question of who has the onus of proof. The state of
Nigerian law on legitimate expectation in this regard is not obvious. This is because the cases that
have followed Stitch have not made it past the first stage of proof. If an inference is to be drawn
from the thin thread of Stitch, then it would seem that the standard is closer to what was said in
Aozora than United Policyholders. In other words, it seems that the unfairness approach rather
than the overriding interest approach, so to speak, better aligns with the state of the law in Nigeria.
The standard is “unfairness amounting to abuse of power” or, as Hely-Hutchinson reflects,
“conspicuous unfairness”, the onus of which is on the claimant to prove. What flows from this is
that there is limited scope for the application of legitimate expectation in administrative law,
generally, and in tax specifically. Further support for this inference can be drawn from the opinion,
albeit persuasive, expressed by Judge J in Ex p. MFK Underwriting Agents, one of the earliest
cases where legitimate expectation was applied in tax jurisprudence:
If contrary to my conclusion it had been established that the revenue had abused its powers
the case for granting judicial review as a matter of discretion would have been clear. In
expressing that view I have recognised that it is only in an exceptional case of this kind that
the process of judicial review is permitted and the court should be extremely wary of
deciding to be unfair actions which the commissioners themselves have determined are
fair.464
Perhaps, Lord Templeman’s dictum in Ex parte Preston best captures judicial leanings:
The court cannot in the absence of exceptional circumstances decide to be unfair that which
the commissioners by taking action against the taxpayer have determined to be fair.465
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The endorsement of a “narrow interpretation” to substantive legitimate expectation in United
Policyholders has been welcomed as valuable and providing welcome clarity by those who reckon
that courts have, effectively, been operating on the basis of a narrow interpretation of that judgment
since it was handed down. 466 The court’s characterization of the ‘narrow interpretation’ of
Coughlan as ‘the trend of modern authority, judicial and academic’ is also fair insofar as it is very
much the middle ground between sceptics and proponents. 467 This narrow approach is also
reflected in the fact that the court is more willing to bind the government to a promise or policy
that is applicable to an individual or small group as opposed to one with a broad application.468
Moreover, the narrow, conservative, approach better reflects the state of affairs in Nigeria where
three decades after its introduction, the deployment of legitimate expectation has been remarkably
frugal; and although, legitimate expectation claims in Nigeria – few as they are – have featured
mainly in the tax sphere, those cases only underline the abysmal chances of success.
5.2

What Principle(s) Underlie or Justify Judicial Protection of Legitimate Expectation?

A persistent aspect of the theoretical debate on substantive legitimate expectation centers on the
normative content of the doctrine. The debate seeks to provide answers as to why the court should
protect legitimate expectation. In other words, what specific, ultimate, fundamental principle(s)
would be actualized by exerting judicial power to protect legitimate expectations? Is it the rule of
law, fairness, natural justice, good administration, consistency, certainty, trust, non-abuse of power
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or something else?469 This is not a particularly smooth venture because, as observed by Daly,
legitimate expectation, as is the case with the common law, “has not followed inexorably from an
agreed set of first principles.”470 Thus, the exact role and scope of the doctrine is less than clear471
because there has, generally, been “a lack of conceptual exploration of the doctrine: it has been
assimilated into administrative law without any real attempt to explain its purpose and to
sufficiently identify principles which underpin this purpose.”472 The apparent lack of a clear
justification is adjudged by some scholars to be problematic from both the normative and practical
points of view. Watson, for instance, opines that although the courts have articulated a number of
factors that may be relevant to determine when a legitimate expectation may arise473 without a
clear underlying principle, there is no guidance as to what weight should be given to these various
factors or how they interact with one another.474 Groves adds that the doctrine’s want of a clear
normative purpose renders it “little more than a smokescreen for an erratic and subjective
assortment of judicial ideas.”475 For Varuhas, this inability to pin down the doctrine or doctrines
of legitimate expectations helps to explain continuing uncertainty over the field’s theoretical
foundations.476 This has, however, not deterred courts or commentators from proposing a myriad
of explanatory theories, including good administration, trust in public administration, legal

469

There are similarities between some of these terms. The reason for naming them is to capture the diverse
terminology used by scholars and courts to describe closely related phenomena.
470
Daly supra note 14 at 102.
471
Reynolds supra note 12 at 331.
472
Ibid at 332.
473
Discussed in the preceding section of this paper: a promise, reliance, detriment, etc.
474
Watson supra note 13. To this end, the doctrine would be assisted by identifying some sort of overarching “meta
value” – see Reynolds supra note 12 at 330.
475
Groves supra note 295 at 487.
476
Varuhas supra note 257 at 19.

118

certainty, the rule of law, consistency, and individual dignity.477 Some specific underlying theory
is, thus, needed to assist in answering the difficult doctrinal questions that will inevitably arise.478
There is judicial support for the inference that legitimate expectation is predicated on the rule of
law.479 Judicial concern for the dignity and autonomy of individuals in their dealings with
administrative decision-makers evokes the rule of law, as “a principle of institutional morality.”480
In legitimate expectation cases where the rule of law is invoked, courts are typically concerned by
the effect on individuals of promises being broken or settled expectations disrupted.481 However,
it is hardly evident that protecting substantive legitimate expectations forms an essential ingredient
of promoting the rule of law.482 It seems evident from available English case law that the two most
prominent explanations for why legitimate expectations are protected are the importance of
ensuring ‘fairness’ and to prevent decision makers from ‘abusing their power’.483 Thus, there are
various cases where the courts’ approach to legitimate expectation were concerned with the ‘duty
to act fairly’ or where fairness has either expressly or implicitly been considered to be central to
the doctrine.484 On this view, legitimate expectations are protected because to do otherwise would
be ‘unfair’.485 Likewise, there are cases where the courts have grounded their appreciation of
legitimate expectation on the need to prevent abuse of power by the public authority. In these
cases, what the courts seem to be saying is that ‘we will intervene to protect an expectation in order
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to preclude public authorities from abusing their powers when dealing with members of the
public.’486 In R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the House
of Lords, per Lord Carswell, made the point that “the basis of the jurisdiction [of legitimate
expectation] is abuse of power and unfairness to the citizen on the part of the public authority”.487
However, the problem with applying these principles is the apparent lack of coherence that exists
between cases. For instance, despite collective judicial recognition of what Bingham, LJ. described
as the “Revenue's unqualified acceptance of a duty to act fairly and in accordance with the highest
public standards,”488 identifying the quantum of unfairness that would justify the protection of
legitimate expectation remains a challenge.
In Nigeria, the few decided cases, Stitch, for instance, evidence the Nigerian Supreme Court’s
endorsement of the principles of fairness and non-abuse of power, as well as good administration,
as the sort of moral compass of legitimate expectation. The Court also remarked that:
The rationale which I gather from these decided cases is that a Government in which the
citizen is entitled to repose confidence and trust, is not expected to act in breach of the faith
which it owes to the citizen, and if it does so act, the courts will intervene. The right of the
appellant in this case to be issued an import licence, on terms prescribed by the Minister on
compliance with those terms, had vested. It was the right of the citizen which could not be
ignored.489
Thus, it may be taken that there is a plurality of rationale for the protection of legitimate
expectation in Nigeria that touches on not less than five principles. 490
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Among scholars, there seems to be a lack of consensus on what should be the underlying basis for
the protection of legitimate expectation; or, indeed, whether there is a need to outline such a
basis.491 Reynolds, for instance, considers the principles of fairness and abuse of power to be
inadequate – not irrelevant – to explain and guide the application of the doctrine. He opines that
while these principles encapsulate the moral impetus of legitimate expectations, they sit at such a
high level of abstraction that reliance upon them alone results in two serious shortcomings. 492 First,
they fail to clearly delimit the doctrine’s scope – they do not tell us what it is that distinguishes a
legitimate expectations case from other cases of unfairness or abuse of power by a public authority
where application of the doctrine is unsuitable. Second, they fail to offer practical guidance when
dealing with a legitimate expectations case – they give little indication of the facts and
considerations that will be pertinent in deciding the doctrine’s effect in a particular case. He argues
vigorously that the result of explaining the doctrine only in terms of fairness and abuse of power
means that the doctrine may be applied wherever there is a fairness issue. Given that fairness is
the touchstone of all public law, the doctrine of legitimate expectation becomes an empty shell, a
mere label;493 that “there is therefore a clear need to identify an ‘illuminating principle’ which sits
comfortably with fairness and abuse of power but is more specific and so is capable of identifying
when the doctrine is relevant.”494 That adequate principle, for various reasons, is also not “good
administration” because good administration, although entirely compatible with the moral impetus
of legitimate expectation, is nevertheless too abstract, vague and overarching to provide any
concrete delimitation or guidance.495 He advocates instead for “public trust” – a general trust – as
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the principle that both fits well with the doctrine of legitimate expectations and can provide
guidance. He concludes that the reason why it is unfair to breach a legitimate expectation is
because this would breach the claimant’s trust in the public authority, and so would be an abuse
of power and contrary to good administration.496
Similarly, Watson views legitimate expectation from a sociolegal standpoint. He reckons that
promises exist not just as statements but also as social conventions that carry with them a number
of socially programmed assumptions. The foremost element of this social convention is an
invitation to an individual to place their confidence in the maker. Thus, the promise exists as a
recognized social convention of trust that is vital to avoid a society dominated by self-interest and
duplicity. To break a promise is to directly interfere with the liberty of the person or persons who
have relied on that promise. For Watson, the enforcement of a legitimate expectation is the judicial
protection of a moral obligation that the public authority has freely solicited.497
The views of Reynolds and Watson align with Professor Forsyth’s view that “good government
depends upon trust between the governed and the governor. Unless that trust is sustained and
protected, officials will not be believed, and government becomes a choice between chaos and
coercion.”498 These views also find judicial support in Nigeria, in Stitch, where the Supreme Court
remarked that “the citizen is entitled to repose confidence and trust” in government.
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Reynolds’s theoretical postulations of a general public trust as the basis of legitimate expectations,
499

which, as noted, aligns with the views of Watson and Forsyth, is not without merit. It tries to

deal with the problem of uncertainty as to the degree of unfairness that warrants the protection of
legitimate expectation – although it does this, not by trying to determine that degree, but by
diverting to another principle – and might even be adjudged the principle that makes the most
sense about legitimate expectation from a tax perspective. It appears to be a low hanging fruit as
far as the interest of the taxpayer is concerned, especially when compared with more demanding
concepts like a “high degree of unfairness” or “unfairness amounting to an abuse of power.” This
is especially so if abuse of power is to be measured in the context of the egregious conduct of the
respondents in the Stitch case. Suffice it to state that a taxpayer’s claim is likely to be more feasible
if the court views it from the angle that the revenue’s repudiation of a promise amounts to a betrayal
of trust reposed in the authority than to state that it amounts to an abuse of power. Moreover, while
the Nigerian court has not directly defined ‘abuse of power’, a close term ‘abuse of office’ has
been severally defined as the “use of power to achieve ends other than those for which power was
granted, for example: gain, to show undue favour to another or to wreak vengeance on an
opponent.”500 If abuse of power, for the purposes of legitimate expectation, were to be construed
in the context of abuse of office then there would be an onerous burden on a taxpayer to prove a
subjective and abusive motive on the part of the revenue authority; a burden that that may be far
less pronounced in the case of trust.
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Second, the postulations of Reynolds and Watson appear to be in tune with the tax policy objective
of certainty.501 By anchoring legitimate expectation on trust, the court is invariably helping to
entrench a more certain tax system. Be that as it may, there are reasons for discontent with these
postulations.
My discontent, first, stems from a perception that the trust theory also suffers from the same
presumptive shortcomings that Reynolds attributes to principles such as fairness, abuse of power
and good administration. His contention that the reason why it is unfair to breach a legitimate
expectation is because this would breach the claimant’s trust in the public authority, and so would
be an abuse of power and contrary to good administration is not infallible. The fact that a trust is
breached may not always amount to abuse of power; nor would it always be unfair. That conclusion
would depend on the circumstances in which the trust was breached and not just the fact that trust
was breached.
Second, it is doubtful that the court is the appropriate forum to legislate public trust for
administrative bodies. It is, perhaps, counterintuitive to suppose that trust in the revenue, as a
distinct entity, can somehow be fostered by the court through its cohesive powers rather than by
the revenue itself acting in a manner that would elicit or maintain trust. To illustrate, can Ms. A
(the taxpayer) maintain trust in Ms. B (the tax authority) because of the actions of Ms. C (the
court), especially at a point where Ms. B has broken her promise to Ms. A? I think it is logically
coherent that it is only the actions of Ms. B that can reinstate or maintain the trust of Ms. A. The
court binding the tax authority to a broken promise made to a taxpayer will not make the taxpayer

501

This will be elaborated on in Chapter 6.

124

trust the tax authority. It might make the taxpayer trust in the court as a viable forum for redress,
but that trust is reposed in the court, not the tax authority.
Third, predicating legitimate expectation centrally on trust rather than fairness (or abuse of
power)502 seems to detract from the core roots of legitimate expectation. Legitimate expectation is
not a mushroom sprouting on deadwood. It is an offspring borne by the womb of judicial review.
This implies that its theoretical underpinning is tied to judicial review like an inseverable umbilical
cord. Current jurisprudence on judicial review restricts the concept to the determination of the
legality of a governmental measure but not the merits or wisdom of such an action or inaction.503
In other words, in the context of judicial review, what the court is principally concerned with is
not whether the administrative act is right, but whether the public body acted fairly. Still, judicial
review seeks to ensure that public bodies are fair, not that they are trustworthy, even if trust might
be a by-product of consistent fairness. “In the exercise of its power of judicial review, the court
has no jurisdiction to substitute its own opinion for that of the public body whose decision is being
reviewed… it is not part of the purpose of judicial review to substitute the opinion of the judiciary
or of individual judges for that of the authority constituted by law to decide the matters in
question.”504 The Nigerian Supreme Court, per Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC, in Bakare v Lagos State Civil
Service Commission & anor captured this point as follows:
The courts in exercise of their power of judicial review are constantly called upon to
scrutinize the validity of instruments, laws, acts, decisions, and transactions. In the exercise
of the jurisdiction, the courts can declare them invalid or ultra vires and void… because they
offend against the rules of natural justice of audi alteram partem, or nemo judex in causa, or
offends against the rules of fairness, or otherwise offends the rule of natural justice… The
court can by its power of judicial review set them aside 505
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To sidestep the fulcrum of fairness – whether procedural or substantive – and delve into trust as
the central concern would seem like the court imposing its own opinion on the body as regards not
just what is fair but what is right; worse still, not just as regards the individual applicant but as
regards what is best for the (tax) system, an evaluation that would seem to transcend the
predominantly arm’s-length borders of judicial review. For that to be done, one may have to go to
the root of legitimate expectation to reconstruct the objectives of judicial review itself.
Again, the elevation of one value, as proposed by Reynolds, may unduly downplay the importance
of another which may be equally significant in a given circumstance. So, rather than adopt a
priority rule or value, a pluralist approach that views legitimate expectation normatively through
a lens of different colours, as has been the dominant judicial pattern, may be more attractive.506 In
the context of tax, for instance, it seems plausible to anchor the doctrine on a variety of first
principles, one of which, contrary to the opinion of Reynolds, would be legal certainty. As
Fordham explains, “what is in play [in the context of legal certainty] is the idea that people deserve
to know where, in law, they stand.”507 Practically speaking, given the uncertainty that often
characterizes tax legislation, legitimate expectation would enable taxpayers attain a useful level of
certainty about how tax rules would apply to them.508 This is especially so in cases involving the
interpretation of vague or ambiguous statutory provisions. Reynolds interprets this context to mean
that legitimate expectation will be protected only insofar as this will ensure clarity and
predictability of the law.509 That need not be the case. While it is agreeable that legal certainty only
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cannot adequately lace all the holes of legitimate expectation,510 in some respects, such as
mentioned above, its usefulness cannot be casually downplayed.511
On the other hand, the enforcement of an expectation arising from a promise or compromise may
not necessarily be rooted in legal certainty since the import of the law may not be of principal
importance to the taxpayer at this time. In those cases, the emphasis may be on good
administration, which Daly512 advocates, or on Reynolds’ preferred public trust. It may as well
simply devolve on the “meta principles” of fairness and non-abuse of power, depending on the
facts. Any one of these principles applied within the framework of the identified ingredients of
legitimate expectation and the peculiar facts of the extant case may justify the enforcement of an
expectation. In that sense, it is, perhaps, better to toe the more cautious approach of Tomlinson
who suggests that attempting to pin down legitimate expectation to a single principle may only
inspire a sort of resistant shifting cultivation, in the sense that the adoption of a specific principle
may not put an end to the debate but instead further ignite the craving for another specific meta
value that will “better streamline” the application of the doctrine. Tomlinson argues that while it
is perfectly valid to reflect upon whether a particular legal principle, new or old, possesses virtue,
to pursue the identification of some sort of overarching ‘meta-value’ that would “provide
invaluable guidance to difficult questions concerning the scope and effect of the doctrine” seems
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to be misguided for various reasons.513 It is, as Daly has observed, only normal that the “doctrine
may not map clearly onto the various justifications offered for it from time to time.”514 Identifying
some sort of meta-value that the doctrine ought to serve also risks foreclosing nuanced judicial
consideration of the issues presented in a particular case. 515 He argues further that such a theoretical
exercise may be representative of a worrying “rationalistic propensity among public lawyers to
prioritize the universal over the local, the uniform over the particular and, ultimately, principle
over practice.”516 As such, the solution offered from such an exercise may provide the attractive
impression of structure, clarity, certainty, and comprehensiveness within the doctrine, but the
courts would inevitably move away from such an abstract stricture when ‘seeking to develop a
knack and feel’ for how the newly rationalised version of the doctrine would actually work in
practice.517 In this respect, he advocates that “Lord Carnwath’s caution that it may be ‘unnecessary
to search for deep constitutional underpinning for a principle …which …simply reflects a basic
rule of law and human conduct’ ought to be heeded.”518 In concurrence, I reckon that it does not
seem altogether necessary for the court to embark on a pilgrimage to discover the soul or
underlying value of legitimate expectation. Such expeditions have become proliferated and
contributory to a rhythm of confusion.519 In any case, if judicial review is the mother of legitimate
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expectation, then the doctrine is firmly rooted in fairness. Reynolds’ assertion that the result of
explaining the doctrine only in terms of fairness and abuse of power means that the doctrine may
be applied wherever there is a fairness issue does not match the reality on ground because if that
were the case there would not be so few successful cases of legitimate expectation. The courts
themselves, as elaborated in the preceding section, have thought in the lines of a “high degree of
unfairness” or similar terms. If there is need for any effort on this point, it should be exerted to
attain (semantic) specificity on the appropriate degree of unfairness, to help ensure that the doctrine
does not become – as Reynolds rightly fears – an “unruly horse”520 for setting aright all things
deemed unfair. That is another matter altogether.521
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Chapter 6: Legitimate Expectation and Tax: Policy Perspectives
6.1

Tax Policy: Concept and Framework

Discussions of legitimate expectation have traditionally focused on judicial approaches. This is
unsurprising since legitimate expectation is a legal doctrine advanced by the court. It is this
approach that has defined my discussion in the previous chapters of this thesis. Those chapters
have examined the legal possibility and parameters of enforcing tax-based legitimate expectation
in Nigeria. However, it is important to recognize that every case of legitimate expectation is
premised on a conflict arising from a withdrawal by the tax authority of a benefit that the taxpayer
expected to enjoy. Cognizant of this background, this chapter focuses on how the tax authority
approaches or should approach issues of legitimate expectation. In other words, I discuss the
importance of the Nigerian tax authority honouring its commitments to taxpayers. The central
question in this chapter is: are there policy basis why the tax authority should respect legitimate
expectation? I consider this discussion necessary because, while the court has an important role to
play in ensuring that the revenue’s commitments to taxpayers are honoured, the revenue itself may
have a managerial responsibility to the tax system to try to honour those commitments.522 The
revenue adopting a more accommodating approach to legitimate expectation limits the chances of
judicial intervention in matters that may impact broader tax policy. Some commentators express
concern that the current situation where the FIRS has severally expressed a view on a tax issue and
subsequently reversed itself might see the tax authority find itself in a position where its views on
tax matters are considered irrelevant.523 I address these concerns in the context of the overall tax
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policy framework of Nigeria.524 I examine the concept of tax policy and some evaluative criteria
of tax policy such as fairness, neutrality, certainty and administrability. With reference to relevant
aspects of Nigeria’s tax policy framework, I discuss how an accommodating administrative
approach to legitimate expectation dovetails with Nigeria’s tax policy and how such approach may
better benefit Nigeria than a dismissive or repudiatory approach.
6.1.1 Policy and Tax Policy
A policy is a "set of ideas or a plan of what to do in particular situations that has been agreed
officially by a group of people, a business organization, a government or a political party.”525 It is
"[t]he general principles by which a government is guided in its management of public affairs."526
A policy speaks to what a public authority plans to do at a given time.527 Drawing from these, tax
policy may be viewed as the general principles which guide the management of the tax system in
a given state, towards the attainment of that state’s tax objectives.
Taxation constitutes a major source of revenue to both developed and developing countries. Tax
generated revenues are used to finance public utilities, perform social responsibilities, and grease
the administrative wheel of the government.528 Ultimately, different groups will have different
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ideas regarding the additional purposes of taxation. These will include redistribution and changing
behaviour. It is up to governments to decide on the appropriate balance between these competing
priorities, but, in all cases, the objectives should be achieved as efficiently as possible. From an
aggregate welfare perspective, the ideal tax system would be "neutral", i.e. would not distort
decisions in areas such as business investment and recruitment. But policy priorities inevitably
result in a non-neutral system.529 A “good tax policy” does not change during times of large budget
deficits or healthy surpluses. Good tax systems can fall woefully short of creating adequate revenue
during recessions, and poor tax systems can raise plenty of money (but they often are
unsustainable).530 Also, a country’s tax regime is a key policy instrument that may negatively or
positively influence investment.531
6.2

Evaluative Criteria of Tax Policy

There have been various theoretical discussions on what constitutes a good tax system or what
constitute the yardsticks for evaluating a good tax system, starting from Adam Smith.532 In modern
time, some of the often discussed models include the traditional tax policy criteria: equity,
neutrality and administrability,533 as well as other offshoots: simplicity, certainty, convenience of

529

UK
Parliament,
“The
principles
of
tax
policy,”
31
January
2011,
online:
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtreasy/memo/taxpolicy/m38.htm
530
“Taxing Decisions Matter: A Guide to Good Tax Policy”, Minnesota Center for Fiscal Excellence, online:
https://www.fiscalexcellence.org/our-studies/tax-policy-primer.pdf
531
OECD,
Policy
Framework
for
Investment
User’s
Toolkit
(2013),
online:
http://www.oecd.org/investment/toolkit/policyareas/41890309.pdf
532
See Adam Smith, The Canons of Taxation, 1776. The four canons of taxation identified by Adam Smith are the:
Canon of Equality; Canon of Certainty; Canon of Convenience; and Canon of Economy. Both the term “canon” and
some of the specific canons have been redesigned by other scholars as the years have gone by. See, for instance,
Clinton Alley & Duncan Bentley, “A Remodelling of Adam Smith’s Tax Design Principles” (2005) 20 Australian Tax
Forum 582 cited in Najeeb Memon, "Prioritizing Principles of a Good Tax System for Small Business in Informal
Economies" (2010) 25:1 Australian Tax Forum 57 at 67.
533
See, for instance, Kim Brooks, "Delimiting the Concept of Income: The Taxation of In-Kind Benefits" (2004) 49:2
McGill LJ 255 at 259; See Christians supra note 30. See also Anthony Stokes & Sarah Wright, “Does Australia Have
A Good Income Tax System?” (2013) 12:5 Intl Business & Economics Research J 533 pointing to a consensus among
scholars that, as a basic criterion, a good tax system should be fair, efficient and simple.

132

payment, information security, economic growth and efficiency, transparency and visibility,
minimum tax gap, accountability to taxpayers and appropriate government revenues.534 For some,
equity (or fairness), economic efficiency and administrative capacity are identified as the three key
principles that most tax scholars adjudge as the right normative criteria to guide society in
achieving the desired distribution of costs and benefits through taxation.535
Like other countries, Nigeria operates a tax system that is guided by a set of identifiable evaluative
policy criteria. These evaluative criteria can be found in a consolidated document, the National
Tax Policy (NTP or the Policy).536 The NTP sets the agenda for the formulation and administration
of tax laws in Nigeria. Underlying the objectives of the NTP are the Fundamental Objectives and
Directive Principles of State Policy contained in the Constitution of Nigeria.537 Accordingly, the
NTP directs that tax policies, laws and administration shall promote the attainment of, inter alia,
the ability of all taxable persons to declare their income honestly to appropriate and lawful agencies
and pay their tax promptly; ensuring that the rights of all taxable persons are recognized and
protected; and eradicating corrupt practices and abuse of authority in the tax system. 538 Also, the
NTP identifies as the Guiding Principles of Nigeria’s Tax System, the factors: equity and
fairness;539 simplicity, certainty and clarity;540 convenience;541 low compliance cost;542 low cost of
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administration;543 flexibility;544 and sustainability.545 Accordingly, all existing and future taxes are
expected to align with these “fundamental features”.546
The policy criteria contained in the NTP are consistent with both the traditional and modern
categorizations of tax policy criteria. I do not consider a discussion of all categories necessary for
the purpose of this thesis. Thus, I elect to discuss a few of the criteria identified above – focusing
mainly on the traditional criteria – and to, as much as possible, streamline the discussion to the
themes of this thesis. For a clear guidance on the trajectory of this section, the tax policy criteria
that I discuss are equity, neutrality, certainty (with simplicity) and administrability. Some of these
evaluative criteria are similar or intertwined.547 Thus, there may be like themes in some of the
discussions.

6.2.1 Equity (Fairness)
In the briefest of terms, equity suggests that people should be treated fairly.548 There are two main
strands of the tax equity theory. The first is the benefits theory, which holds that people ought to
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pay taxes in relation to the benefits they receive from society.549 The second is the ability to pay
theory, which, as its terminology implies, holds that people ought to pay taxes in relation to their
relative abilities to do so.550 The ability to pay theory may be divided into two: horizontal and
vertical equity. The principle of horizontal equity, the narrow focus of this section, demands that
similarly situated individuals face similar tax burdens, 551 while vertical equity demands that
taxpayers who are better-off should bear a larger proportion of the tax burden than those who are
worse off.552 There is a third strand of equity called is inter-nation equity. Inter-nation equity deals
with the question of whether a tax system promotes a fair sharing of the international tax base,
especially among developing countries.553 Inter-nation equity is not predicated on the allocation
of the tax revenue, but rather on the allocation of national gain, which is affected by the source
country’s decision to tax (or not) the gain.554
The challenge for the modem legal system is how to protect equality while preserving the ability
of administrators to use discretionary power in the pursuit of social goals.555 This protection is

549

Ibid.
Ibid at 12.
551
See Brian Galle, "Tax Fairness" (2008) 65:4 Wash & Lee L Rev 1323; David Elkin, “Horizontal Equity as a
Principle of Tax Theory” (2006) 24:1 Yale L & Policy Rev 43; Tim Edgar & Daniel Sandler, eds, Materials on
Canadian Income Tax (Toronto: Thomson Canada Ltd, 2005) at 66; RA Musgrave, “In Defense of an Income
Concept,” (1967) 81 Harv L Rev 44 at 45. See also National Tax Policy, para 1.7.6. There is a debate on whether
horizontal equity has any normative value. One school of thought led by Musgrave argues that horizontal equity has
a firmly grounded normative basis, while another school of thought, led by Kaplow, argues any application or
measurement of horizontal equity would be meaningless or even harmful for policymakers if horizontal equity were
indeed a bad normative principle: ‘Horizontal equity should not be measured and new measures of social welfare
should not be deployed until we know what we are trying to measure and why. See RA Musgrave, The Theory of
Public Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959); Louis Kaplow, "Horizontal Equity: New Measures, Unclear
Principles," (2000) NBER Working Papers 7649. For a deeper analysis of this debate, see Roberto Galbiati & Pietro
Vertova, “Horizontal Equity”, (2008) 75:298 Economica 384. For more celebratory evaluations of horizontal equity,
see Ira K Lindsay, "Tax Fairness by Convention: A Defense of Horizontal Equity" (2016) 19:2 Fla Tax Rev 79; and
Galle ibid.
552
Edgar & Sandler Ibid.
553
Edgar & Sandler Ibid.
554
See, generally, Kim Brooks, “Inter-Nation Equity: The Development of an Important but Underappreciated
International Tax Value”, in Richard Krever & John G Head, eds, Tax Reform in the 21st Century: A Volume in Memory
of Richard Musgrave (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009) 471.
555
Dotan supra note 104 at 28.
550

135

pertinent because taxpayers who perceive the tax system as inequitable are likely to report less
income to restore equity.556 Administrative discretion is a coin of two sides as far as the demands
of horizontal equity are concerned. On the one side, the use of discretionary power or, indeed,
sticking to a given assurance may, intendedly or not, result in some taxpayers gaining undue
advantage over others. Such outcomes may be unpalatable because the requirement of equal
treatment for equal cases is a fundamental principle in public law.557 According to Dotan, this
concern for equality was sufficient for some commentators to denounce the use of discretionary
powers by administrators as an arbitrary form of governmental action.558 A way to deal with this
concern is to administer discretion through informal flexible rules or policies.559 The existence of
a general policy is a powerful vehicle to ensure that administrators do not misuse their
discretionary powers to unjustly discriminate between similar cases. The authority should however
be bound to its policies in any case which falls within their scope, and unless it showed reasonable
and sufficient grounds to depart.560 This will help preserve fairness among taxpayers.
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6.2.2 Neutrality (Economic Efficiency)
Tax neutrality essentially means that the tax system should not distort choices and behaviour, i.e.
that taxpayers in similar situations and carrying out similar transactions should be subject to similar
levels of taxation.561 “According to the neutrality criterion, it should be assumed that people make
choices that are in their own best interest and therefore, to the extent possible, their choices should
remain after tax what they would be in a world without taxes.”562 The baseline to decide whether
a taxation system is neutral is to compare it with the situation as if there is no-tax levied.563 A nonneutral system creates incentives to reduce tax payments by changing behaviour – the behavioural
response. This may be either a deliberate policy choice, such as in the case of taxing polluting
industries more heavily, or incidental to the revenue collection objective.564 Economists agree that
tax policy should raise revenues without major distortions to the decisions of firms.565 They also
typically conclude that other funding means (for example printing money or borrowing) would be
more distortive than taxation and therefore the efficiency goal that taxation is meant to meet is one
of minimum disruption rather than absolute non-distortion. Accordingly, pursuing economic
efficiency with taxation usually means trying to predict or measure the relative economic impact
of various types of taxes, and favouring those which are believed to produce the least distortion,
as economists define it.566 It is arguable that the behavioural patterns of taxpayers stand to be
altered by the uncertainty that derives from a policy of non-adherence to discretion. Such
unpredictability can push or discourage taxpayers – especially businesses – to make or refrain from
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making important decisions, which may have economic implications. These concerns will be
buttressed further under the heading of “certainty.”
6.2.3 Simplicity, Certainty and Clarity
The NTP outlines the triplet of simplicity, certainty and clarity as part of the guiding principles of
the Nigerian Tax System.567 The Policy mandates that tax laws and administrative processes
should be simple, clear and easy to understand.568 Legislative clarity is important as it enables
companies to comply more easily, as tax liabilities are better understood, which should reduce
costly and time-consuming disagreements with the tax authorities. Tax compliance should not
require an excessive amount of company resource, which would divert energy from more
productive and profitable business activities.569 Simplifying the tax system will thus lead to a
reduction in taxpayers’ costs of complying with their tax obligations.570
The lack of clarity in tax legislation leaves holes that sometimes only administrative guidance for
taxpayers can fill. This is at the heart of the tax guidance functions performed by the FIRS. In other
words, providing tax guidance is a part of the revenue’s policy responsibility, especially as the
NTP mandates the FIRS to undertake tax awareness and taxpayers’ education.571
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Uncertain tax consequences deter some taxpayers from carrying out contemplated transactions,
while others who do carry out the transactions risk potential loss.572 Binding tax guidance will,
thus, ensure certainty and consistency, and encourage investors to invest in such a country since
investors are concerned with the certainty of the tax consequences of their proposed transactions
and trades.573 Where the tax authority can withdraw or modify rulings or dishonor them to the
detriment of the taxpayer, the air of certainty disappears (with its rewards) barring judicial
intervention.574
Tax certainty has been defined as the creation and maintenance of stable and regulatory policy
frameworks for tax administration, taxpayers and tax compliance.575 Certainty is one of the
hallmarks of a good tax system as it helps to stabilize the expectations of both taxpayers and
governments.576 Indeed, the property and business interests involved in taxation lead some to
suggest that certainty in tax law is of the utmost importance – perhaps even more so than in other
areas of law.577 Research shows the many causes of tax uncertainty to include unpredictable or
inconsistent treatment by a tax authority, retroactive changes to legislation, frequent changes in
the statutory tax system, complexity in the tax code, poor understanding of the tax code by the tax
authority, unpredictable or inconsistent treatment by the courts, inability to achieve clarity
proactively through rulings, poor general relationship with tax authority and corruption.578
Uncertainty is also traceable to biased and inconsistent adjudication of tax cases by the court in
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favour of the revenue579 and in some cases by deliberate legislative intendment.580 Uncertainty
arising from unpredictable or inconsistent treatment by tax authority notoriously ranks as the
second most important factor in determining uncertainty when encountered.581
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non-avoider paid $1,261 million of cash taxes over a typical five-year period.
However, the mean tax avoider also faced more tax uncertainty, increasing its UTB account by $139 million,
compared to an increase of only $68 million for the mean non-avoider over the five-year period…
Second, firms with frequent patent filings face significantly higher tax uncertainty than do other firms, and the
relation between tax avoidance and tax uncertainty is stronger among firms with frequent patent filings. These
results are consistent with intangibles exposing firms to increased tax uncertainty, particularly among firms we
classify as tax avoiders. Third, we find that tax haven usage and intangible intensity appear to have a joint
effect on the relation between tax avoidance and tax uncertainty. This suggests that while intangible-related
tax avoidance involving transfer pricing provides tax savings, it also forces firms to bear tax uncertainty.
Fourth, we find limited evidence that tax avoidance using tax shelters leads to more tax uncertainty than does
tax avoidance outside of tax shelters. The tax shelter results should be interpreted cautiously, however, because
of the difficulty of distinguishing between likely tax shelter users and likely non-users in samples of large
firms.
Finally, we conduct a path analysis that confirms the presence of both direct and indirect effects of tax
avoidance, patents, and havens on tax uncertainty. The results of this study also have implications for two
puzzling empirical regularities. First, there is mounting evidence that multinational firms incur effective tax
rates at least as large as domestic firms (Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock 2017). This is a somewhat
puzzling empirical regularity given that multinational firms have access to (arguably vast) opportunities for tax
avoidance (i.e., shifting income to low-tax countries) that are simply not available to purely domestic firms.
Our findings, however, show that income shifting involving tax havens and intangibles comes at a price, in the
form of increased tax uncertainty.
See Scott D Dyreng, Michelle Hanlon & Edward L Maydew, “When Does Tax Avoidance Result in Tax Uncertainty?”
(2019) 94:2 The Accounting Rev 179 at 180. This is an insightful contribution to the literature. It is difficult, however,
to state emphatically how this perspective fares alongside the seemingly predominant pro-certainty views. A tie
breaker may be that the focus of this perspective rests only on the objective of tax avoidance, which may be deemed
narrow when compared to the pro-certainty school that focuses on broader micro and macroeconomic considerations.
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Empirical evidence of the effects of tax uncertainty at the firm level is still limited due to the
difficulties in measuring tax uncertainty.582 However, the existing studies consistently support the
view that tax uncertainty has a negative impact on investment. 583 Devereux’s empirical research
reveals that uncertainty about the effective tax rate on profit ranks as one of the top four
considerations for investment and location decisions.584 A poorly designed tax system, where the
rules and their application are non-transparent, overly complex or unpredictable, may discourage
investment adding to project costs and uncertainty.585 Companies make long term investment
decisions over substantial time periods and need to do so in a tax system that is stable, in order to
receive the expected return on investment (which may then encourage further investment).586 Prior
to taking an investment decision, investors must forecast the prospective tax burden associated
with the investment as it can be a significant cost factor.587 Thus, to integrate taxes accurately into
the decision calculus, the taxpayer has to estimate the prospective tax burdens of available
investment options in advance.588 Stability in the tax system gives companies certainty about their

Also, it is worth iterating that the preponderance of work in this area seems to lean towards certainty in the tax system
rather than the opposite. While a trend may not speak conclusively to what is best, it does suggest that certainty is a
greater goal to pursue than uncertainty, especially since the aim of the tax system is not only to collect tax. In terms
of peculiar needs, can a capital importing country (like Nigeria) afford to prioritize uncertainty over certainty?
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ongoing tax liabilities and when they fall due. A more predictable tax policy and administration
will increase investment attractiveness.589
Tax uncertainty is a nuisance in Nigeria. This is because Nigerian tax laws are fraught with
intricate provisions, complexities and ambiguities that impede tax compliance to a great extent,590
as well as poor policies of successive governments and inconsistent legal framework.591 It is
therefore the common experience of taxpayers often willing to discharge their responsibilities that
they are stuck with uncertainties on what the law actually requires of them.592 It is partly for these
reasons that sound and consistent use of discretion is important to businesses/taxpayers. A policy
of abrupt resilement from tax policies and guidance, sometimes with retroactive effect, does
nothing to aid Nigeria’s quest for an improved tax system and investment attraction, especially in
the light of other socio-political and infrastructural challenges facing the country.593
The uncertainty arising from the inconsistent use of discretion in tax administration is a
disincentive to investors. Nigeria has for years used tax incentives to attract investors while
generally ignoring the impact of tax disincentives on how investors think. 594 Ironically, the more
heralded tax incentives are only likely to hurt Nigeria by either negatively influencing taxpayer
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behaviour or transferring much-needed tax revenue from Nigeria to high income resident
countries.595 Rather than focus on granting tax incentives to taxpayers, tax policy should focus on
eradicating disincentives such as inconsistent use of discretion.596 Through this rebalancing, fears
of lost foreign investment due to the non-conferment of tax incentives may be offset by the
strategic elimination of tax disincentives.
6.2.4 Administrability
Administrability suggests that societies should be able to enforce the tax systems they create.597
The principle also suggests that societies should impose tax obligations that taxpayers can comply
with.598 This policy objective sometimes proves evasive because there is so often a disconnect
between what lawmakers say they want the law to do and what it actually does.599 Moreover,
regardless of how well tax laws are drafted, the role of institutional players bears significantly on
how they are implemented in reality. In the view of some, “tax administration is tax policy”.600
Ultimately, tax administrators would want to ensure that the primary objective of taxation –
revenue generation – is met as smoothly as possible. Theoretically, there are at least two ways that
adherence to promises and representations can facilitate administrability. First, adherence can
engender trust and public confidence in the tax system, which in turns facilitates self-assessment.
Second, adherence can minimize the risks of dispute between the revenue and taxpayers, which in
turn saves valuable time and resources that the revenue can use to pursue tax defaulters.
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6.2.4.1 Public Confidence and Voluntary Compliance
Public confidence in the administration and enforcement of taxes is a cornerstone of self-assessing
tax systems. 601 Although the primary responsibility of a tax administration is to collect the proper
amount of tax due to the government, it is essential that a tax administration carries out its
responsibilities in a manner that warrants the highest degree of public confidence in the
organization’s efficiency, integrity and fairness. 602 The revenue must understand its role as that of
a service provider and must be ready to treat the taxpayer as a customer. 603 Another way to
approach the tax policy matter is to look at the role of tax administrators in a tax system.
Commenting on the defunct 2012 National Tax Policy, Nigeria’s Tax Appeal Tribunal in Shell
Nig. Ltd & 3 Ors. v FIRS articulated the role of tax authorities in this regard as follows:
In articulating the roles of tax authorities, paragraph 2.9 of the NTP states that the authorities
should create a conducive tax atmosphere and environment which will engender taxpayer
confidence at all levels of tax administration. 604
The most cost-effective means of collecting taxes is through voluntary compliance of the public
with the tax laws. The more enforcement activities are necessary, the more expensive the
administration of the tax system.605 Voluntary compliance goes hand in hand with a system of selfassessment. 606 Good taxpayer services and well-designed and well-targeted publicity campaigns
are crucial elements in encouraging taxpayers to comply with the tax legislation. 607 Given clear
information, proper education, simple procedures and sufficient encouragement, there is a greater
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possibility that taxpayers will calculate and pay their tax liabilities on their own. In this way tax
administration can concentrate its resources on identifying and dealing effectively with those
taxpayers who fail to comply properly with their tax obligations. Extensive reliance on a selfassessment system combined with targeted enforcement would allow the tax administration to
effectively administer the tax system. Among the key elements which must be in place for a selfassessment system to operate are: (1) good taxpayer services programs to facilitate understanding
of their obligations and entitlements; (2) simple procedures; (3) a strong but fair penalty system;
and (4) effective verification and enforcement programs. The two broad principles, voluntary
compliance and self-assessment, are the foundation of modern tax administration.608 Among the
core functions performed by tax administration is the provision of information, forms,
publications, and tax education to taxpayers to help them comply with their tax obligations, to
demonstrate that they are considered valued customers of the tax administration, and to reduce the
need for extensive enforcement, given limited resources. 609 This can be done through various
means of taxpayer assistance. It is, however, essential for the tax administration to establish
procedures and processes for providing guidance to taxpayers. 610 Having obtained guidance,
taxpayers need to be able to apply it to their affairs without worrying that the FIRS might come
after them in future and seek to apply a different interpretation to the periods they had relied on
the guidance or advance ruling. An FIRS that cannot be trusted will lose its credibility. That will
be a sad day for the country.611
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Critical to the concept of voluntary compliance is the belief on the part of the tax-paying public
that the Tax Administration respects the rights of taxpayers and operates on the principles of
integrity and honesty.612 Too much emphasis on raising revenue and not enough on customer
service and taxpayers’ rights can lead to a lack of confidence on the part of the public in a tax
administration’s ability to manage its responsibilities properly. Lack of confidence in the tax
administration can also lead to reduced levels of voluntary compliance with it.613 When a taxpayer
acts on a representation made by the tax authority, there is an inferable presumption on the part of
the taxpayer that the tax authority has both the competence and the knowhow to make that
representation. Thus, where the tax authority turns around to reverse the representation on the basis
that it does not disclose the correct position, the confidence is broken. This may breed an
atmosphere of distrust in the tax system, which may affect compliance especially in a selfassessment system.614 Thus, as a matter of policy, refusal to honour promises should be the
exception, not the general to disposition, and the need for judicial review should only arise as a
last resort.
6.2.4.2 Conflict Management
There is a consensus that revenue guidance delivered through the ruling system can reduce
potential disputes between the taxpayer and tax authorities and the necessity of recourse to the
courts.615 A well-managed guidance system should help promote administrative efficiency by
reducing conflict between taxpayers and tax authorities. Since taxpayers know what the law is –
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or, at least, what the tax authority deems the law to be – in respect of the taxpayers’ activities, there
is, presumably, a lower chance of conflict.616 This then limits the need for the tax authority to
dissipate resources battling taxpayers on the applicability of tax statutes. Not observing those
positions, invariably, takes both taxpayer and the tax authority back to the root of conflict, which
just affects the capacity of the tax authority to deal with the actual collection of taxes.617
Finally, an official, well-tailored policy of adhering to discretionary positions serves the interests
of Nigeria and complies with the NTP. Of course, this is not to imply that the NTP should take
preeminence over tax statutes. It is, nevertheless, important for a state to apply its tax laws in line
with defined policy, since policy gives life to the law. As charged by some, the NTP should not
become a redundant policy document or reference tool only for academics. The NTP should be the
“bible” that guides the thinking, formulation and execution of strategies relevant to taking tax
administration at all levels (assessment, collection etc.) and the tax system at large to optimum
heights.618
It is evident from these discussions that judicial enforcement and administrative observance of
legitimate expectations have important roles to play in the tax system. While judicial enforcement
should be a last resort for the taxpayer, administrative compliance enables the revenue to smoothly
administer the tax system. The latter reduces incidents of conflict and strengthens the confidence
of the taxpaying public in the tax system. Observance of legitimate expectations aligns not only
616
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with traditional principles of tax policy but, in the case of Nigeria, with the specified tax policy
objectives of the state.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
In the preceding six chapters of this thesis, I have discussed the subject of legitimate expectation
in tax administration and the legal and policy approaches to addressing this complex subject. This
final chapter has one principal objective; to discuss some possible policy directions that Nigeria
may adopt to try to address the subsisting issues around tax-based legitimate expectation. Before
the principal discussion, however, I summarize the thesis thus far, in order to provide a synoptic
reference to the issues already discussed.
7.1

Summary

Tax complexity is at the heart of the issues discussed in this thesis. Considering the usual
complexity of tax statutes and the administration of the tax system, generally, administrative
guidance, provided by the revenue, is a useful tool for enhancing the objectives of clarity,
simplicity and certainty, as well as the attainment of incidental micro and macroeconomic results.
Administrative guidance and other forms of discretion exercised by tax authorities generally elicit
expectations and trust from taxpayers that the tax authority would apply the law in the manner
represented. If the tax authority subsequently decides to apply the law differently, to the apparent
detriment of the taxpayer, it behoves on the court to determine whether the revenue should be
made to stand by the promises or representations made in the circumstances; in other words,
whether to uphold the legitimate expectation of the taxpayer. The question of whether the court
should intervene – as well as the basis for doing so – is a complex one that has elicited attention
from legal scholars, courts and practitioners for years across various jurisdictions, including
Nigeria. On the one hand, there are concerns that a pro-legitimate expectation disposition may,
inter alia, fetter administrative discretion, over-leverage judicial power over other branches of
government, circumvent legislative intent and truncate the public interest of tax collection. On the
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other hand, upholding expectations may promote fairness and certainty in the tax system. If
extreme conclusions are to be drawn from the few existing tax decisions, the approach of the
Nigerian courts, so far, is dismissive of legitimate expectation. That is to say, such expectations
cannot be upheld at all, as the courts prefer to dwell on the supremacy of statute perspective. This
thesis observes that, given deeper reflection, the Nigerian courts have not done much in terms of
developing the general jurisprudence. Rather, it has been a case of picking flaws in the case
presented by the taxpayer and deciding, based on those flaws, that a legitimate expectation has not
been established. I argue that there are sound legal bases both under Nigerian and foreign –
predominantly UK – jurisprudence for the Nigerian court to take a more receptive approach to taxbased legitimate expectation; that the court must in every case look beyond the shortcut of
adjudging a case on the basis of statutory limitation; that statutory limitation is not always absolute,
even in tax matters. I rely firmly on Nigerian judicial precedent where the courts have held public
authorities, including tax authorities to representations or commitments made to private actors.
Acknowledging the need for a ‘principled’ and ‘coherent’ (rather than whimsical) application of
legitimate expectation, I argue that the Nigerian courts should consider the approach adopted by
the UK courts in streamlining the application of the doctrine, especially in revenue cases. I make
this argument bearing on a painstaking analysis of the UK approach in this thesis and bearing in
mind the jurisprudential ‘consanguinity’ between Nigeria and the UK.
I contend that the revenue has an equally significant role to play in upholding taxpayers’ legitimate
expectations. The revenue has a management responsibility to the tax system to respect the
legitimate expectations that it creates in the minds of taxpayers; there are important policy
considerations for the tax system. If the revenue is more forthcoming on its obligations, there will

150

almost certainly be lesser chances of disagreement or conflict, which will ease the administrative
burden.
7.2

Further Recommendations

7.2.1 Clear Modalities for the Withdrawal or Modification of Discretionary Benefits
It is pertinent that the FIRS as much as possible avoids repudiations of promises or policies that
may have retroactive effect. If repudiations are to take place at all, I consider it best that they do
so through a process that is transparent, predictable and fair. Policy changes should as much as
possible give policy consumers opportunities to adjust. I also advocate for specific provisions,
preferably by statute,619 to specify the circumstances where the FIRS can withdraw or modify
guidance or assurance given to a taxpayer. South African law, for instance, specifically provides
that the Commissioner may withdraw or modify a binding private ruling that has been issued to
the applicant. Before doing so, however, the Commissioner must first notify the applicant of the
proposed withdrawal or modification and provide the applicant with a reasonable opportunity to
state any proposition of law or fact relevant to the decision to withdraw or modify the ruling.620
Whether the provisions under South African Law are broad enough to offer sufficient protection
is another matter.621 They do, however, indicate, prima facie, that tax rulings are binding and can
only be withdrawn under certain procedural safeguards.
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7.2.2 A Policy-based Application of Discretion
The benefits of discretion find a counterweight in strong demands from taxpayers for certainty,
legitimacy, consistency and equality.622 Thus, if tax authorities do not exercise discretion in a
coordinated and consistent manner the benefits of discretion may be lost especially as excessive
administrative discretion can result in unintended consequences such as abuse of power and
official corruption.623 Tax systems that leave excessive administrative discretion in the hands of
tax officials tend to invite corruption and undermine good governance objectives fundamental to
securing an attractive investment environment.624 These are potential side effects of a poorly
regulated system of discretion, which must be considered with full sensitivity especially where
revenue matters are concerned. It would be inappropriate for revenue discretion to be used to
corruptly to circumvent the statutory mandate of the tax authority. As a way of addressing these
concerns, I advocate a system of discretion that based on clearly laid out policy and is less
susceptible to individual manipulation. In other words, a rules or policy-based system of
discretion.625 Policies being the rules which are developed by authorities in areas where
discretionary powers are exercised,626 the creation and application of general policies add
important benefits to the decision-making process in a discretionary framework (in comparison to
an ad-hoc decision-making process). These benefits serve as a reason to encourage authorities to
develop general policies, and at the same time are the rationales for the requirement that authorities
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will follow their policies while disposing of particular cases.627 Soft laws (and legitimate
expectation) provide a framework for ensuring greater consistency and coherence in the exercise
of discretion – and where it can be justified, also ensure transparency if and when administrative
decision makers depart from guidelines and other policy instruments. 628 In that sense, a soft law
or policy-based system of discretion serves the end of ‘quality control’ in the use of discretion.
Instead of individual tax officers only dealing with cases on an ad-hoc basis, there should be greater
emphasis on synthesized revenue-wide policies that deal with like cases. Advance rulings should
be issued by authorized and task-specific departments, while guidance resources such as circulars
should be developed by specialists, where possible in consultation with relevant stakeholders. 629
This can lessen the risks of induced compromises, enhance quality control and limit the chances
of inequality between taxpayers with similar cases. The publication of advance tax rulings, in
particular, is a fundamental aspect of a sound administrative practice, and consistent with basic,
democratic, legal principles.630 Thus, publishing redacted versions of private rulings is encouraged.
This should, of course, be undertaken through a system that balances between equality and
transparency on the one hand, and confidentiality of taxpayer information, on the other.631
7.2.3 Systematic and Strategic Reform of Tax Law
Until more recently, tax law reform was a considerably slow process in Nigeria. Consequently,
obsolete, moribund and vague statutory provisions remained operable for long periods of time,
leaving problems of uncertainty and complexity for both the revenue and taxpayers to deal with.
For instance, certain provisions that impose penalties in these tax laws, aimed at discouraging non-

627

Ibid.
Ansari & Sossin supra note 10 at 316.
629
Stakeholders may include other government agencies and private tax consultants, scholars and experts.
630
Romano supra note 15 at 478.
631
Ibid.
628

153

compliance, do not reflect current economic realities. 632 It follows logically that a proactive way
to avert some of these issues and, thus, limit the need for revenue discretion – with its attendant
problems – is to regularly update the country’s tax statutes. Thankfully, the Nigerian government
seems to be awaking to this responsibility – most likely out of a pressing need to address the
country’s troubling tax-to-GDP problem.633 The country recently enacted the Finance Act 2019.634
This legislation has introduced sweeping changes to the Nigerian tax system, including the
amendment and deletion of some obsolete or clogging provisions in various tax statutes.635 I
subscribe to the more proactive approach, the only caveat being that reform should take into
account potential disruptions to the existing tax order.636 I would add, however, that regardless of
the amount of reform, it simply is not possible to eliminate substantive tax law uncertainty for
every conceivable business transaction. No matter how long and detailed the tax laws become,
there will always be gaps; there will always be transactions or activities whose proper tax treatment
is uncertain,637 thus necessitating administrative discretion.
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7.3

Conclusion

It is often said that the only things certain in life are death and taxes. To an extent that seems to be
true, although one might be “humble” to acknowledge that factors like legal complexity,
globalization, digitalization of business, etc. make tax far less certain than Daniel Defoe may have
contemplated centuries ago. If truly taxes were as certain as death, everyone would know theirs;
everyone would, maybe, pay theirs. In Nigeria, like in most countries, taxation is a matter of
legislation. Legislation prescribes the tax obligation on income and transactions and stipulates the
mode of their collection. Ideally, tax laws should be clear and easy to apply for both the tax
authority and the taxpayer. Regrettably, this is barely the case. This is the muddled field where
both administrative discretion and legitimate expectation play. The end game of honouring or
enforcing tax-based legitimate expectations should be the entrenchment of a tax system that is built
on both fairness and trust, across board. Applying these principles is a tough reality, as I have tried
to demonstrate. These are realities that taxpayers, judges and tax administrators must grapple with.
To say that legitimate expectation does not apply to Nigerian taxation is to lie, but finding a fitting
case is where the challenge truly lies.
From a non-adjudicatory standpoint, I subscribe to the view that Nigeria needs to do more to shore
up tax leakages and increase tax collection. This must be done through a more robust and
aggressive tax system. Recent tax reforms suggest that the Nigerian government is serious about
these responsibilities. Nigeria must aim to derive the maximum benefit possible from the tax base
through sound legislation and administration, but not through broken promises.
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